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 THE GIVENNESS OF DESIRE 
 Concrete Subjectivity and the 
Natural Desire to See God 

 Introduction 
 Human desire in the concrete world is intensely dialectical. Its complex-
ity is captured with unparalleled insight in Augustine’s  Confessions: his 
account of the “restless heart” has animated the theological imagina-
tion and nourished a wellspring of reflection on the human longing for 
rest in God. 1 Although he profoundly recognized the ultimate desire 
of the human heart, Augustine was not blind to the persistent tempta-
tion to idolatry, to our all-too-often distorted love of deviated transcen-
dence: “There is no rest where you seek for it … You seek the happy 
life in the region of death; it is not there. How can there be a happy life 
where there is not even life?” 2 Thus is the human desire for God in all 
its concreteness. 
 Renewed attention to Henri de Lubac’s treatment of the natural desire 
to see God and his widely accepted dismantling of “pure nature” from 
its neo-scholastic edifice has awakened the theological community from 
its historical-contextualist slumber. On the one hand, many thinkers 
have attempted to rescue, secure, and develop de Lubac’s  ressourcement 
revolution in twentieth-century Catholic thought. Against the rational-
istic foundations of modern neo-scholasticism, such critics have hailed 
de Lubac’s Catholic organic integration of natural desire and super-
natural destiny as an antidote to extrinsicist and dualist understand-
ings of nature and grace, enabling the religious to penetrate the whole 
of human reality. 3 On the other hand, some have attempted to call this 
entire thesis into question, and others have attempted to provide cer-
tain correctives. 4 This line of thought has exhibited a renewed interest 
in securing more intentionally the “intelligibility of nature” in its own 
right – whether articulated as “pure nature” or “integral nature.” Only 
a retrieval of the authentic wisdom of Aquinas, along with his faithful, 
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but unfairly maligned, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century commenta-
tors, will enable us to discern a pastoral and spiritual solution to the 
contemporary loss of the authentically sacred. The solution to this crisis 
“cannot lie in weakening the distinction between nature and grace,” 
one scholar argues, “or diminishing the coherence of the natural order, 
but only in rightly understanding how the Christian promise opens the 
horizon to what we already naturally desire in a dim and inefficacious 
way.” 5 My own engagement with de Lubac echoes the suggestion of 
Toulouse Dominican Gilbert Narcisse: on the one hand, de Lubac’s con-
siderable theological contribution “must be read, reread, and meditated 
upon”; on the other hand, his arguments were rooted in theories that 
are “much more debatable – and not debated enough.” 6 
 The central question of this book can be stated as follows: How might 
we understand, in a systematic-theological manner, the human desire 
for God when it is explored with particular attention, not only to human 
nature, but also to concrete subjectivity? 
 In answering this question, the book is guided heuristically by the 
often neglected yet highly relevant framework set forth by the Jesuit 
philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904–84), as well as by 
contemporary developments of his work. 7 This book identifies Loner-
gan’s shift of emphasis from human nature to historically conscious 
subjectivity and traces its influence on his developing position on the 
“natural desire for God,” attentive to both his earlier presentation of 
this natural desire within a scholastic context and his later, more phe-
nomenologically informed emphasis on the emergence of the question 
of God within the conscious horizon of the concrete subject. Lonergan’s 
contribution is often ignored in the scholarship. 8 My aim is to illuminate 
the vitality of his work, but also to complement his contribution with 
insights from other thinkers. Having Lonergan as an integrating thread 
enables the analysis to selectively turn to other thinkers for this comple-
mentary and corrective work, especially Hans Urs von Balthasar, Jean-
Luc Marion, and René Girard. 
 The theme of concrete subjectivity is especially pertinent to the debates 
over the natural desire to see God. As will become clear in the first two 
chapters, Henri de Lubac privileged concrete, historic nature over an 
abstract, hypothetical claim about what we would be in a purely natural 
universe – the maligned theory of “pure nature.” Humanity as it is, de 
Lubac insists, cannot be equated with a hypothetical nature  not called 
to the vision of God. Even so, neo-Thomists have criticized de Lubac’s 
position for its lack of metaphysical precision. In Aristotelian-Thomist 
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terms, a  nature is the same in all who participate in that nature. It is 
the  individual, the  person, that is historical and concrete, not the nature 
itself. 
 Lonergan’s work has special bearing on this question, due to its 
explanatory attempt to do justice to both human nature and concrete 
subjectivity. 9 Despite the tendency to explain human reality solely in 
terms of human convention, the discovery of human nature affirmed 
the existence of a certain permanence and universality inherent in the 
person that endures beneath the multiplicity of human lifestyles and 
customs. Aristotle defined such a nature as an “immanent principle of 
movement and rest.” 10 Human nature, in light of this Aristotelian devel-
opment, is marked, for Lonergan, by the intellectual movement and rest 
of the asking and answering of questions – the very spirit of inquiry 
that transcends human cultural differences. To consider the subject as 
a knower is to be cognizant of the rich unity of the unfolding of cog-
nitional process. The spontaneously operating spirit of inquiry – the 
desire to know, the eros of the mind – carries the subject from experi-
ence of the data of sense and of consciousness to understanding, and 
from understanding to judgment. In short, this constitutive intellectual 
dimension of human nature reveals that human beings have a natural 
desire for God – a claim that we consider at more length in the first half 
of the book. 
 But this claim about the permanence of human nature admits of 
two interpretations. It may be framed in terms of universal proposi-
tions, self-evident truths, and naturally known certitudes; or it may be 
considered as a part of human nature itself, but nature “not abstractly 
conceived, but as concretely operating.” 11 Lonergan opts for the latter. 
His account of the concrete subject ensures the permanence of human 
nature, but at the same time it accentuates the way intellectual move-
ment and rest operate concretely in human historical life. 
 This move to concreteness requires a shift from understanding 
the human being as an individual substance of a rational nature to 
understanding him or her as a concretely operating subject. When 
conceived as substance, human nature is understood as always the 
same “whether [the individual] is awake or asleep, young or old, 
sane or crazy, sober or drunk, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sin-
ner.” 12 From the perspective of metaphysical substance, these differ-
ences are accidental. For Lonergan, however, the subject is not an 
abstraction but a “concrete reality” – a “being in the luminousness 
of being.” 13 
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 Concrete subjectivity attends to the complexity of human living: bio-
logical, psychic, and intersubjective; intellectual, moral, and loving; 
interpersonal, historical, and hermeneutical. 14 This fuller view consid-
ers the “intimately related moments in the organic unfolding of a con-
sistent and ever more comprehensive understanding of the elusive and 
polymorphic reality to which each of us is ever present” in the con-
scious reality of our lives. 15 As concrete human subjects, we are called 
to self-transcendence, to an ongoing intellectual, moral, and religious 
conversion. Concrete human existence is a “dramatic enterprise that 
embraces all aspects of human living – personal, communal, ethical, 
religious – and it unfolds in time.” 16 The subject as subject is an embod-
ied, engaged entity, embedded in time and subject to death. 17 As Loner-
gan put it, “we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and 
fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt.” 18 How might we reimagine 
and articulate the human desire for God, this book asks, in light of the 
polymorphic reality of human consciousness? 
 Lonergan’s emphasis on concreteness is due, in part, to his critical inte-
gration of phenomenological insights. Phenomenology prioritizes the truth 
of disclosure – the intelligible object or state of affairs as it is presented to 
us and unfolds before us. 19 It acknowledges the quest for truth, but also the 
limitations of this search in the concrete life world – “the inescapable ‘other 
sides’ that keep things from ever being fully disclosed, the errors and vague-
ness that accompany evidence, and the sedimentation that makes it neces-
sary for us always to remember again the things we already know.” 20 In 
addition, phenomenology gives more explicit attention to human embodi-
ment, intersubjectivity, and the gift-character of human interpersonal life. 
 Lonergan’s turn to more sustained emphasis on intersubjectivity and 
interpersonal relations is especially important to the argument of this 
book. 21 While some work has been done to reframe the natural desire 
for God debates in light of phenomenology, the relevance of Lonergan’s 
contribution in this regard has been undertreated. 22 As Lonergan notes, 
intersubjective disclosure is “not an object to be apprehended,” but a 
presence that “works immediately upon my subjectivity, to make me 
share the other’s seriousness or vivacity, ease or embarrassment, joy or 
sorrow; and similarly my response affects his intersubjectivity.” 23 Thus, 
phenomenology, for Lonergan, explores “the whole drama of our inter-
personal relations” and makes thematic “the preconceptual activities of 
our intellects, the vertical liberty by which we may emerge out of prev-
oluntary and prepersonal process to become freely and responsibly, 
resolutely yet precariously, the persons we choose to be.” 24 
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 If the primary aim of this book is to show the relevance of Loner-
gan’s concrete subjectivity for the natural desire for God debate as it is 
cast within the neo-scholastic/Lubacian frame, the secondary aim is to 
investigate, in light of the emphasis on the interpersonal above, how 
attention to concrete subjectivity prompts us to take seriously the other-
mediated, mimetic character of human desire and its impact on conver-
sations about the human desire for God. Little attention has been given 
to René Girard’s intriguing assertion that “mimetic desire is also the 
desire for God.” 25 Accordingly, this book – especially part 3 – engages, 
as an underlying thread, the ongoing Lonergan-Girard conversation. 26 
It responds to Kevin Lenehan’s suggestion that Girard’s emphasis on 
“social relations” instead of “individual subjectivity” offers much raw 
material for theological transposition. Girard’s anthropological empha-
sis on intersubjectivity, relationality, and the phenomenon of “knowing 
and willing according to a model” as a ground for “human openness 
to divine revelation” might complement, Lenehan suggests, “the more 
cognitive approaches of scholasticism and transcendentalism.” 27 
 Robert Doran has offered a framework – to be revisited in chapter 6 – 
for integrating natural desire and mimetic desire. 28 According to Doran, 
Girard’s mimetic desire penetrates – for better or worse – our spiritual 
orientation to meaning, truth, and goodness. In other words, distorted 
mimetic desire can infect the unfolding of the eros of the human spirit, 
while positive mimesis may strengthen, enhance, and deepen our 
commitment to the exigencies of the mind. 29 Positive models have the 
power to elicit the desire to be faithful to the natural desire for meaning, 
truth, and goodness. The intersubjective and interpersonal presence of 
the other may evoke our innate drive for self-transcendence, for being 
more authentically oneself. 30 This theme will be treated in the last part 
of this book, which considers the relationship between the saints and 
the human desire for God, on the one hand, and the love of deviated 
transcendence, on the other hand. 
 Outline of the Book 
 This book constructs a multifaceted language for the human desire for 
God in the context of concrete subjectivity. Part 1 considers the animat-
ing force behind the work of Henri de Lubac and the critical scrutiny of 
his work that has re-emerged in contemporary theology. Chapter 1 cap-
tures de Lubac’s critique of the scholastic theory of “pure nature” and 
his account of the “natural desire for the supernatural” with attention 
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to his social, political, and ecclesiastical milieu. It considers his lament 
over the loss of the sacred in the modern world and situates his work 
within the theological and ecclesial tensions that emerged between  res-
sourcement thinkers and neo-Thomists. This is particularly evident in 
the Daniélou/Garrigou-Lagrange exchange in 1947, an exchange that 
illuminates some of the key themes in this book: an openness to the 
categories of subjectivity, historicity, and culture (Daniélou), on the one 
hand, and the wisdom of a metaphysical account of the natural-super-
natural relationship (Garrigou-Lagrange), on the other hand. Chapter 
2 captures the contemporary neo-Thomist/Lubacian debate. It first 
examines Lawrence Feingold’s critique of de Lubac and brings to light 
several key tensions in light of the work of many contemporary scholars 
on this topic: the relationship between natural and supernatural ends; 
pure nature and concrete nature; obediential potency and the “aesthetic 
compromise”; and the intelligibility of nature and the human good. 
 In light of this neo-Thomist/Lubacian debate, Part 2 turns to some 
distinctive contributions of Lonergan and subsequent developers of 
his thought. In light of a contemporary tendency to diminish rational-
ity, chapter 3 focuses on the erotic roots of the intellectual desire of the 
concrete subject – the pure, unrestricted desire to know – on which 
Lonergan bases his account of the natural desire to see God. Though he 
encouraged the preservation of the theoretical wisdom of metaphysi-
cal terms and relations, he also challenged theologians to integrate 
them within the framework of concrete religious experience and the 
call for ongoing affective, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. 
I thus note his shift in emphasis from an intellectual proof for God’s 
existence in the tradition of natural theology to the variety of ways the 
question of God arises in the intellectual, moral, and religious dimen-
sions of our concrete lives. Chapter 4 shows how Lonergan speaks to 
the legitimate Lubacian emphasis on the concrete and historical, on the 
one hand, and the Thomist call to affirm a more substantive account of 
nature, on the other hand. Lonergan’s account of nature in scholastic 
terms and in his more dynamic and scientifically influenced account of 
emergent probability – along with his key explanatory terms of verti-
cal finality and obediential potency – offers a reconciling voice to the 
debate. This substantive account of “nature” both preserves the gratu-
ity of the supernatural order and creates the space for the role of intel-
lectual and moral self-transcendence in rational deliberation about the 
natural, penultimate goods of social, cultural, and political life. In light 
of this shift from intellectual desire to a more holistic account of the 
Introduction 9
concrete subject, chapter 5 focuses on Lonergan’s later emphasis on the 
centrality of love. The chapter presents a non-extrinsicist account of the 
relationship between the natural and the supernatural – an account that 
preserves the language that has been privileged in the tradition (meta-
physical), but transposes it into terms revelatory of the interpersonal 
experience of being-in-love (intentionality analysis, phenomenology) 
within a Trinitarian context. After establishing the Trinitarian roots of 
the human desire for the supernatural, the chapter treats the interpen-
etration of loving and erotic subjectivity. 
 Part 3 shifts the inquiry to a more substantive engagement with 
socially mediated desire. Can the integration of the innate drive for self-
transcendence (Lonergan) and mimetic desire (Girard) shed light on the 
human desire for God as it is manifested in the concrete subject? Chapter 
6 constructs a connection between the theme of socially mediated desire 
and concrete models of holiness. In light of Doran’s integrative model, 
the chapter brings into conversation Lonergan’s category of “incarnate 
meaning” and René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire as a means of 
developing an account of the saints as “living texts” with the power to 
elicit human desire for God. It also highlights a distinctive feature of a 
Girardian account of sanctity – humility and resistance to scapegoating, 
which will pave the way for a discussion of the metaphysics of holiness 
and the habit of charity in the following chapter. Hence, chapter 7 exam-
ines the Trinitarian roots of a theologically grounded phenomenology 
of the graced life. If the previous chapter borders on the descriptive, this 
chapter’s return to the four-point Trinitarian hypothesis helps to estab-
lish a more explanatory account of holiness. With particular attention 
to sanctifying grace and the habit of charity – two supernatural realities 
that make possible the kind of humble love and nonviolent resistance 
so integral to Girard’s expression of Christian holiness – the chapter 
offers two specific examples of the human desire for God in a secular 
age: Thérèse of Lisieux and Etty Hillesum. If concrete subjectivity also 
reveals the biases that infect human desire for God in our fallen condi-
tion, then chapter 8 focuses on the task of mitigating the persistent wit-
ness of idolatry. This chapter considers more fully the vagaries of desire 
and the persistent temptation to worship at the altars of false and devi-
ated transcendence. Mindful that theology “mediates between a cultural 
matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix,” 31 this 
chapter focuses on the phenomenon of consumerism, and argues that 
consumerism ought to be considered, at its extremes, a “sacralization to 
be resisted,” a distortion of desire, a misdirected religious love. 

 PART 1 
 De Lubac, Ressourcement, and 
Neo-Thomism 

 1 De Lubac’s Lament: 
Loss of the Supernatural 
 De Lubac’s  Surnaturel was “an intentional body blow to the neos-
cholastic understandings of reason and grace, as well as to neos-
cholastic conceptions of philosophy and theology and the  relation 
between them.” 1 Its publication constituted a “cultural event 
nearly as important as the publication of Martin Heidegger’s  Being 
and Time (1927) or Ludwig Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical Investiga-
tions (1953). 2 Beginning with  Surnaturel (1949) along with a modi-
fied essay, “The Mystery of the Supernatural,” published shortly 
thereafter in the same year, and continuing with  The Mystery of the 
Supernatural (1965) and  Augustinianism and Modern Theology (1965), 
Henri de Lubac sought to refute the doctrine of “pure nature” as 
developed by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century neo-scholastic 
commentators. 3 
 The aim of this chapter is to communicate the heart or animat-
ing force of de Lubac’s reflections on the natural desire to see God. 
Though this book is primarily systematic-theological, I want in the 
following pages to treat the natural and the supernatural with some 
attention to de Lubac’s social, political, and ecclesiastical milieu. 
No doubt the historian will feel short-changed, as will the theo-
logian. The systematic-theological issues raised here will receive 
more sustained attention later in my treatment of Thomist-Luba-
cian tensions and my retrieval of Lonergan’s theological contribu-
tion. Here, I aim to show that de Lubac was principally concerned 
with identifying some of the decaying theological and political 
roots that underlay the disintegration of a sense of the authenti-
cally sacred in modern life. 
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 The French Social and Political Context 
 De Lubac’s particular stance on natural desire does not, in Lawrence 
Feingold’s view, have intrinsic implications for his other works on 
ecclesiology, scripture, atheism, and so on. In other words, he does not 
hold that de Lubac’s “particular interpretation of the natural desire to 
see God represents the key that unifies his theological work, without 
which it cannot stand.” 4 Feingold means to suggest that his own tren-
chant critique of de Lubac on nature and grace – which is summarized 
in the next chapter – ought not indicate a widespread dismissal of the 
French Jesuit’s contributions to the life of the Church. 
 One does not have to agree with de Lubac on all the fine details to 
accept the deeper implications of his work. In this book, after all, I 
attempt to retrieve the heart of de Lubac’s project, but often differ in 
terms of the explanatory resources employed. At the same time, I ques-
tion whether Feingold understates some of the interconnecting threads 
of de Lubac’s work: “Most of de Lubac’s other writing, which in a sense 
works out the thesis of  Surnaturel in relation to ecclesiology, exegesis, 
inter-religious dialogue, and secular social and scientific thought, is of 
a similar character.” 5 Even if overstated, Milbank is correct to point out 
a certain kind of organizing impetus to de Lubac’s work. De Lubac’s 
intellectual concerns with pure nature, the separation of the natural and 
the supernatural, impoverished religious education, and a rationalist 
theological culture require an acquaintance with the bitter political and 
ecclesiastical struggles that shaped his life into the 1950s. 
 In his essay on the disappearance of the sacred, de Lubac makes a 
connection between a dualistic understanding of nature and the super-
natural and the abstract rationalism of theology (both discussed below) 
and the sociocultural and political environment of 1940s France. Such 
dualism and rationalism will not sustain in an age dominated by power-
ful totalitarian movements. The privileging of abstract propositions tied 
to ancient controversies and presented in a fragmentary way simply 
cannot communicate the internal fullness and radiance of the Catholic 
tradition. “Is a theory,” de Lubac asks, “that tends to separate the super-
natural from nature a suitable instrument for penetrating the whole of 
reality and life of the authentically sacred?” 6 
 De Lubac’s ongoing treatment of the relationship between the nat-
ural and the supernatural must be read in connection with his other 
great works of the time, including  Catholicism and  The Drama of Atheistic 
Humanism . De Lubac’s concerns – and the larger issues at stake over the 
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 nouvelle théologie – were not, as much as they may read at first glance, 
“narrow, Church-internal controversies over esoteric issues.” 7 In fact, 
de Lubac attempted to recover the redemptive role of theology in the 
world. 
 One problem had to do with poor religious instruction. De Lubac 
identifies a distinctive contrast between a mature grasp of secu-
lar knowledge and a puerile grasp of religious faith. The latter has 
“remained that of a child, wholly elementary, rudimentary, a mixture 
of childish imagination, poorly assimilated abstract notions, scraps 
of vague and disconnected teachings gathered by chance from exis-
tence.” 8 The failure to foster a mature and intelligent grasp of faith 
often results in its abandonment. Even scholars have foregone a deep 
engagement with biblical texts, relegating it to a domain for a few spe-
cialists. The Bible became a “source for rationalist objections to which 
the apologist had to respond.” 9 It was no longer studied seriously as a 
religious text – a reservoir of the sacred – and instead became a source 
for thin apologetics. 
 To grasp the impoverished religious educational scene requires 
acquaintance with the social and political situation of late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century France. 10 In broad strokes, the scene 
divided into supporters of the anti-clerical laicism of the Third Repub-
lic, on the one hand, and devotees of monarchy-nostalgic traditional 
Catholicism, on the other. The concrete political issue centered on the 
educational system. One side feared that Catholic schools were not 
fostering loyalty to the Republic, while the other charged the state-
sponsored schools with perpetuating atheism and anti-Catholicism. 
The larger issue involved questions about the relationship between 
the Church and the world. Can one respect the autonomy of the secu-
lar without reducing the Church to a privatized ghetto? Several events 
indicate this tension. The Jesuits, for example, were banned from 
teaching in 1880. Religious instruction in public schools was made 
illegal in 1882. The Dreyfus affair (1894–1906) – a case involving the 
false accusation of a young military officer of Jewish descent – fuelled 
largely Catholic anti-Semitic, pro-army sympathies over and against 
anti-clerical republicanism. 
 In this wake, the movement known as  Action française emerged. 
Led by Charles Maurras (1868–1952),  Action française dedicated itself 
to both opposing anti-clerical republicanism and restoring the mon-
archy. This political movement was based on a naturalistic concep-
tion of human nature, but regarded religion as an important social 
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control. Even though Maurras was himself an agnostic, many Cath-
olics believed that his denial of the supernatural “did not prevent 
his conception of the natural order from being both accurate and 
indeed in harmony with Catholic social teaching.” 11 After France was 
defeated and occupied by the Nazis in 1940, the Vichy state of Mar-
shal Pétain, with its motto of “Work, Family and Country,” replaced 
the Third Republic with a new national revolution. Vichy’s appeal 
to traditional values endeared the regime to many Catholics, includ-
ing many bishops, especially those who had supported  Action fran-
çaise . 12 Vichy brought in “a train of miseries, horrors and, for Chris-
tians, spiritual perils.” 13 Pétain’s Vichy regime inflicted “five long 
years of oppressive fascism, anti-Semitic legislation, and other forms 
of collaboration with Nazi Germany.” 14 Particularly painful was the 
widespread support that many Catholics gave to  Action française in 
the 1930s and Pétain’s Vichy regime during World War II. Out of 
seventy-six thousand Jews deported from France to Germany during 
this period, only twenty-five hundred survived. 
 De Lubac’s reflections on the convenient alliance with Catholicism 
of the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), echoes his 
judgment of the Vichy regime’s “extrinsicist” use of Catholicism. In  The 
Drama of Atheist Humanism (1944), he writes: 
 They pay homage to Catholicism; but, in varying degrees and often with-
out being clearly aware of it, their purpose is to rid it more effectually 
of the Christian spirit. They stress the elements of superstition that still 
subsist in a body so large as the Church and which it is so easy to exac-
erbate, especially in periods of unrest. It sometimes happens that church-
men, paying too little heed to the Gospel, let themselves be caught by 
this. Positivism is gaining ground as its founder repeatedly predicted, far 
less by any conquest over former “metaphysicians” or “revolutionaries” 
than by a slow and imperceptible dechristianization of a large number of 
Catholic souls. The “accommodations” and “alliances” favored by Comte 
have actually borne fruit. They were followed by a period of spontane-
ous assimilation, and the faith that used to be a living adherence to the 
Mystery of Christ then came to be no more than attachment to a social 
program, itself twisted and diverted from its purpose. 15 
 De Lubac analyses this kind of extrinsicism that emerged in lived 
French Catholicism. Though he recognizes that part of the problem lies 
intellectually with the influence of Kant’s rationalist account of religion, 
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he also notes a kind of sentimental abuse of devotions. The haunting 
mysteries of religion experienced in the past have been outstripped by 
religiosity. The separation of “pure nature” from the supernatural dis-
cussed below must be corrected by a view of religion that informs and 
penetrates everything. 16 
 De Lubac resisted the temptation to support the Vichy regime, and 
also resisted the Nazis. 17 During the Nazi occupation of France, he 
co-edited a clandestine journal dedicated to elucidating “the incom-
patibility between Christianity and Nazism.” 18 He often masked his 
critique in academic lectures on theological topics. In a 1941 letter to 
his superiors, he expressed his concern that Catholics did not recog-
nize the threat of the Nazi regime because of extensive Vichy censor-
ship and propaganda. Vichy’s appeal to traditional values created the 
conditions for a kind of state worship in this so-called providential 
time for France. De Lubac offered strong spiritual and theological 
resistance to both the Vichy regime and the Nazi empire. He even 
had to leave Lyon for six months under a pseudonym. As Komonchak 
reminds us, “anyone who may at times feel lost in the massive erudi-
tion of  Surnaturel might be fortified by the knowledge that it was in 
such circumstances that de Lubac used his exiles to make it ready for 
publication.” 19 
 To his superiors, he outlined the “war of conquest” being waged 
by the spread of Nazism. 20 This anti-Christian regime, he wrote, is in 
the process of imposing pagan teaching, systematically de-Christian-
izing the youth. And the economic, political, and cultural collabo-
ration is rendering France defenseless against the “Hitlerian virus.” 
The danger is that “one lets oneself fall asleep through the silences 
imposed” and then be “formed by the propaganda.” The French were 
being led towards a “cult of the state that is contrary to Catholic doc-
trine.” 21 And anti-Semitism was growing among the Catholic elite, 
even infecting the houses of religious orders. De Lubac expressed his 
wishes: 
 I do not expect or desire any activity of the political order, any possible 
“crusade” from our spiritual leaders. What I would simply like is for them 
to be more fully informed so that they might better give knowledge of the 
danger to those who are uninformed, that they might be better even in 
encouraging our faith and in helping us save our souls; so that the impres-
sion that Catholicism is abdicating in the face of the terrible upheaval of 
the world may not gradually enter consciences. 22 
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 Three Centuries of Neo-scholasticism: 
Separation of Nature and Grace 
 Another internal cause of the loss of the feeling of the sacred involves de 
Lubac’s indictment of the legacy of three centuries of neo-scholasticism 
that created a gulf between nature and the supernatural. For de Lubac, 
this was not simply a matter of theory, but perhaps more powerfully a 
habit of thought. In his judgment, the French sociocultural and political 
situation outlined above was inseparable from the natural-supernatural 
separation. So many Catholics uncritically accommodated the “fascist 
neo-paganism” of Vichy because the natural and the supernatural realms 
were formed into “two hermetically sealed departments,” unequipped 
with the religious resources for political and cultural resistance. 23 
 This wholly modern conception of nature and grace was formulated 
as a response to certain errors, such as Baianism and Jansenism (dis-
cussed below), which tended to confuse or even collapse the two orders. 
De Lubac’s response in this early essay – characteristic of his response 
throughout his later works on this theme – is to return, in part, to the 
Fathers of the Church. As the Fathers emphasized, the human being was 
created in the image of God, endowed with reason, freedom, and immor-
tality. The human being was destined to love eternally in God. Just as he 
continually returns his readers to the Fathers, de Lubac also reorients them 
to the actual texts of Aquinas himself. For St Thomas, there is “in human 
nature as such, because it is spiritual, a desire, a natural appetite, a sign of 
an ontological ordination, which could not remain ever unsatisfied with-
out the work of the Creator having failed and which could be satisfied in 
no way but through the very vision of God, face to face.” 24 This doctrine 
was part of “the unanimous Tradition, for fifteen centuries,” according to 
de Lubac, and is captured by “this famous explanation of Saint Augustine, 
which should be taken in its reflexive and ontological sense: ‘Lord, you 
have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.’” 25 
 A grasp of de Lubac’s concern requires some acquaintance with his 
uncovering of two inadequate and diverging lines of interpretation 
that emerged in the sixteenth and century, what might be called the 
“Thomistic consensus” versus the Baianist-Jansenist position. 
 The Thomistic Consensus: The Silver Age of Scholasticism 
 Shortly after joining the Jesuits in 1913, de Lubac was drafted as an 
infantryman in World War I. He suffered a serious head injury and 
returned to the Jesuits in 1916. Since religious orders were banned at 
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the time from teaching on French soil, de Lubac remained on British 
soil until 1926. It was in England that he was encouraged by his pro-
fessor, Joseph Huby, to compare selected texts of Thomas Aquinas 
with the same texts of the Dominican commentator Thomas de Vio, 
known as Cajetan. De Lubac discovered what he judged a “radical mis-
understanding of Thomas by Cajetan,” who had “corrupted authentic 
Thomism by introducing the destructive idea of pure nature into his 
discussion of the human desire for God, thereby inadvertently leading 
Catholic theology to infect Europe with an ideology of anti-religious 
secularism.” 26 
 The “Thomistic consensus” refers to a relatively consistent line of 
development associated with thinkers such as Cajetan, Sylvester of Fer-
rara, Medina, Báñez, Suárez, and John of St Thomas and continuing into 
the twentieth century with a notable thinker like Réginald Garrigou-
Lagrange and today in the work of Lawrence Feingold, among others. 
This school of thought privileged the axiom that a “natural desire can-
not be in vain.” If the human desire for the beatific vision were natural, 
then God would seem obliged to offer it. De Lubac blamed Catejan as 
the root of the problem. 
 Even if Cajetan was at root, it was Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) who 
spread the key tenets of this consensus more effectively and system-
atically than any other thinker. In fact, twentieth-century  ressourcement 
theologians often dub the Thomism they received a Suárezian Thomism. 
Developing the positions of earlier thinkers, Suárez argues that an innate 
appetite for the vision of God is untenable. The natural desire for God 
is not “innate,” but “elicited” and “conditional.” 27 His most important 
argument against the existence of an innate appetite for the vision of 
God involves the hypothetical possibility that God could create intellec-
tual creatures without ordering them to beatific vision. This has become 
known as the possibility of a “state of pure nature” – the non-absurdity 
of a natural happiness for the intellectual creature that falls short of the 
vision of God. Suárez develops this position based on his understanding 
of  debitum naturae , of what is due to nature. The gratuity of grace presup-
poses that there are things due to nature (rationality, union of body and 
soul, etc.) and others things due to a gratuity that exceeds the proportion-
ality of nature (sanctifying grace, original justice, beatific vision, etc.). If 
our supernatural end is not due to our nature, then man could be created 
without being ordered to a supernatural end. There must then exist a 
“natural happiness corresponding to man’s natural powers, in addition 
to his supernatural end.” 28 For Suárez, natural happiness is certainly pos-
sible in the hypothetical state of pure nature, but is not even limited to this 
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state: this capacity for natural beatitude exists in all human beings in the 
current economy of salvation. Grace after all does not destroy nature, but 
perfects it. Connatural beatitude then is truly possible for human nature 
and is the end for which intellectual creatures are naturally inclined. This 
connatural end includes the contemplation of God in creation, but not 
the beatific vision. Of course, it is also true that, in the present economy 
of salvation, this connatural end is only a final end in its own order and 
is ultimately subordinated and ordered to our supernatural end. Hence 
Aquinas considers happiness in our connatural end imperfect in com-
parison to that in our supernatural end, but it is still an authentic type of 
happiness that can be experienced in this life. The doctrine of limbo flows 
from this reasoning and claims that it is possible to experience natural 
happiness even after this life. 29 In his two treatments of limbo, Aquinas 
substantiates the possibility of natural happiness by his position that a 
lack of spiritual suffering exists in this state. 30 
 In light of the axiom that “natural desire cannot be in vain,” the six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century Thomistic consensus holds, in sum, 
that the natural desire to see God exceeds the limits of what is due to 
nature. We are ordered by nature to a connatural end. The natural desire 
for God is not an innate desire, but elicited and conditional. Although 
this desire for God depends on our intellectual and volitional opera-
tions, the desire to know is not technically ordered to seeing God. That 
said, and this is important for the issues treated in this book, “the exis-
tence of this desire constitutes a powerful argument from fittingness, 
for the possibility of the vision of God, as well as for its actual offer.” 31 
I take up the theme of  convenientia or fittingness later in this book. 
 Baius, Jansenius, and the State of Human Misery 
 The Thomistic consensus finds its counterpart in the teaching of two 
Flemish Louvain-trained thinkers, Michael Baius (1513–1589) and Cor-
nelius Jansenius (1585–1638). In his work  De iustitia primi , Baius argued 
that the “condition in which Adam was created was his natural con-
dition and not a supernatural elevation.” 32 He asserts that grace “has 
nothing to do with man in the state of innocence.” 33 In this view of 
man’s integrity, God could not have created the human person with-
out destining him to the beatific vision. Thus Baius rejected the state of 
pure nature, in which the human person would have been ordained to 
a lesser end. This ordination to a lesser end would fail to do justice to 
the original integrity of man – an integrity that implies a unique destiny 
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to the beatific vision. Since it is necessary and natural for the human 
person to reach beatitude, these gifts of sanctifying grace and original 
justice were also necessary and natural. 34 Through sin, however, Adam 
forfeited this state of integrity. The nature that remains after the fall is 
basically disordered desire. Baius offers a brutal account of the state 
of fallen man: every sin merits eternal punishment, and all works of 
unbelievers – even virtuous pagans – are sinful. Reacting to Renais-
sance theories that seemed to separate nature as too independent of a 
reality from grace, Baius sought to return to Augustine. It was reported 
that he read Augustine’s corpus nine times and the works on grace sev-
enty times. Ironically, with his collapsing of nature and grace, he ends 
up in a kind of Pelagianism. 35 He posits that real love is equated with 
observance of the law. With Baius, as de Lubac notes, we can no longer 
speak of “the relationship between God and man as a mystery of love; 
the whole thing has become a commercial transaction. Eternal life is 
offered to man on a basis of strict reward. Man demands, merits and 
claims; God provides the tool and pays the account, to the last penny.” 36 
 Baius deeply shaped the thought of Corenlius Jansenius, the fore-
runner to a movement that ended by deforming a rich French Catholic 
revival into one of the great crises in the history of the Church. Janse-
nius, along with the later thinker of a similar stripe, Antoine Arnauld 
(1612–1694), defended and developed the position of Baius. The Jan-
senist position, in sum, holds that the only possible beatitude for ratio-
nal creatures is the vision of God. The human person thus has an innate 
appetite for this vision, though its realization is supernatural. Unequiv-
ocally rejecting the possibility of a state of pure nature, Jansenius argued 
that God must provide the creature with the means for reaching his 
final end, which is the beatific vision. Therefore, the innate desire for the 
beatific vision is absolute, and the frustration of such desire results only 
in a state of misery. The Jansenist argument from natural desire substan-
tiates both the possibility of the vision of God and the impossibility of 
a state in which it would not be given. 37 Thus the vision of God would 
be considered something due to nature ( debitum naturae ) – a claim that 
seems to destroy the true gratuity of our supernatural end. 38 
 De Lubac’s “Natural Desire for the Supernatural” 
 In his key works on nature and grace, De Lubac treats the two diverging 
lines of interpretation that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, discussed above, which he calls “conservative Thomism in the 
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sixteenth century” 39 and the “Baianist-Jansenist position.” 40 Against 
Cajetan and the Thomistic consensus, 41 he was uncomfortable with the 
claim that human nature possesses two ends, natural and supernatural. 
This  duplex ordo vision tended to create a divide in the human being 
and an impasse between philosophy and theology, ultimately treating 
the supernatural vocation as extrinsic to the natural end of the human 
person. This desire, which is not the result of actual or habitual grace, 
marks concrete nature as such. The concrete person “can achieve no 
genuine rest in a purely natural end.” 42 
 This overemphasis on a natural human end – an emphasis that is 
understandable in light of Jansenius’s pessimistic resignation over the 
ruins of nature (which de Lubac also rejected) – was the result of a mis-
taken reading of Thomas Aquinas. 43 In the wake of this anthropological 
pessimism, the safeguarding of a natural end secured a more generous 
view of human nature, as exhibited in the doctrine of limbo, the legiti-
macy of the virtuous pagan, and the retaining of some ability to know 
the truth and to choose the good, even after the fall. But for de Lubac, 
this same hypothesis tended to separate nature and grace, and did so 
with disastrous consequences. With rhetorical flair, de Lubac invites us 
to consider that when Aquinas said, “Grace perfects nature,” could he 
have foreseen that “what he said about the completion or perfecting of 
nature would be retained, while the grace which effects that completion 
would be left aside.” 44 Or, take Aquinas’s statement that “This immedi-
ate vision of God is guaranteed to us in Scripture.” Surely, the angelic 
doctor “could not have supposed that one day people would attribute 
to him the idea of another vision of God, equally ‘direct,’ which could 
be obtained without reference to anything promised in scripture.” 45 De 
Lubac poses a direct question to those who place so much stock in the 
modern hypothesis of pure nature: “Do you think that this hypothesis, 
as you present it, even were it basically sound, is really useful here?” 46 
 There exists, then, for de Lubac, a “natural desire for the supernatu-
ral.” Though the proponents of pure nature were attempting to safe-
guard the gratuity of grace, de Lubac argued that such a theory in fact 
marginalized the concrete religious vocation of the human person. As 
he writes, “For this desire is not some ‘accident’ in me.” It does not result 
in a “possibly alterable” reality of “historical contingency whose effects 
are more or less transitory.” 47 This desire results in our very member-
ship in concrete humanity as it is in this historical order. This desire 
indicates a finality inscribed upon our very being – a nature that has 
no other genuine end “except that of ‘seeing God.’” 48 In his writings on 
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nature and grace, De Lubac envisioned the relationship between natu-
ral and supernatural as “anthropological unity” that situates the human 
person before God as “fully unified by grace, capable of being a partner 
in the Covenant in the integrity of a being that grace heals, renews, per-
fects in his nature.” 49 He returns to an emphasis on the biblical image 
of the human being made in the “image” of God and to the paradoxi-
cal nature of the human spirit, 50 expressed succinctly in a 1932 letter to 
Maurice Blondel: “how can a conscious spirit be anything other than 
an absolute desire for God?” 51 De Lubac reiterates the absolute nature 
of this desire unequivocally in  Surnaturel (1946). 52 Inspired by Blondel, 
he held that human intelligence – which involves human commitment 
and action – can arrive at some sense of the supernatural, revealing the 
paradoxical situation of the human person. As a  capax Dei , the human 
person by nature desires the supernatural, but the fulfilment of this 
desire lies beyond nature. Hence, though we desire the supernatural 
end naturally, the means to attain this end remains utterly gratuitous; 
he explicitly maintains this dissociation. 
 De Lubac’s positive argument for gratuity says that our innate desire 
for the beatific vision is the desire to receive this vision as a gift. 53 The 
only exigency of the human desire is “not to demand anything,” but to 
“desire for a gift as a gift.” 54 It is a desiring spirit that is essentially and 
ontologically humble: “The ‘I who aspires’ is not an ‘I who requires.’” 
De Lubac’s position on the gratuity of the supernatural develops from 
his treatment in  Surnaturel (1946) to  The Mystery of the Supernatural 
(1965). Whereas the earlier position tended to collapse the gratuity of 
the supernatural with the gratuity of creation as a “phantom of the 
imagination,” 55 the later position clarifies “two instances of gratuitous-
ness,” 56 as I show in the next chapter. This desire of nature is not neces-
sarily a deliberate, conscious act. 57 
 Even if de Lubac modified his position, one cannot underestimate 
the centrality of “paradox” as a controlling theme in his work. 58 The 
Aristotelian principle of connaturality, noted in my presentation of 
Suárez above, involved, for de Lubac, a rejection of paradox in favour 
of common sense. 59 This is an expression of the emergence of “extrinsi-
cist thought patterns” in the scholastic tradition that de Lubac identi-
fied in his historical studies. In de Lubac’s interpretation, Aquinas had 
relied too much on Aristotle for his understanding of nature. In a sense, 
Aquinas had difficulty cleanly integrating the “Aristotelian idea of a 
self-contained nature” and the “patristic understanding of image.” 60 
Still, the  imago Dei teaching was important for St Thomas. De Lubac 
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draws our attention to Aquinas’s discussion of “trace” and “image” in 
natural beings in  Summa theologiae I, q. 93. Natural beings are a distant 
reflection of God by way of “trace”; human beings resemble God by 
way of “image.” Hence, De Lubac cites approvingly Gilson’s claim that 
“Thomist nature is not Aristotelian nature.” 61 This is not a self-enclosed 
nature. As the “image of God” theme suggests, human nature is intrin-
sically, but gratuitously, ordered to the supernatural. Throughout his 
writings, de Lubac expresses sympathy for Dominic Soto, a Domini-
can highly critical of Cajetan. 62 As Soto writes, “Aristotle knew nothing 
about the supernatural, and he would not have conceded that any mat-
ter has a natural inclination toward anything, unless it has the power 
and natural strengths to attain it; we, however, do concede that our 
nature is so sublime that it is inclined toward that end which we cannot 
obtain except through God’s help.” 63 
 This separation of natural desire and the supernatural is in part due 
to Cajetan’s account of “obediential potency.” I examine this theme 
more thoroughly in the next chapter, as it continues to be a point of 
contention between Thomists and Lubacians. For now, it suffices to 
point out that de Lubac indicts Cajetan as an “unfaithful Thomist” in 
this regard. His particular teaching on obediential potency tended to 
naturalize the human being. 64 For Cajetan, our potency for God is only 
obediential. In one of its uses, “obediential potency” is the explanatory 
term associated with how miracles operate on nature. But for de Lubac, 
the relationship between the human spirit and the supernatural ought 
not to be characterized in terms of what is “abnormal” in the sense of 
a miracle; 65 for this characterization contributes to the sense that the 
supernatural is something super-added to an already enclosed nature. 
De Lubac prefers Thomas’s principle that “the soul is naturally capable 
of grace.” With little attention to paradox and mystery, neo-scholastic 
theology appeared, in de Lubac’s estimation, like “a buildup of con-
cepts by which the believer tries to make divine mystery less mysteri-
ous, and in some cases to eliminate it altogether.” 66 
 With an eye to history, De Lubac’s pastoral concern is that those who 
intended to safeguard the supernatural by separating it conceptually 
from the natural ended up facilitating a vision of the human person 
during the Enlightenment that detoured into deism, agnosticism, and 
ultimately atheism. 67 Initially constructed to do important theologi-
cal heavy-lifting, the development of a purely natural human domain 
“eventually gave rise to the space of the secular, free of religion and 
indeed of God.” 68 De Lubac asked whether this thesis leads us 
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 to suppose a being similar to that so often presented by rationalist phi-
losophies – both ancient and modern: a being suffi cient to himself, and 
wishing to be so; a being who does not pray, who expects no graces, who 
relies on no Providence; a being who, depending on one’s point of view, 
either wants only to continue as he is, or seeks to transcend himself, but 
in either case stands boldly before God – if he does not actually divinize 
himself – in a proud and jealous determination to be happy in himself and 
by his own powers. 69 
 A presentation of nature and grace that envisions “pure nature” as the 
prolegomenon to the Gospel of Christ presents a dilemma: either the 
total renunciation of the self vis-à-vis grace or the renunciation of grace 
as superfluous to our lives in the real world. This leads to either an 
ineffective and culturally isolated ghetto Christianity or an Enlighten-
ment theology that valorizes reason and rejects faith. It creates, in a 
counterintuitive manner, the conditions for an “ecumenical choir” of 
the Catholic proponents of “pure nature,” Enlightenment deists and 
atheists, and Protestant defenders of “total depravity.” 70 Their common 
song is that human nature does not incline the human person to super-
natural union with God. 71 
 Although he acknowledged a clear distinction between nature and 
the supernatural, de Lubac emphasizes 
 an intimate relation between them, an ordination, a fi nality. Nature was 
made for the supernatural, and, without having any right over it, nature is 
not explained without it. As a result, the whole natural order, not only in 
man but in the destiny of man, is already penetrated by something super-
natural that shapes and attracts it. When it is absent, this absence is still a 
kind of presence. 72 
 This language of presence and absence evokes the language of the 
“sacred” and “secular.” Though a useful distinction as far as it goes, it is, 
de Lubac reminds his readers, in a sense an abstraction: “For in concrete 
reality, nothing is purely ‘in itself’… all is sacred by destination and must 
therefore begin by being so through participation.” 73 (The next chapter 
explores more thoroughly de Lubac’s preference for discussing the natu-
ral desire for God with reference to “concrete nature” in the world-order, 
not hypothetically, but as it exists concretely.) The practical result of this 
dualism, for de Lubac, is that many have brushed aside the supernatural, 
placing it in a separate compartment. In the realm of pure nature, they set 
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out “to organize the world, this world that was for them the only true real 
one, the only living one, the world of things and men, the world of nature 
and the world of business, the world of culture and that of the city.” 74 
 Even if de Lubac rightly lamented the loss of the sacred, it is fair to 
question if he overstated the root of the cause in the doctrine of pure 
nature. Scholars have urged a more complex diagnosis than the one he 
offered. As Mulcahy has argued, “French disaffection from the Catho-
lic faith is more reasonably traced, not to the idea of pure nature, nor 
to scholasticism as such, but to other, more obvious factors.” 75 These 
factors include the Church’s alliance with royal absolutism, its neglect 
of the growing middle class, and its failure to resolve moral-theologi-
cal questions raised by the Molinist controversy. Furthermore, history 
often shows that religiosity may wax and wane in response to various 
factors, including war, trade, legal development, technology, science, 
urbanization, and economic growth. In short, an “exclusively theologi-
cal account of secularisation is surely simplistic.” 76 
 Impoverished Rationalism and a Return to Mystery 
 De Lubac also identifies the atmosphere and spirit of rationalism domi-
nant in theological practice as an internal cause for the diminishing of 
the sacred. Hans Urs von Balthasar reflects grimly on the rationalism of 
his intellectual formation: 
 My entire period of study in the Society was a grim struggle with the 
dreariness of theology, with what men had made out of the glory of revela-
tion. I could not endure this presentation of the Word of God. I could have 
lashed out with the fury of Samson. I felt like tearing down, with Samson’s 
strength, the whole temple and burying myself beneath the rubble. 77 
 Referring to his training in Lyon, Balthasar expressed the consola-
tion that “Henri de Lubac lived in the house. He showed us the way 
beyond the scholastic stuff to the Fathers of the Church and generously 
lent us all his own notes and extracts.” 78 
 It is difficult to grasp the significance of de Lubac’s work, along with 
the Thomist-Lubacian tensions, without an acquaintance with Catholic 
theology in the early to middle twentieth century. Many of the think-
ers considered in this book – de Lubac, Balthasar, and Lonergan, for 
example – received priestly and intellectual formation under a system 
shaped by a Suárezian-influenced neo-scholasticism. 
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 On one level, Leo XIII’s post–Vatican I encyclical  Aeterni Patris 
(1879) shaped theological formation in this era. This encyclical 
launched a program “to implant the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in 
the minds of students, and set forth clearly his solidity and excellence 
over others.” 79 Leo called on universities to “illustrate and defend 
this doctrine, and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors.” 80 He 
also penned a papal brief in 1892,  Gravissime Nos , inviting the Jesu-
its to a genuine devotion to the work of Aquinas, which is relevant 
to the Jesuit formation of de Lubac, Daniélou, Balthasar, and Loner-
gan. It was not right, Leo’s brief exhorted, to deviate from Aquinas 
“except in very rare cases.” 81 The neo-scholastic theology manuals 
that shaped theological instruction from 1900 to 1960, however, rarely 
lived up to the ideal imagined by Leo in his promotion of the method 
and vision of Aquinas. This is due to the fact that the manuals were 
informed “less by Aquinas than by his Dominican confrere, Melchior 
Cano (d. 1560), and by Cano’s posthumous work,  De locis theologicus 
(1563).” 82 As Jared Wicks notes, dogmatic theologians of this style 
“were children of their positivist age, and so they tried above all to 
amass evidence from the sources to support the doctrine of divine 
instruction that they presented in carefully worded theses.” 83 This 
theses-method gave “seminary theology an apologetic orientation in 
support of official Catholic teaching” and aimed “to supply elements 
of proof that showed that official doctrine in fact articulates positions 
given in the Bible and tradition.” 84 
 Connected to  Aeterni Patris and the neo-scholastic manuals was 
the magisterium’s condemnation of modernism, crystalized first 
in the Holy Office’s July 1907 decree  Lamentabili sane exitu , and 
then in Pope Pius X’s (1835–1914) encyclical released two months 
later,  Pascendi dominici gregis . 85 In short, concerns over modernism 
involved the worry that modern historical, scientific, and philo-
sophical currents were infecting the Church’s ability to faithfully 
transmit divine revelation and the truths of the faith. Beginning 
in 1910, all seminary professors were required to take an anti-
modernist oath. Against the winds of historical consciousness, 
tradition, intuition, and experience, philosophical formation in 
Catholic seminaries revolved around the twenty-four Thomistic 
theses developed to uphold the notion of absolute and unchange-
able truth. The history of Catholic theology in the twentieth cen-
tury, then, is in part, the history of the attempted elimination of 
theological modernism. 86 
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 I referred above to de Lubac’s designation of neo-scholasticism as 
“less a matter of theory” and more a “habit of thought.” He captures 
this habit of thought in the following passage, worth quoting at length: 
 Perhaps then we stroll about theology somewhat as if in a museum of 
which we are the curators, a museum where we have inventoried, 
arranged and labeled everything; we know how to defi ne all the terms, 
we have an answer for all objections, we supply the desired distinctions 
at just the right moment. Everything is obscure for the secular, but for us, 
everything is clear, everything is explained. If there is still mystery at least 
we know exactly where it is to be placed, and we point to this precisely 
defi ned site. We are conscious of being specialists in knowing what com-
mon Christians do not, as the specialist in chemistry or in trigonometry 
knows what common students do not. 
 Thus, for us, theology is a science a bit like the others, with this sole 
essential difference: its fi rst principles were received through revelation 
instead of having been acquired through experience or through the work 
of reason. But this difference itself is, after all, extrinsic. How little mys-
terious, then, is this very word ‘revelation’ for us: God has spoken: What 
could be simpler? He said this and this and also this: that is clear. Conse-
quently, one can deduce from this and this and also this. Scripture, Tra-
dition are only points of departure: their contribution is at times judged 
to be a bit rudimentary, without anyone daring to say it too loudly. It is 
necessary to push “farther” than this revealed given. If doctrine increases 
in a way with the centuries, all is still explained wonderfully well: a major 
part faith, a minor part reason bring about a theological conclusion. The 
theologians lay in a stock of them, and they hand them over to the Magis-
terium, which will solemnly defi ne those it judges appropriate according 
to the need. They are the proprietors of sacred doctrine. An elementary 
catechism teaches the rudiments, then there are more and more complex 
expositions at greater and greater depth, up to a large theological treatise, 
which comprises the science in its entirety. 87 
 After capturing the spirit of a kind dead rationalism at work, de Lubac 
follows up with a lament, not unlike Balthasar’s cited above: “Lord, 
Lord! There we have what men make of your Mystery! There we have 
how the best-intentioned and at times the most intelligent among them 
treat your Word! As if the revelation that, in your love, you have made 
of yourself were reduced in fact, as if it could be reduced to some series 
of statements.” 88 He laments how little our treatises on God are rooted 
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in the human experience of divine mystery. As Boersma argues, “The 
 ressourcement project was not simply a protest against neo-Thomist 
intellectualism – though it was that, too. The purpose of the protest was 
to re-appropriate the mystery of being.” 89 The shared sensibility among 
the diverse thinkers of the movement was a return to mystery – “to 
reconnect nature and the supernatural, so as to overcome the rupture 
between theology and life.” 90 
 Surnaturel amid Theological Tensions: 
Daniélou and Garrigou-Lagrange 
 I depart in this section from an exclusive focus on de Lubac, for the 
controversy around his work must be situated within the broader theo-
logical and ecclesiastical tensions in the 1940s. To offer a glimpse of 
this tension, I focus here on the public exchange between Jean Danié-
lou and Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Not only does this debate offer 
some context for the treatment of de Lubac, it also reveals differing 
visions of doing theology in the modern world. In the Daniélou/Gar-
rigou-Lagrange exchange, one finds tension between openness to the 
categories of subjectivity, historicity, and culture (Daniélou), on the 
one hand, and reinsertion of a kind of rationalist scholastic metaphys-
ics (Garrigou-Lagrange), on the other. Many years removed from this 
exchange it is plausible to say that both thinkers raised timely questions 
about theology in the modern world. In our post– Fides et Ratio era, the 
challenge of integrating subjectivity and history, while still remaining 
committed to theology’s metaphysical range, remains. 91 This book is, in 
part, a response to that challenge. 
 Daniélou expressed his call for theological renewal in his 1946 “Les 
Orientations presents de la pensée religieuse.” 92 Intended or not, 
Daniélou’s article “had all the appearances of a manifesto and a call 
to action.” 93 It was interpreted as a challenge to the Dominican journal 
 Revue Thomiste , and a declaration of war on Thomism. 94 Daniélou was 
engaged in personal conversations with prominent French intellectuals: 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de 
Beauvoir, among others. 95 
 Daniélou casts this essay in light of the yearning for a living Christian 
thought that could adequately respond to ambitious forms of atheism 
that were calling into question the viability of Christianity as a whole. 
A perception of a rupture between theology and life was shown by the 
generation that gave birth to modernism. 96 Though he was critical of 
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much of modernist content, Daniélou believed the emergence of mod-
ernist thinkers elucidated “the loss of the sense of God’s transcendence 
by a rationalistic philosophy that treated God as just another object of 
thought.” 97 Theological speculation severed from life commitment was 
on the precipice of the grave. The influential philosophical movements 
of the day, such as existentialism and Marxism, privileged commitment 
and action. 98 
 In Daniélou’s vision, contemporary theology could bridge the rup-
ture between theology and life by (1) treating God as God, not as an 
object but as the Subject,  par excellence ; (2) entering into a new dialogue 
with contemporary intellectual developments – science, history, litera-
ture, and philosophy – and their reorientation of our understanding 
of space and time, of soul and society; and (3) functioning as a con-
crete attitude that engages the entire person, the inner light of an action 
where the whole of life is in play. 99 
 In this essay, Daniélou notes a restored contact in contemporary reli-
gious thought with the essential sources, the Bible, the Fathers of the 
Church, and the liturgy. He recognizes the value of the historical-critical 
method, but also notes the challenge of treating the Bible as a “living 
nourishment for souls.” The key is to continue the renewal of theology 
shaped by a retrieval of patristic sources. Daniélou notes the achieve-
ment of de Lubac’s  Catholicism in this regard. He emphasizes the atten-
tion to the vocation of the laity in the work of thinkers like Emmanuel 
Mounier, in the Catholic Action movements, in the new theology and 
spirituality of marriage, and finally in political activity. 100 Of the Vichy 
and Nazi challenges discussed above, Daniélou acknowledged that 
“the events of recent years have posed grave problems for numerous 
Christians, upon whom the duty of temporal engagement has imposed 
itself as an unavoidable requirement, and who have been reflecting on 
the meaning of that requirement.” 101 
 A new living theology also requires an enriching encounter with con-
temporary thought: “When a Nietzsche, a Dostoevsky, a Kierkegaard 
uncovers a human universe for us, when the material universe displays 
before our imaginations the depths of the history of the earth or spaces 
between the stars, theological thought is obliged to broaden itself to 
their measure.” 102 Daniélou is attentive to historicity (Marxism, Dar-
win, Hegelian dialectic), subjectivity (Nietzsche, Sartre, de Beauvoir), 
and intersubjectivity (“the way each of our lives causes reverberations 
in the lives of others”). 103 The Parisian theologian does not acquiesce 
to the positions of these particular thinkers just mentioned, but takes 
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seriously the contemporary experiences and thought-forms from which 
they emerged. He counters these thinkers with Kierkegaard, Barth, 
Marcel, Scheler, and Teilhard de Chardin, even if some of their views 
on particular questions are questionable. Decadent neo-scholasticism, 
on the contrary, has little use for subjectivity, history, and intersubjec-
tivity, moving in the world of essences. The “abysses” of Marxism and 
atheistic existentialism enable us to see that the “Christian mystery” 
makes possible a lived encounter of fullness – a vision communicated, 
for Daniélou, by Irenaeus, Augustine, Teilhard, and Kierkegaard, 
among others. 104 Existentialism, after all, emerged with Kierkegaard’s 
reaction against the way theology of his time rationalized the Christian 
mystery: “Against a theology that treats God as an object, he affirms 
this mystery of a personal God, hidden among the shadows where no 
light can break its way in, who only reveals himself through love.” 105 
In an ecumenical manner, Daniélou notes how the converging views 
of Losski, Barth, Casel, Otto, Scheler, and Marcel might illuminate a 
“phenomenological path” to the irreducibility of mystery, in contrast 
to the “chaining together of concepts” in the manner of “Aristotelian 
logic or Hegelian dialectic.” 106 Though this method is “incomplete,” it is 
nonetheless “precious for its ability to reveal the originality of religious 
categories against the reductionism that is the basis for sociological and 
psychoanalytical interpretations of religion.” 107 
 Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964), the prominent Dominican 
professor at the Angelicum in Rome, published a scathing response to 
Daniélou’s piece entitled “La nouvelle théologie, va-t-elle?” 108 Garrigou-
Lagrange’s answer to the question of where the “new theology” is 
heading was unequivocal – modernism. Explicitly critical of Henri 
Bouillard and Maurice Blondel, this essay attempted to show how the 
“new theologians” were, in the anti-modernist words of Pius X, per-
verting “the eternal concept of truth.” 109 There had been a transition, 
 Garrigou-Lagrange lamented, from truth understood as the “adequa-
tion of  intellect and reality” to truth as “the agreement of mind and 
life.” 110 This emphasis on the philosophy of action – an attack, of course, 
on Blondel – mistakably equates truth with process and becoming, 
draining it of immutability and eternality. When Blondel proposed this 
idea in 1906, “he did not foresee,” suggests Garrigou-Lagrange, “all of 
the consequences for the faith. He himself would be perhaps terrified, 
or at least very troubled.” 111 
 In contrast to Daniélou, Garrigou-Lagrange worried about the 
deleterious effects of losing metaphysics in favour of psychological 
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introspection, historical study, and religious experience. To ignore St 
Thomas on metaphysical questions offers a grave disadvantage. And 
to substitute metaphysics either for phenomenology or for a philoso-
phy of becoming or action leaves a theologian on shaky ground. How 
can one affirm, for example, that “sanctifying grace is  essentially super-
natural, gratuitous , and not at all owed to human nature nor to angelic 
nature?” asks Garrigou-Lagrange. 112 It is crucial to distinguish between 
the light of intelligence and the light of revelation, the order of nature 
and the order of grace. Garrigou-Lagrange mentions in a critical man-
ner de Lubac’s recently published  Surnaturel . 
 Garrigou-Lagrange also cites Daniélou’s 1946 article “Present Orien-
tations of Religious Thought,” which stated that neo-Thomism was a 
guardrail but not an answer. 113 Garrigou-Lagrange responds by asking 
whether Leo XIII and Pius X were simply wrong in their advocacy of a 
Thomist renewal. Without solid foundations in Thomism, he suspects 
that this “New Theology” is heading down “the road of skepticism, 
fantasy and heresy” 114 and shares Pius XII’s concern that the “New The-
ology” is in a constant state of flux. How can one secure the unchange-
able dogmas of faith on such fluid foundations? For example, if the 
laws of evolution were theologically privileged, then the Incarnation, 
the mystical body, the universal Christ would simply be moments in the 
process of Evolution, based on a view of the constant progress of good 
from the beginning. This would seem to minimize or remove altogether 
the doctrine of the fall at the beginning of humanity. 115 
 In sum, the “New Theology” returns to modernism because it accepts 
a position on truth intrinsic to modernism: truth understood not as the 
conformity of judgment to immutable laws, but as the conformity of 
intellect and life – the “conformity of judgment to the exigencies of 
action and to human life which is always evolving.” 116 As Komonchak 
explains, “Garrigou-Lagrange’s ‘atomic bomb’ had the effect of so 
frightening the Jesuit superiors in Rome that they refused to allow the 
indicted Jesuits to reply to it.” 117 
 In the midst of these controversies, de Lubac’s  Surnaturel was pub-
lished: “When my book  Supernatural appeared (1946), the cry for 
blood redoubled. It’s true that, in it, I criticized certain complications 
of modern scholasticism. I proposed returning to the doctrine of St. 
Thomas [Aquinas], which was simpler, more profound, both more tra-
ditional and a better guide for us today.” 118 When Pope Pius XII had 
the opportunity to address the delegates of the Jesuit order in Rome 
in the summer of 1946, he remarked that some have conjectured that 
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the new theology’s emphasis on constant development compromised 
the immutable dogmas of faith, as mentioned above. De Lubac, and 
several others who were indicted, wrote a letter – approved by their 
superiors – denying the formation of a new school of thought. In the 
letter they defended themselves from charges of doctrinal and subjec-
tive relativism, and suggested that many different theological schools 
could flourish in the Church. 119 As de Lubac would later reflect: “like all 
constituted bodies, certain groups of theologians don’t like to have their 
habits disturbed. And, to boot, since I was living at the time at Four-
vière, they created an imaginary beast called the “School of Fourvière” 
(as well as an imaginary ‘New Theology’) – of which I was supposedly 
the chief. The combat increased in violence.” 120 
 There is certainly evidence to support the suspicion that political dif-
ferences played a role in the controversy over  nouvelle théologie ; staunch 
supporters of the Vichy government rejected the so-called proponents 
of this New Theology. Garrigou-Lagrange, OP and Charles Boyer, SJ 121 
publicly opposed de Lubac and called for the superior general to issue a 
condemnation of the New Theology. Garrigou-Lagrange had long sup-
ported  Action française , and his defense of Vichy had reached the point 
of accusing anyone who supported de Gaulle of mortal sin. He was 
close to the Vichy ambassador to the Holy See and had sent a “notori-
ous dispatch in which he not only stated that the Vatican had no major 
objections to the Vichy anti-Jewish legislation but defended it by cita-
tions from St. Thomas, which de Lubac believes were contributed by 
‘Thomists,’ either in Rome or in France.” 122 As I explained above, De 
Lubac, along with other theologians associated with the New Theology, 
had actively resisted the Nazis and the Vichy government. The philoso-
pher Étienne Gilson observed, referring to Garrigou-Lagrange, “how 
peculiar it was that ‘a master in theology belonging to the order of Saint 
Dominic … was able in conscience to sustain the notion that the ‘best 
political regime’ defended by Charles Maurras was the same as that 
taught by saint Thomas.” 123 The steadfast opposition of Catholic  res-
sourcement theologians to the Nazis is given scant attention compared 
to that of leading Protestant theologians. Yet  ressourcement thought is 
“essentially a practical theology engaged in open, critical, and some-
times militant fashion with the most pressing issues of contemporary 
society.” 124 
 Even if de Lubac overstated the explanatory value of pure nature 
in his cultural diagnosis, it is still important to note that one cannot 
separate his critique of the neo-scholastic hypothesis of pure nature 
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from his witness of political failure. The thrust of his work was, in 
part, to lead people back to the texts of Aquinas himself. He found 
the Thomism of the early twentieth century – the heir of Cajetan and 
Suárez – often “too rigid” and yet “not faithful enough to the Doctor 
it claims as its authority.” 125 He witnessed Thomism employed as a 
support for  Action française , Christian democracy, and neo-Marxism. 
De Lubac reflects, “I have more than once observed a ‘Thomism’ that 
was scarcely more than a tool in the hands of the government, the ral-
lying point of a party, the password of a troop of ambitious careerists, 
or even the empty shell of a thoughtless conformity, the padlock clos-
ing the door to all understanding of the thought of others.” “Even 
today,” he adds (in 1975), “despite all the supervening changes, this 
still makes it difficult for me to be very loud in proclaiming that I am 
a Thomist.” 126 
 Pius XII’s encyclical  Humani Generis was published in August 
1950. 127 The encyclical addressed “some false opinions threatening 
to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine.” These princi-
pal trends included evolution, historicism, neglect of the magiste-
rium, and so on. Pius also included existentialism and its focus on the 
“existence of individual things” and its neglect of “their immutable 
essences.” 128 He decries a “contempt for terms and notions habitually 
used by scholastic theologians,” which contempt leads to the “weak-
ening” of “speculative theology.” 129 The Church reiterates, on the 
contrary, its “authoritative approval to scholastic theology.” 130 With 
particular significance to this book, Pius briefly mentions those theo-
logians who “destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since 
God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and 
calling them to the beatific vision.” 131 Though it is tempting to iden-
tify de Lubac as the culprit, he himself tells a different story: “Far 
from containing any rebuke in my regard, the passage borrows a sen-
tence from me to express the true doctrine. And it is no accident that 
it avoids all mention of that ‘pure nature’ so many established theo-
logians wanted to canonize and accused me of not sufficiently appre-
ciating.” 132 Still, it is difficult to disagree with Hans Boersma that the 
encyclical seemed to target the Fourvière  ressourcement scholars. It 
warned against a symbolic or spiritual exegesis of the scriptures (de 
Lubac and Daniélou). And it is difficult to imagine that the reference 
to theologians who “destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order” 
was not an allusion to de Lubac. 133 In the encyclical’s wake, de Lubac 
did not teach or publish for several years. 134 
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 A Note on De Lubac’s Theological Style 
 Prior to presenting one version of the neo-scholastic counternarrative 
in the next chapter, I will comment on de Lubac’s theological style. De 
Lubac’s own remarks on what animated his work, along with its short-
comings, certainly indicate a lack of concern with systematic rigour. 
And while de Lubac has identified in provocative ways important theo-
logical issues to address, there is plainly much systematic work yet to 
be done. As Mulcahy put it, de Lubac’s treatment of “nature, grace, and 
their inter-relationship” has left us “with questions rather than system-
atic answers.” 135 
 In his own reflections, de Lubac urged people to recognize that most 
of what he has written was circumstantial and not crafted with techni-
cal precision. He did not receive specialized formation in systematic 
or historical theology and never had to complete a doctoral thesis. In 
other words, he maintained a distance, especially from 1950 onward, 
from scientific theology. Even de Lubac admits that it would difficult to 
isolate a clearly and coherently worked out synthesis in his work. That 
said, he did discern a “certain texture” that suggests a “certain unity”: 136 
 Without claiming to open up new avenues of thought, I have sought 
rather, without any antiquarianism, to make known some of the great 
common areas of Catholic tradition. I wanted to make it loved, to show 
its ever-present fruitfulness. Such a task called more for a reading across 
the centuries than for critical application to specifi c points; it excluded any 
overly preferential attachment to one school, system, or defi nite age; it 
demanded more attention to the deep and permanent unity of the faith, to 
the mysterious relationship (which escapes so many specialized scholars) 
of all those who invoke the name of Christ, than to the multiple diversities 
of eras, milieu, personalities, and cultures. So I have never been tempted 
by any kind of ‘return to the sources’ that would scorn later developments 
and represent the history of Christian thought as a stream of decadences; 
the Latins have not pushed aside the Greeks for me; nor has Saint Augus-
tine diverted me from St. Anselm or St. Thomas Aquinas; nor has the latter 
ever seemed to me either to make the twelve centuries that preceded him 
useless or to condemn his disciples to a failure to see and understand fully 
what has followed him. 137 
 As Milbank notes, de Lubac does not contribute directly to a metaphysi-
cal or foundational theology. He offers rather a kind of “grammar” for 
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Christian understanding and practice. He affects his readers with a 
visionary spirit of renewal. 138 
 A Different Kind of Lament: De Lubac after the Council 
 The focus of this chapter has been de Lubac’s lament over the loss of 
the supernatural and the prevalent extrinsicism that marked pre- and 
post-war Catholicism in France. While his is the most germane lament 
in relation to the topic of this book, it was not his only lament. If de 
Lubac’s vision was vindicated at the Second Vatican Council (and I 
believe it was), this same theologian expressed misgivings about some 
trends in the post–Vatican II era. If he had to defend himself as an inno-
vator at one point in time, he suddenly became, in the view of some, the 
proponent of an outdated theology. De Lubac’s later lament is captured 
in his 1969 lecture at Saint Louis University entitled “The Church in 
Crisis.” 139 
 De Lubac frames his address in the wake of the rapidity of devel-
opment, the frenzy of violence and rebellion, and the widespread loss 
of meaning in technologically and scientifically advanced rational cul-
tures, marked as they are by addiction, suicide, and distraction. And de 
Lubac detected – a point that disturbed him the most – the same kind 
of frenzy and rebellion in the Church: 
 I stand in amazement at the good conscience of so many sons of the church 
who, never having accomplished anything exceptional in their own right, 
who have neither taken time to think nor ever really suffered, who do 
not even take the time to refl ect, and yet who, each day, urged on by an 
unknown and unknowing crowd, become the accusers of their mothers 
and brothers. How frequently, when listening to them, I have thought how 
much more the church, the whole church, would be within its rights to 
complain about them. 140 
 De Lubac’s essay deserves searching scrutiny today, in terms of both 
what is dated and what endures. I simply highlight three enduring 
themes that are especially relevant to this book. 
 First, de Lubac identifies the separation between human reason and 
divine mystery. He notes the predominance of what he called “com-
puter thinking,” but what may also be called instrumental rationality 
or scientific-mathematical rationality. When intelligence is reduced to 
computer thinking, it becomes a principle of human oppression. What 
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is missing when one narrowly focuses on the instrumental dimension 
of thinking is precisely contemplation. Without recourse to the contem-
plative dimension of the mind and a deeper appropriation of mystery, 
theology becomes, in de Lubac’s words, “superficial,” “crammed full 
of slogans borrowed from the advertising world,” and an “escape into 
confrontation” 141 De Lubac recognized that he may be coming across 
as a reactionary or as outdated. But he believed, in the midst of such 
threats to unity, that the future of the Church – the very fruitfulness of 
its mission – was at stake. 142 Note de Lubac’s worry: “It would seem that 
from all horizons of knowledge, starting with hermeneutic and stretch-
ing to the highest level of speculation, the progress made by the human 
spirit in recent years has been funneled together so as to turn us away 
from this love of Christ Jesus, this love from which St. Paul declared 
that nothing, absolutely nothing could ever separate him.” 143 He adds 
that this split is foreign to the kind of witness we find in Teilhard de 
Chardin. The dissociation of the intellectual quest and the question of 
God is a theme that runs throughout this book.  
 Second, de Lubac notes a relegation of the love of Christ from the 
centre of history to the margins. The very idea has become for some a 
kind of cliché or passé notion. De Lubac speculates on some of the rea-
sons: the reduction of the biblical text to its historical-critical meaning 
(Jesus is inaccessible to us), the relegation of religious love to sentimen-
tality and childish immaturity (some forms of psychoanalysis), and the 
dismissal of the dogmatic statements of the early Church as outdated 
cultural expressions. 144 Later in the book I highlight Lonergan’s refor-
mulation of grace as being-in-love with God, which transforms, in his 
vision, human knowledge and action, and stands at the heart of the 
theologian’s disposition and activity. 
 Third, in relation to the love of Christ, de Lubac finds recourse in 
the saints, living and dead. He highlights those who have “drunk at 
this source for the past twenty centuries”: 145 Charles de Foucauld, 
Jules Monchanin, Madeleine Delbrêl, not to mention Origen, Bernard, 
Augustine, Aquinas, Möhler, and Newman. 146 After describing the pro-
found simplicity and missionary zeal of the spirituality of Delbrêl, de 
Lubac comments: “There is nothing grand about so simple a gesture. 
Yet it will do more to maintain the cohesion of the church than so many 
opposite gestures which merely dig away at this very cohesion.” 147 This 
book’s later emphasis on concrete religious subjectivity – on disclosures 
of holiness as a concrete form of religious intellectuality – speaks to de 
Lubac’s enduring concern. 
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 Conclusion 
 This chapter attempted to illuminate the animating force behind de 
Lubac’s reflections on the natural desire to see God, namely his lament 
over the disappearance of the sense of the sacred in contemporary 
life. I considered de Lubac’s account of the relationship between the 
natural and the supernatural with significant attention to its mean-
ingfulness in light of the social, political, and ecclesiastical milieu. 
The systematic-theological issues raised will receive rigorous atten-
tion in the next chapter; here my aim was to show that de Lubac was 
principally concerned with identifying some of the decaying theologi-
cal and political foundations of a sense of the authentically sacred in 
modern life, symptoms of the decline of which included the horrors 
of the Vichy government and the Nazi regime. Against two diverg-
ing lines of thought – the Thomistic consensus and Baianism/Jansen-
ism – de Lubac’s account of the “natural desire for the supernatural” 
attempted to retrieve the Fathers and the authentic Aquinas as a cor-
rective to the manifestation of the theory of pure nature in the religious 
extrinsicism of modern life. As the chapter indicated, de Lubac’s posi-
tion takes on heightened meaning when cast in light of the theological 
tensions churning during the postwar period in France, as exhibited 
in the Daniélou/Garrigou-Lagrange exchange and the controversy 
surrounding Pius XII’s  Humani Generis . 
 2  Ressourcement and Neo-Thomism: 
A Narrative under Scrutiny, a 
Dialogue Renewed 
 Although the precise meaning and impact of the Second Vatican 
Council remains a topic of dispute today, “no result of the council 
seems more secure that this conviction: that in the clash between neo-
scholasticism and  ressourcement theology, the latter had decisively 
won.” 1 In terms of the previous chapter, one might say that in light of 
the Second Vatican Council and the pontificates that emerged thereaf-
ter, Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou were vindicated while the neo-
Thomism of the Roman universities – Garrigou-Lagrange, Charles 
Boyer, etc. – was relegated to the dustbin of history. 
 This victory found expression, for example, in the widespread accep-
tance of Karl Rahner’s theology of grace and his account of the “super-
natural existential.” 2 Consider also Walter Kasper’s obituary for neo-
scholasticism. Kasper writes, “There is no doubt that the outstanding 
event in the Catholic theology of our century is the surmounting of 
neo-scholasticism” and its aim “to establish a timeless, unified theology 
that would provide a norm for the universal church.” 3 Kasper adds that 
it’s “impossible to deny this attempt a certain grandeur. But in the long 
run a restoration was bound to fail.” 4 
 According to Oakes, however, recently “this same neo-scholasticism 
– which had been thought moribund these past four and a half decades, 
and whose obituary has been written so many times – has shown sur-
prising signs of life.” 5 A generation removed from Vatican II, certain 
scholars have investigated the work of Henri de Lubac and have ques-
tioned whether he misrepresented the Thomist tradition. An uncritical 
embrace of the developments associated with  ressourcement has even, 
some suggest, contributed to the decline of vocations, religious apathy, 
secularism, and widespread dismissal of the Church’s moral claims. 
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As one scholar notes, “Like a firefighter who does not know that the 
fire has spread far beyond one room and who inadvertently intensifies 
the fire elsewhere by redirecting the airflow, de Lubac’s heroic effort to 
escape the implications of antecedent errors in certain critical respects 
served to amplify them.” 6 Did not de Lubac’s integration of nature and 
grace tend to collapse the two together, inscribing grace into nature? 
And did not this supernaturalizing of the natural diminish both the 
integrity of nature and the surprising, unmerited gift of grace? 
 The relationship between emerging forms of Thomism and the  res-
sourcement tradition, however, has not been an altogether polemical affair. 7 
They have at times exhibited similar aims as found, for example, in the 
 Ressourcement Thomism project. 8 As William Murphy writes, “Catholic 
intellectual life has begun – and will need to continue – a more thought-
ful encounter between these two overlapping streams of the tradition, a 
dialogue that … was unfortunately sidelined when Thomism was widely 
abandoned in the postwar years and even more in those following the 
council, at least partially due to a backlash against the official imposition 
of some aspects of it in the antimodernist era.” 9 Even if we recognize that 
the very distinction between neo-Thomism and  nouvelle théologie is some-
times problematic, the “underlying issues that these terms designate must 
be held in careful tension by any theology that calls itself Catholic.” 10 
 Although this book as whole might be understood as an attempt to inte-
grate these overlapping streams, the more modest aim of this chapter is 
to capture some of the central tensions between the followers of de Lubac 
and contemporary neo-Thomists of various stripes on issues related to 
the natural desire to see God. Accordingly this chapter, first, describes 
several features of Lawrence Feingold’s neo-scholastic counter-narrative 
as perhaps the most rigorous challenge to de Lubac’s thesis; and second, 
highlights four key tensions: the relationship between natural and super-
natural ends, pure nature versus concrete nature, obediential potency and 
the aesthetic compromise, and the intelligibility of nature and the human 
good. In doing so, I gather insights from many thinkers. It is important to 
note that I do not offer a full exposition of the thought of all these scholars. 
The aim is to present the main contours of the debate. These themes are 
important to my retrieval of Lonergan’s thought in subsequent chapters. 
 Neo-scholastic Counter-narrative: Feingold’s Challenge 
 Feingold’s exhaustive study  The Natural Desire to See God According 
to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters stands at the heart of this 
re-emergence. Other prominent representatives like Reinhard Hütter, 
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Steven Long, and Guy Mansini acknowledge their indebtedness to 
Feingold’s work. Indeed, Feingold offers a thorough – though of 
course debatable – analysis of key texts from Aquinas, Scotus, Denis 
the Carthusian, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, de Soto, de Toledo, Medina, 
Báñez, Suárez, and Jansenius. And with his re-examination of this 
centuries-old conversation, he not only critiques de Lubac but chal-
lenges a presumed narrative and attempts to retell the story. 
 If de Lubac self-consciously exhibited a visionary style with a lack of 
systematic rigour, Feingold’s work is both exegetical and systematic. 
Though my own constructive work in this book will articulate, at times, 
a different position from that of Feingold, one cannot underestimate 
Feingold’s achievement in this book and his generosity as an interlocu-
tor. More than Feingold, I integrate a historically conscious and con-
crete understanding of nature, along with phenomenological resources. 
Furthermore, I offer a different articulation of sanctifying grace, just to 
point out a few examples of where our positions may come into tension. 
That being said, my inquiry is still shaped significantly by Feingold’s 
important questions and challenges. 
 As Reinhard Hütter notes, Feingold’s revival of Thomas has 
characteristically drawn on “the historical reconstruction of the 
authentic Thomas behind the interpretive discourse of the once 
greatly esteemed but now equally widely despised Thomist com-
mentarial tradition, a Thomas whose theology is properly fore-
grounded and again linked to its original  Sitz im Leben in the 
 contemplative  tradition of Dominican spirituality.” He also notes an 
increasing philosophical interest in Thomas: the historical embed-
dedness of philosophical discourse (Alasdair MacIntyre), in dia-
logue with analytic philosophy of religion (Eleonore Stump), and 
post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language (Herbert McCabe, 
Fergus Kerr, David Burrell). 11 
 Hütter is correct that Feingold’s provocation largely ignores the 
advances just mentioned. 12 Rather, Feingold directly addresses the 
Thomist commentarial tradition that was so vehemently critiqued by 
de Lubac. And what makes Feingold’s book so provocative is its form 
of discourse. In clear contrast to de Lubac’s way of reading the com-
mentators, Feingold chooses not to construct a historical hermeneu-
tic. Rather, he engages the commentators by “reconstructing and thus 
entering their own way of conducting a speculative theological enquiry, 
a mimetic exercise reconstructing and thus continuing the commenta-
tors’ discursive mimesis of Thomas.” 13 Thus, Feingold displays, for 
Hütter, “a historical consciousness sui generis.” 14 
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 In the last chapter, I highlighted de Lubac’s deeper intent to bring to 
life the vibrancy of the Catholic tradition, to make it loved, and show 
its enduring fruitfulness. De Lubac’s special impact on the  ressourcement 
movement was to encourage the “reading and studying of the Patristic 
writers in a fresh way.” 15 It is pertinent to point out that Feingold under-
stands his own retrieval of the scholastic thinkers in a similar way – as 
a work of love, not an arch-reactionary retrieval of palaeothomism: “I 
have tried in this work to read the classical Thomistic tradition of the 
fifteenth through seventeenth centuries with the same love, benevo-
lence, and understanding that de Lubac lavished on their forefathers 
in the Augustinian tradition.” 16 Feingold’s  ressourcement of the silver 
age of Scholasticism aims to contribute to Catholic theology without 
diminishing the seismic impact of the Fathers and the golden age of 
Scholasticism. 
 Since this book is one of systematic and not historical theology, I am 
more interested in Feingold’s systematic-theological proposal. A brief 
word on his pastoral concern, however, might illuminate his focus. 
Feingold believes that the classical Thomistic school that de Lubac most 
virulently opposed has, in fact, “the elements of a solution that provides 
a fine balance between the natural desire for the vision of God and the 
distinction of the natural and supernatural orders.” 17 “The pastoral and 
spiritual solution to our crisis,” contends Feingold, “cannot lie in weak-
ening the distinction between nature and grace, or diminishing the 
coherence of the natural order, but only in rightly understanding how 
the Christian promise opens the horizon to what we already naturally 
desire in a dim and inefficacious way.” 18 Feingold suggests, for exam-
ple, that one of the pastoral challenges of our time is that so many tend 
to take heaven for granted. Heaven is due, many contend in popular 
consciousness, to our natural goodness. This naturalization of heaven 
demands a rekindling of “radical wonder at the inconceivable dimen-
sion of the gift of our supernatural vocation, which carries with it a true 
divinization, enabling man to enter into the divine friendship, into the 
spousal relation with the Holy Trinity, into the beatitude proper to God 
himself.” 19 De Lubac’s “natural desire for the supernatural” lends itself 
to exacerbating this pastoral challenge. Thus, it is crucial to preserve 
the notion that human beings have both natural and supernatural ends. 
The fact that human beings are not “intrinsically ordered by nature 
to the vision of God, but only by grace, better manifests the  humility 
of the spiritual creature, whose nature is coherent and perfectly con-
ceivable without the gift of the supernatural, to which it nevertheless 
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stands uniquely open, and which alone will give it an absolutely perfect 
beatitude.” 20 
 Feingold offers several helpful services to scholars investigating these 
themes. First, he clarifies two fundamentally different interpretations of 
what Aquinas meant by natural desire. On the one hand, some interpret 
this natural desire as an innate appetite – the kind of appetite found 
in our lower nature, prior to any knowledge. This involves an innate 
tendency, inclination, or relation of will to its maximum and proper per-
fection prior to any knowledge. On the other hand, some interpret this 
natural desire as an elicited act of the will, following on natural knowl-
edge of the good. The Thomist commentators understood the natural 
desire to see God as a “naturally elicited” and “conscious” desire that 
flows from knowledge of God’s existence. 21 Feingold uses that latter 
strand in his critique of de Lubac, who by and large embodies the first. 
 The distinction between “innate appetite” and “elicited appetite” 
provides explanatory power to Aquinas’s fluid identification of two 
mutually exclusive categories, but often without fixed terms. 22 The will 
has a natural appetite for its natural end, namely, universal good or 
happiness. In the presence of knowledge, however, the will also has 
“specific acts or movements of desire (elicited desire) toward the vari-
ous goods that are apprehended by the intellect.” 23 Knowledge of the 
goodness of the object can move the  unconscious potency of the innate 
appetite to the  actual desiring of the elicited appetite. Such knowledge 
draws out (elicits) an act of desire from the sensitive or rational appetite. 
 Second, Feingold identifies the chronology and substance of the key 
texts associated with Aquinas’s teaching on the natural desire to see 
God. 24 His mature position appears in  Summa contra Gentiles III, chapters 
50–1, and from this time forward the argument is repeated in various 
contexts but without substantial change. Feingold carefully walks the 
reader through these key passages in  Summa contra Gentiles III guided 
by the heuristic question: What kind of natural desire is operative? 25 
 Feingold concludes, in sum: “It is not hard to see that all of St Thom-
as’s texts on this subject show the existence of a  naturally elicited desire 
of the will following upon knowledge.” 26 He argues that, for Aquinas, 
the natural desire to see God is derived from “the dynamism of our 
natural desire to know.” This natural desire to know leads to “the con-
crete desire to know the essence of the first cause.” Hence, this natu-
ral desire to see God is a “naturally elicited desire of the will, which 
spontaneously seeks the perfection of the intellect.” Once we grasp that 
God exists, we desire to know God’s essence. This is based on the fact 
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that we naturally want to know the ultimate causes of things, as stated 
above. Next, what makes this “natural” is the fact that, once we affirm 
the mystery and existence of God, we spontaneously wonder what 
God is and who God is. Finally, Aquinas does not specify whether the 
natural desire to see God is conditional or unconditional. For Feingold, 
it is “fairly easy to see,” along with Báñez and Suárez, that for a per-
son without the theological virtues of faith and hope, it is a conditional 
movement of the will. 27 
 Third, Feingold recognizes that, in the midst of his own firm convic-
tions, this subject matter is complicated and has evoked centuries of 
intense theological controversy. The challenge lies in harmonizing the 
dynamic reasoning of Aquinas with other key aspects of his teaching. 
For example, Aquinas often asserts that “the vision of God is an end 
too great for our will to desire, except through grace, since it exceeds all 
natural power of realization.” 28 He normally uses this language in the 
context of defending the necessity of grace and the theological virtues. 
And grace and the theological virtues are necessary for us to desire our 
supernatural end. This begs the question, “In what sense then is the  nat-
ural desire to see God a natural desire?” 29 In fact, though he states often 
that our supernatural end lies beyond the capacity of natural reason, his 
argument for the natural desire for God seems to provide at times “a 
strict demonstration of our supernatural end.” 30 How can the principle – a 
natural desire cannot be in vain – apply to an object that exceeds what 
is due to nature? The positing of a natural desire to see God seems to 
imply that God is our natural end, and that anything lower – a con-
natural end, for example – would not suffice. Furthermore, Aquinas 
does not address, as Feingold points out, the relationship between the 
natural desire to see God and the theological virtue of hope. 
 Finally, at the end of his work, Feingold proposes a framework for 
understanding the human desire to see God. Though previous inter-
preters “have not usually distinguished these four states of our natural 
desire to know God,” he is convinced that they are “waiting to be redis-
covered and developed.” “On the basis of this distinction,” he contends, 
“we can more correctly analyze the relation between nature and grace, 
focusing on the transformation and  conversion of this desire from the 
natural to the supernatural plane.” 31 The following constitute the four 
states of the human desire for God. 32 
 First, we possess an innate desire for our connatural end, that is, to 
know and love God through the mirror of creation. For Feingold, this 
follows from the very nature of our spiritual faculties. This is not an act, 
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but simply the relation of the spiritual faculties to their proportionate 
end. This desire is innate and unconscious. It is important to note that, 
for Feingold, our natural end already involves a contemplation of God. 
It is not a nature disconnected from God. 
 Second, in the texts of Aquinas listed above, St Thomas demonstrates 
the existence of a “naturally elicited” desire for the vision of God’s 
essence. Feingold infers that this desire is conditional without the aid 
of revelation and actual grace. The object of this natural desire is simply 
essential knowledge of the first cause. This requires prior knowledge of 
the existence of God. Hence, this desire is elicited and conscious. 
 Third, the elicited and conditional desire just described is trans-
formed into an elicited and  unconditional desire for the vision of God 
through knowledge of God’s promise in revelation, together with the 
aid of actual grace. This desire reveals an act of theological hope – an 
act that presupposes the reality of faith. As Feingold writes, “The object 
of the desire based on Revelation is seeing the God who has revealed 
Himself as Father, Redeemer, spouse of the soul, and ineffable commu-
nion of three divine Persons, and who has promised that we shall see 
Him face to face if we correspond to His grace.” 33 “On the basis of this 
Revelation,” Feingold adds, “through the aid of actual grace, we can 
make acts of hope and charity. These acts then lead us to seek Baptism, 
by which we receive an abiding inclination directly for the vision of 
God, through the gift of sanctifying grace.” 34 
 Finally, the fourth state is a  supernatural habitual inclination for the 
vision of God that results from sanctifying grace. This state consists of 
the theological virtues of hope and charity. This habitual inclination 
is present whenever a soul is in a state of grace. It is “independent of 
knowledge and thus  unconditional and is based on the proportional-
ity between grace and glory.” 35 It is also innate and unconscious, but it 
underlies and shapes our conscious acts and desires. The innate inclina-
tion to our connatural end (first state) is “capable of transformation into 
a supernatural inclination to the vision of God through the reception of 
sanctifying grace, by which we are made mysteriously proportionate to 
a divine end.” 36 
 There is much to engage here. But for now it is pertinent to capture 
the heart of Feingold’s claim – a claim that deserves both strong con-
sideration and a critical response: “The natural desire to see God is not 
sufficient to naturally incline or order us to our supernatural end. For 
that purpose we need the supernatural virtue of charity which flows 
from sanctifying grace by which we are mysteriously made somehow 
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proportionate to God, having become ‘partakers in the divine nature.’” 37 
In short, Feingold’s challenge to us is to work out systematically the 
relationship between the natural desire to see God, the habit of charity, 
and sanctifying grace, which will be treated more explicitly in chapter 5. 
 Having summarized key features of Feingold’s theological counter-
proposal based in the neo-scholastic Thomistic consensus and written 
in opposition to de Lubac’s “natural desire for the supernatural,” I turn 
now to several issues that have emerged in the debate. The remainder 
of this chapter highlights four key tensions: between natural and super-
natural ends, pure nature and concrete nature, obediential potency 
and the aesthetic compromise, and the intelligibility of nature and the 
human good. My aim is not to treat every thinker in full, but to offer the 
reader a sense of the main contours of the debate. 
 Natural and Supernatural Ends 
 A central question that permeates Lubacian-Thomist conversations 
deals with the relationship between natural and supernatural ends. 
Nicholas Healy has perceptively clarified some of “the terms of the 
question” that continue to divide de Lubac and neo-Thomists such as 
Feingold, Hütter, and Long. 38 Healy focuses on the neo-Thomist axiom 
that the innate desire of nature must be essentially proportionate to 
nature’s power to achieve that desire. Healy notes a basic agreement 
between the Lubacians and the neo-Thomists on the twofold gift from 
God and hence the distinction between the natural and the supernatu-
ral orders. De Lubac distinguished the gift of creation and the gift of 
deification, that is, the ontological call to be transformed into a new 
creature. Pursuing the analogy of the gift, de Lubac clarifies the two 
distinct ways of declaring this twofold gratuity: first, “God has given 
me being,” and second, “Upon this being he has given me, God has 
imprinted a supernatural finality; he has made to be heard within 
my nature a call to see him.” 39 Whereas the first declarative statement 
expresses total contingence (natural being), the second communicates 
total gratuity (divine sonship). Noting a certain measure of common 
ground, Healy points us to Hütter’s similar rendition: “the second gift 
necessarily presupposes the first gift (not in the chronological order, but 
in the logical as well as ontological orders) while the second gift is not 
necessarily entailed by the first.” The second gift brings the first gift to 
a gratuitous, supernatural perfection and fulfilment. Hence, the second 
gift of supernatural orientation discloses the “ontological openness of 
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creation for grace” without “canceling out the relative integrity of the 
connatural, proportionate end that is entailed” in the first gift of created 
nature. 40 
 The key difference, as Healy notes, is how to think about human 
nature and the duality of ends implied in the twofold gift. De Lubac 
situates natural and supernatural beatitude in human nature itself as 
created in the image of God. 41 Human nature, in this frame, only has 
one final end, which is communion with God through beatific vision. 
However, De Lubac does not mean to imply that the beatific vision 
simply follows from the principles of nature. Rather, “God has freely 
inscribed in nature itself, prior to grace, a finality and a desire that goes 
beyond nature.” 42 Neo-Thomists like Feingold, Hütter, and Long tend 
to reject the idea that human nature is created with a supernatural end. 
Although nature may be open to receiving a higher end, this super-
natural end is given only with the second gift of deifying grace. With a 
Lubacian pushback, Healy suggests that the underlying premise is that 
the final end of nature must be proportionate to nature. 43 The key ques-
tion then is whether both imperfect natural beatitude and supernatural 
beatitude are inscribed in nature itself from the first moment of creation 
(de Lubac), or whether our supernatural finality is later imprinted on 
our being first by sanctifying grace, a kind of super-addition giving us a 
new finality (Feingold). As Feingold observes, de Lubac’s mature posi-
tion on the twofold gratuity maintains that no other destiny is possible 
for concrete human beings in the actual order of the universe than an 
absolute natural desire to see God. Hence, for Feingold, the problem 
of gratuity in  Surnaturel has simply been transferred under a different 
guise. Feingold continues to wonder what the phrase “supernatural 
finality imprinted on my being” means and, furthermore, how this 
qualifies as a double gratuity. 44 
 It would also appear at first glance that there is a contradiction between 
the Lubacians and the neo-Thomists on the existence of a natural end 
relatively consistent in its own order. To some extent this is true. But, on 
Healy’s account, both strands of thinking affirm the importance of pos-
iting some kind of a natural end. Tensions arise when we think about 
the natural end in relation to the supernatural end. Healy proposes that 
the natural order is relationally constituted from top to bottom. The 
relative closure of nature is, in fact, a deeper openness to God. The rela-
tive autonomy of nature, if one wants to use that phrase, is equated to 
creaturely dependence on God. Human beings have “an active readi-
ness for God – one whose innate character is fully revealed” in the Son’s 
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assumption of human nature and in the fiat of Mary. 45 Healy credits de 
Lubac with, on the one hand, resisting the neo-scholastics’ overemphasis 
on the claim that the innate desire of nature must be essentially propor-
tionate to nature, and, on the other hand, deepening our thinking on the 
structure of nature as gift. 46 The structure of the gift – in light of creation 
and Incarnation – prioritizes the themes of receptivity and gratitude. If 
I am reading Healy correctly, the real issue of contention between Luba-
cians and neo-Thomists is not whether there is a relative integrity to 
nature, but whether nature itself is best understood under the aegis of 
receptivity and gift. “In other words, Christ reveals the nature of nature 
as receptive readiness for a surpassing gift.” 47 This tension is germane to 
my full retrieval of Lonergan’s positions in part 2 of this work. 
 Another way of parsing this tension between natural and supernatu-
ral ends involves the doctrine of limbo. Recall Suárez’s claim (discussed 
last chapter) that in the present economy a natural happiness can be 
experienced in this life and even in the afterlife in the state of limbo. 
De Lubac disagrees. Since this natural desire for the supernatural is 
an absolute desire, then this desire “cannot be permanently frustrated 
without an essential suffering.” 48 He identifies any state less than super-
natural life as equivalent to the pain of the damned. And yet he does 
not say that the innocent suffer due to punishment. 49 Still, de Lubac 
asks, “Does natural beatitude mean contentment in a natural end truly 
attained and possessed, which can give the being a completely stable 
and positive satisfaction …?” Attempting to rest in this imperfect end, 
one would experience only “anxious joy,” “always poeticizing reality 
by dreaming,” and calling upon “an indifferent and silent heaven.” De 
Lubac actually prefers Gregory of Nyssa’s approach of “eternal incom-
pleteness” – the continual desiring of a God who is forever sought. 50 
Real advance, real development in the life of the “uncalled” constitutes 
“at least the beginnings of possession” and a certain kind of delight. 51 
Nevertheless, de Lubac as a whole seems to imply that natural hap-
piness is a kind of anxious, melancholic state, akin to Dante’s limbo: 
“Down there … / there were no wails but just the sound of sighs / 
rising and trembling through the timeless air, / the sounds of sighs of 
untormented grief / burdening these groups, diverse and teeming, / 
made up of men and women and of infants … ‘In this alone we suffer: / 
cut off from hope; we live on in desire.’” 52 And in this light a “good and 
just God could hardly frustrate me, unless I, through my own fault, turn 
away from him by choice.” 53 
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 Scholars dispute de Lubac’s interpretation, retrieving Aquinas’s 
two ways of answering this question about human beings who die 
without being baptized. 54 Thomas’s earlier position suggested that 
infants in limbo are not afflicted with suffering, but live according 
to a kind of Stoic ethic through a virtuous moderation of desire. His 
later position says that those in limbo do not desire the vision of God 
“because they have no idea of God under this formality.” 55 If the natu-
ral desire to see God, properly speaking, is elicited and conditional 
(as Feingold believes), then those without knowledge of revelation 
will not suffer. 56 Both solutions can stand together, if one maintains 
the clear distinction between the “species of the natural end” and the 
“species of the supernatural end.” 57 Aquinas’s account of the lack of 
spiritual suffering in limbo, according to Feingold, is fundamentally 
incompatible with de Lubac’s interpretation. Since de Lubac holds 
that the natural desire to see God is “the most absolute of all desires, 
he cannot admit that it could be frustrated or unfulfilled without 
causing an essential suffering.” 58 
 If it seems difficult to escape this logic, Edward Oakes pushes back 
in a couple of ways. First, this way of stating the case seems to sug-
gest (even though Feingold does not make this explicit connection) 
that limbo was offered as a defence of a naturally elicited desire for 
God. Limbo, in fact, was introduced to “get around Augustine’s 
teaching that unbaptized infants go directly to hell.” 59 Pelagius, of 
course, denied original sin and hence had to navigate the embedded 
practice of infant baptism in the early church. Mindful of the con-
nection in John 3:5 of the necessity of baptism and the kingdom of 
God, Pelagius distinguished between the “kingdom of God” (which 
required baptism) 60 and “eternal life,” which unbaptized infants 
enjoy by virtue of having immortal souls. 61 In response this Pelagian 
logic, Augustine argued that such babies are condemned to eter-
nal death, for they have not received the remission of original sin 
and remain in solidarity with the sin of Adam. The justice of God 
demands nothing more. 62 
 Second, although limbo makes some logical sense if one grants the 
legitimacy of two real human ends, Oakes points out that there has been 
a significant development in the twentieth century. From the docu-
ments of Vatican II through the writings of Benedict XVI, the consistent 
line of argument seems to be that, in reality, there is only one end for 
rational creatures – a supernatural end. This is captured, for example, 
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in  Gaudium et Spes 22, a passage that reverberated throughout John Paul 
II’s papacy: 
 The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mys-
tery of man take on light … For by His incarnation the Son of God has 
united Himself in some fashion with every man … All this holds true not 
only for Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace 
works in an unseen way. For, since Christ died for all men, and since the 
ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe 
that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every man 
the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery. 63 
 Of course, these contemporary documents do not minimize the neces-
sity of baptism for salvation. How then do they reconcile the existence of 
one supernatural end and the necessity of baptism? Perhaps the answer 
lies in a turn to concrete subjectivity. This particular paradox is resolved, 
as Oakes notes, by resort to the principle of solidarity, indicating that 
our concrete lives are inextricably intertwined with the lives of others. 64 
Many traditional accounts of sin, salvation, and limbo stress solidarity 
with Adam more than solidarity with Christ. Hence, many have perhaps 
examined this issue “through the wrong end of the telescope.” 65 How 
might our views be changed “if priority were restored to our solidarity 
with Christ,” or more accurately with “Christ’s solidarity with us?” 66 
 This principle of solidarity constitutes the heart of Benedict XVI’s 
response in his encyclical  Spe Salvi , which positively endorses de Lubac’s 
 Catholicism , especially his demonstration that salvation has always been 
considered a social reality. 67 In light of our social nature, and in the con-
text of the enduring Christian belief in communion between the liv-
ing and the dead, Benedict writes, “Our lives are involved with one 
another, through innumerable interactions they are linked together. No 
one lives alone. No one sins alone. No one is saved alone.” 68 In the midst 
of our interconnecting lives, our prayer for one another is not “extrane-
ous to that person, something external, not even after death.” We must 
not limit our hope to asking, “How can I save myself?” but also, “What 
can I do in order that others may be saved and that for them too the star 
of hope may rise?” If recent Catholic teaching on limbo constitutes a 
kind of doctrinal development, one may ask whether this development 
is also a vindication of de Lubac’s critique of pure nature and an affir-
mation of the single human end in the concrete order of the universe, 
which includes the present economy of salvation. 
Ressourcement and Neo-Thomism 51
 Pure Nature and Concrete Historical Nature 
 “It appears that both de Lubac and Balthasar perhaps breathed too 
deeply of the suspicion toward abstraction popular in the 1950s amongst 
a wide variety of both scholastic and non-scholastic authors.” 69 This 
speculation of Steven Long captures the second tension between con-
temporary Thomists and the Lubacians that I wish to highlight in this 
chapter, the emphasis on concreteness. 
 One of the systematic issues at play in de Lubac’s critique of the “pure 
nature” is the unity of the world order in relation to the unity and integ-
rity of the divine plan. De Lubac continually returns to concrete, historic 
nature as distinct from a hypothetical, abstract nature. The doctrine of 
pure nature speculates about what we would be in a purely natural uni-
verse. Humanity as it is cannot be equated with a hypothetical nature 
“not called” to the vision of God. 
 De Lubac acknowledged many times that the state of pure nature 
could hypothetically exist, but in reality it is not a meaningful category. 
In this state, the human person “would have his rational ambitions lim-
ited to some lower, purely human, beatitude.” 70 Therefore, it is more 
pressing to concentrate on the drama of the human person within the 
concrete world order. Though this natural desire for the supernatural 
is not always explicitly recognized, it is also not some mere accident 
in us. It is the result of belonging to humanity as it is in the concrete – 
 humanity-as-called. “My finality,” contends de Lubac, “is inscribed 
upon my very being as it has been put into this universe by God. And, 
by God’s will, I now have no other genuine end, no end really assigned 
to my nature or presented for my free acceptance under any guise, 
except that of ‘seeing God.’” 71 The vision of God refers not just to a pos-
sible or most fitting end, but an end really inscribed in the depths of our 
nature. Though it is the intent of the pure nature theorists to maintain 
the gratuity of the supernatural by positing a different order of things 
with a different finality, this is inadequate because it does not do justice 
to the concrete nature in the real world order. In fact, a purely natu-
ral order with purely natural ends supposes, for de Lubac, “another 
humanity, a different human being, and thus a different ‘me.’” 72 In sum, 
the question of gratuity can only be asked and answered in relation to 
our concrete humanity. 
 De Lubac acknowledges that his reference to the concrete over the 
abstract might lead his critics to suspect a kind of nominalism – that is, 
a position that privileged the individual in the concrete at the expense 
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of assigning substantive reality to nature. Yet, he understands his 
emphasis on the concrete as a retrieval of past tradition – a tradition far 
more personalist and existential that can be discerned at first glance. 
The Fathers never imagined reasoning from a pure abstraction discon-
nected from our concrete natures. Rather, citing Maximus, they were 
concerned with “the nature of the humble human being that we are.” 73 
 Even if de Lubac’s work is wrought with a lack of systematic precision, 
it still played an essential role in achieving a more adequate consensus 
on “the unity of nature and grace in the single plan of God, according to 
the mind of him who repents not and has no second thoughts.” 74 With 
explicit attention to Cajetan and Suárez, de Lubac points out what he 
judges to be a radical extrinsicism associated with the theory of pure 
nature. This framework presupposes the possibility that supernatural 
beatitude could be given “in addition to the essential, wholly natural, 
happiness that is desired, postulated, required, and won by nature.” 75 
This would seem to imply that “the ultimate destination of the universe 
has been changed in the course of time, without this fact making any 
change in the structure of the universe or the essence of the beings who 
constitute it; supposing that God had not willed to make himself seen, 
or even that to see him were utterly impossible, everything that goes 
to make up the universe and man would still be exactly the same.” 76 
Consistent with a metaphysically informed claim that God has no after-
thoughts, de Lubac writes: “If God really destines man to see him, one 
can understand his not actually admitting him to that vision from the 
first, but there can be no understanding the idea that he only destines 
him to it from a given moment of his life or of world history.” 77 De 
Lubac argues that “God is in no way governed by ‘prototypes.’ There 
is no idea within him prior to his Word. He has no other ‘form,’ no 
other ‘reason for things’ than that Word, that unique Word, begotten 
by him.” 78 God’s mind is not a “kind of reservoir in which all the com-
binations of the possible preexist, as it were, before the real and ‘claim 
existence in proportion to their perfections,’ competing among them-
selves until the one which is best triumphs over all the rest.” 79 De Lubac 
has captured and critiqued in an undifferentiated way what Lonergan 
refers to as a static essentialist view of the universe, to be discussed at 
greater length in chapter 4. 
 Hans Urs von Balthasar reinforces this same Lubacian line of rea-
soning. 80 Balthasar acknowledges that pure-nature theorists often have 
ready-made answers to difficult theological questions. When answered 
with reference to pure nature, Balthasar opines, such conclusions are 
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inadequate, since they offer a system of pure nature that is a “hollow 
phantom of the real, existing world order.” 81 The practitioners of pure 
nature suggest the possibility of accounting for the essence of worldly 
structures in terms of purely natural and purely isolatable relation-
ships. 82 “For where do we get the right to understand these intraworldly 
structures as if they were disengaged from transcendence?” 83 How can 
one drain marriage, to draw on Balthasar’s example, from “its  concrete 
relation to God and to the Last Things?” “The only end we know in our 
 de facto world,” writes Balthasar, “is our supernatural one. So how can 
we so blithely maintain that the world possesses a self-sufficient,  defini-
tive ground of fulfillment apart from this end?” 84 
 For Balthasar, a more adequate theological approach operates within 
the concrete, complex order of this world. In the concrete world order, 
grace has already been given. Hence, theology must reverently acknowl-
edge our unworthiness to receive such a gift. In this view, the “nature” 
that grace presupposes is createdness as such. 85 Balthasar posits a “for-
mal concept of nature,” which is a minimal concept that is expressed 
most adequately in the analogy of being. Created being by definition 
is created, dependent, and non-divine, on the one hand, but also can-
not be totally dissimilar to its Creator, on the other hand. With Barth 
as his interlocutor, Balthasar acknowledges that being God and being 
creature reveal, of course, an utter dissimilarity. At the same time, in the 
very contrast itself we can also consider, under a different accent,  being 
God and  being creature – an accent that reveals some kind of similarity 
in being. 86 Nature defined as creatureliness ensures, for Balthasar, that 
grace is grace and is not collapsed into nature. Formal nature serves as 
an authentic presupposition for the incarnation of the Word. The ambi-
guity must remain as we consider concrete subjects within the concrete 
world order. Nature functions as a kind of “servant concept” to “pro-
tect the concept of grace and, in that function, has a legitimate place.” 87 
Accordingly, we include elements that have “already been affected by 
the  de facto ordering of nature toward its supernatural destiny,” among 
them “man’s original state, his fall from grace, God’s redemption and 
the awaited transformation of the universe at the end of time.” 88 In this 
light, nature as it exists in the concrete order of things has one, single, 
supernatural end. There is “no slice of ‘pure nature’ in this world.” 89 
Balthasar’s Lubacian reading privileges the concrete. Part of the lure 
of concreteness is that it resists a clear demarcation of philosophy and 
theology. Theology is not simply a superstructure grafted on to philoso-
phy. They form, instead, a kind of symbiosis. Though the formal object 
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of philosophy is the creaturely world as such, it is not cleanly isolatable, 
because creation as it actually exists is affected by grace and sin. 90 
 In light of de Lubac’s and Balthasar’s emphasis on concrete nature, it 
is pertinent to note a lack of systematic precision in general and a fluid 
use of the term “nature” in particular. In response, Feingold has argued 
that this distinction between abstract and concrete nature is incom-
patible with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Feingold questions 
the very distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” as it pertains 
to nature. “For St. Thomas,” Feingold writes, “a nature is necessarily 
the same in all the individuals that participate in that nature. It is the 
 individual that is historical and concrete, and not the nature or essence 
itself.” 91 A particular human person has individuated matter and acci-
dental forms, which are not accounted for by human nature as such. 
But one cannot, in the Aristotelian-Thomist world of discourse, turn 
“abstract nature” into something concrete. 
 Feingold argues that a significant divergence exists between this 
line of reasoning and Aquinas. For Aquinas, in Feingold’s reading, 
our intrinsic supernatural finality is “the result of an  accidental form 
(sanctifying grace), given through  Baptism and justification.” 92 For de 
Lubac, our supernatural finality is, as noted above, essential to our con-
crete nature as created in the image and likeness of God. Critical of de 
Lubac, Feingold argues that if indeed a supernatural finality has been 
imprinted on our concrete nature, elevating our natural desire for God 
to a desire for the supernatural, then it necessarily involves the recep-
tion of sanctifying grace and hence a reception of a supernatural ele-
ment. 93 Feingold has raised an important question and in many ways 
offers a viable critique of de Lubac. I return to the relationship between 
the desire for God and sanctifying grace in chapter 4. 
 Similar to Feingold, Steven Long orients his reader to the fallacy of 
concrete nature. Long argues that “nature is not merely a negative con-
cept, a sort of empty theological Newtonian space” providing a vacuole 
for grace; rather, nature has “an ontological density and proportion-
ate end.” 94 Contemporary Roman Catholic theology, he observes, has 
tended to dissolve the structure of human nature into a limit concept. 95 
This de Lubac-Balthasar theological frame privileges concrete nature as 
it exists within a vocational narrative, attentive to graced, fallen, and 
redeemed humanity. In doing so, it diminishes the proportionate natu-
ral end as unintelligible in its own right. Long acknowledges that the 
human  subject , of course, is concrete. Although the subject has a nature, 
the concrete subject in the world is either more or less than its nature, 
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depending on whether we consider concretely the way evil impedes 
or frustrates human nature. 96 Still, for Long, even if one recognizes the 
concreteness of human subjectivity, one ought not to dismiss the rich 
ontological density of human nature. Human nature is not simply a 
limit concept, but rather something created by God. 97 
 Human nature is a real principle in the human person, and its species 
is derived, not from the ultimate supernatural end of beatifi c vision, but 
from its proportionate natural end. Nothing in this, however, is to sug-
gest that the natural end in its proper integrity and completeness may 
be attained apart from grace in the actually existing providential order. 
Nor can the ultimate supernatural end be attained by one who rejects the 
impress of the divine wisdom in the natural law and its dominion over 
his actions. 98 
 For Long, nature has a theonomic character. This ontologically dense 
account of the intelligibility of nature constitutes a limited participation 
in the eternal law. Long’s larger concern with de Lubac’s and Balthasar’s 
rejection of an ontologically dense account of nature involves an “anti-
nomian rejection” of the magisterium’s authoritative teaching in mat-
ters of faith and morals. 99 Moral experience does not involve a direct 
connection to the supernatural beatific vision without regard for cre-
ated goods. In our moral lives, we do not simply face non-being, on 
the one hand, and the beatific vision, on the other hand. Rather, for 
Long, the “grammar of our assent to God weaves into its fundament all 
those subordinate natural teleologies that are further ordered in and by 
grace.” The moral theology of marital fidelity exhibits this interlocking 
set of teleologies. Spousal relations constitute a natural human good. 
They also represent a sacramentally blessed natural good. “There is not 
hope,” writes Long, “of seeking God through  infidelity to one’s spouse, 
because this does not merely violate the subordinated natural teleology 
but also – since that teleology  itself is further ordered and elevated in 
grace – it contravenes supernatural charity.” 100 
 In the subsequent chapters of this book, I take seriously Feingold’s 
and Long’s call for a richer, more ontologically dense account of nature. 
For now, I want to highlight David Braine’s recognition of de Lubac’s 
philosophical informality. Though just as critical in some respects as 
Feingold and Long, Braine encourages a softer, more sympathetic read-
ing of de Lubac’s claim about concreteness. Braine claims that “the 
supernatural finality with which de Lubac is concerned is the end which 
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man has according to the order of providence in which the whole of cre-
ation is actually set, the plan actually chosen by God and operative in 
religion as it is.” 101 De Lubac’s references to “concrete, historic human 
nature” and a supernatural finality “imprinted” or “inscribed” on 
human nature would be better served and more accurate with reference 
to the language of persons and personhood. Braine affirms de Lubac’s 
instinct to return to existential and personalist categories. Such a return 
would inch us away from the “excessive naturalism and essentialism” 
expressed in the Thomistic tradition from Cajetan through Suárez and 
John of St Thomas to Garrigou-Lagrange. 102 
 The tension between de Lubac and Feingold/Long prompts us to 
ask whether “pure nature” and “concrete nature” are our only options. 
Anticipating my retrieval of Lonergan in the chapters to come, I suggest 
that, while Lonergan believed pure nature was a marginal theorem, he 
strongly affirmed the speculative power of the category of nature. Thus 
it is fitting to turn to the work of Jean-Pierre Torell for a third way – the 
way of integral nature. 103 
 The expression  natura pura , as Torrell notes, cannot be found in the 
works of Aquinas. Thomas does use the term  pura naturalia . He does not 
give this term a technical meaning, but it is clear that he distinguishes 
this from  gratuita , the goods of grace. Torrell advises, given the term’s 
complicated fate, translating  in statu naturalium not as “in the state of 
pure nature,” as is sometimes the case, and instead speaking of man’s 
“natural powers alone.” 104 It is clear in Thomas that this phrase is not 
the equivalent of pure nature in its sixteenth-century coinage, for it is 
only thought to be a temporary state as persons wait for God to elevate 
the creature by sanctifying grace. The term does, however, preserve 
the gratuity of grace and provides the concept of nature with a certain 
autonomy in relation to grace. 105 But Torrell notes that the term “inte-
gral nature” does much of the same work, and is more helpful in its 
explanatory power. Occurring forty-nine times in the works of Thomas, 
the state of “integral nature” designates the state of Adam before the 
fall. This state includes the privileges with which God endowed Adam 
at the moment of his creation, but abstracted from sanctifying grace. 
Integral nature preserves both the gratuity of grace and the autonomy 
of the natural order. 106 
 Part of  natura integra’s explanatory power is the inclusion of its cor-
relative term,  natura corrupta . In the corrupted state, human nature is 
not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to lose all natural goods. Torrell’s 
inventory shows that “the loss of the state of innocence did not return 
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the first man to a chimerical state of pure nature, which he had never 
known.” 107 Rather, the human condition that remained after sin is that 
of a human person who from the first instance had God as the ultimate 
end. The human person was capable of knowing and loving God at the 
supernatural level, called to live in beatific communion. The depriva-
tion of the possibility of attaining this end leaves the human being in a 
sorrowful state of frustration. Aquinas insisted that Adam was created 
from the beginning with the reception of grace and hence “did not live 
for a second under a regime of pure nature.” 108 
 Obediential Potency and the Aesthetic Compromise 
 In a letter to de Lubac, Étienne Gilson expressed his opinion on the defi-
ciency of the term “obediential potency.” 109 This term, Gilson reflects, 
mainly refers to miracles, “where nothing in matter either prepares for, 
expects, or makes the phenomenon possible.” 110 “Nobody will ever be 
able to capture, in a phrase,” opines Gilson, “the synchronous, but not 
identically-related, natural and supernatural character of this natural 
desire to see God.” 111 De Lubac, on the whole, concurs with Gilson, even 
if he carves out a space for the use of the term. De Lubac especially 
questions Cajetan’s use of “obediential potency,” which he finds wholly 
alien to Aquinas’s. Obediential potency was often connected to the pos-
sibility of miracles occurring. Affirming obediential potency should not 
imply, for de Lubac, that human beings possess a purely natural final-
ity, and then are only fitted to receive a supernatural finality beyond or 
against nature by a miraculous intervention. Rather, for Thomas, “it is 
precisely because the ultimate finality of this human nature is super-
natural that it can receive sanctifying grace.” 112 There is both an “obedi-
ential potency” and a certain “natural order” to the reception of grace. 
In the case of miracles, there is no such natural order. 113 In other words, 
as I said in chapter 1, the relationship between the human spirit and the 
supernatural, for de Lubac, ought not be characterized in terms of what 
is “abnormal” in the sense that a miracle is abnormal. 114 This character-
ization contributed to the sense that the supernatural was something 
super-added to an already enclosed nature. In order to preserve the 
more fitting use of the term, de Lubac suggests that the “passive poten-
tiality” that marks “human nature in relation to that supernatural gift” 
can be called “specific obediential potency.” 115 
 It is important to distinguish  obediential potency in general and the more 
specific  obediential potency proper to human nature . In terms of obediential 
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potency in general, the theologians of the thirteenth century meant the 
creature’s capacity to receive a perfection directly from God, beyond 
the order of natural causes. In other words, the natural laws of the cre-
ated order do not limit the Creator. This is exemplified by the biblical 
account of miracles where the winds and sea obey him. 116 As a clarifica-
tion by contrast, obediential potency in general is distinguished from 
natural passive potency. Whereas “natural passive potency” refers to 
our passive receptivity to be moved by secondary causes, “obedien-
tial potency” refers to the passive receptivity to be moved directly by 
God. 117 
 Specific obediential potency, however, refers to the fact that spiritual 
creatures – angels and humans – have transcendent obediential poten-
cies that are unique to them. 118 This is the capacity “to receive super-
natural perfections without losing one’s nature and identity.” 119 For 
Feingold, the principle of non-repugnance or non-contradiction should 
not be disregarded as only negative. It also implies astonishing possi-
bilities – that of a spiritual creature who maintains its essential nature 
or personal identity while at the same time being called from natural 
to supernatural likeness. 120 In a related manner, Nicholas Healy high-
lights de Lubac’s tentative support for a minimal use of the language 
of obediential potency. In the economy of salvation, God has placed 
a natural basis in human nature for the call to our supernatural end. 
In other words, at the heart of created nature there is a kind of recep-
tive readiness, which he also calls specific obediential potency, except 
that de Lubac is not satisfied by the ability of the term “passive non-
repugnance” to capture this dynamic pattern. 121 
 For many neo-Thomists, obediential potency reveals a  convenien-
tia for the beatific vision. This natural desire constitutes “a powerful 
argument from fittingness, first for the possibility of the beatific vision 
of God, as well as for its actual offer.” 122 This emphasis on fittingness 
or  convenientia constitutes what Milbank calls the Thomist “aesthetic 
compromise.” 123 Arguments from fittingness are in part aesthetic argu-
ments. In Feingold’s argument from fittingness, for example, the natu-
ral desire for God disproportionately exceeds the limits of what is due 
to nature. Hence, it cannot furnish a “strict demonstration of the pos-
sibility of the beatific vision (and certainly not its actual offer), although 
it does prove that  perfect beatitude for the intellectual creature can only 
lie in the vision of God.” 124 
 Milbank notes the possibility of both consonance and incompatibil-
ity between Thomist and Lubacian thought. Is there a clear difference 
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between the Thomist aesthetic compromise and de Lubac’s thesis? 
There is much consonance, Milbank suggests, if one understands the 
 convenientia of human nature for supernatural elevation as intrinsically 
participating in divine wisdom. This view envisions human nature as 
teleologically drawn to the beatific vision without claiming that human 
nature elicits it. On the other hand, if  convenientia is presented in a more 
extrinsic manner, then incompatibility abounds. A conflicting view 
of the aesthetic compromise would communicate “an already replete 
human nature” lending itself to “a further end and purpose added on 
to it by God – as if, for example, a railway carriage turned out to be an 
ideal home for gypsies after the closure of the branch line, and a ruling 
government proclaimed that this had always been secretly envisaged 
by the earlier government that built railways in the first place.” 125 In 
this interpretation, the Thomist aesthetic compromise finds itself in dis-
agreement with the  nouvelle théologie . 
 The Intelligibility of Nature and the Human Good 
 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the debate over pure nature 
and the natural desire for God involves more than just quibbling over 
academic subtleties. De Lubac believed the hypothesis of pure nature 
constituted a “cancerous growth on the tree of theological develop-
ment” 126 – a development with deleterious implications for our social, 
cultural, and political life. Granting legitimacy to a purely natural end 
created the conditions, in John Milbank’s interpretation of de Lubac, 
for a “conception of individual and social self-sustaining in terms of 
the logic of survival and preservation of material well-being and free-
dom.” 127 The logic of self-sufficiency ended up trumping the  telos of 
flourishing. The autonomous self severed from morality, religious prac-
tice, and “mystical self loss,” suggests Milbank, results in “joyless disci-
plinary programs for the maximizing of corporeal efficiency, and in the 
long run in nihilistic cults of individual and collective power.” 128 The 
denial of “the natural desire for the supernatural” leads us to a situa-
tion where politics is just about politics and not about a holistic vision 
of human flourishing. Milbank’s attempt to capture the larger implica-
tions of pure nature theory in a Lubacian vein here certainly raises more 
questions than it offers easy answers. 
 Feingold disputes this trajectory of thought. Naturalism, atheism, and 
secularism have come about not by neo-Thomism, but through “a deni-
gration of the natural order and the power of natural reason” to know 
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“the essences of natural things, natural law, and the existence of God.” 129 
Hence, for Feingold, fourteenth-century nominalism was the culprit, 
only to be augmented by the Protestant Reformation and carried fur-
ther by Kant and philosophies that depend on his critique of reason. 130 
Modern atheism, as exemplified by Sartre, for example, rejects both the 
connatural end and the supernatural end of human nature. The most 
fitting response, then, requires a “defense of the natural order (the  Logos 
in nature) together with the supernatural, ‘engaging the whole breadth 
of reason,’ as we find eminently in the Thomistic tradition.” 131 Though 
there is certainly truth to Feingold’s account, an acknowledgment of the 
dialectical pattern evident in the emergence of atheism might complicate 
the neatness of his argument, lending a certain credence to Milbank’s 
narrative. I suggest that the “pure nature” argument reflects something 
like the bracketing of the specifically religious in order to defend the God 
of religion. 132 This apologetic strategy asserts implicitly, as Michael Buck-
ley argues, “the cognitive emptiness of the very reality one was attempt-
ing to support.” 133 This dialectical unraveling is generated by omitting 
the particularity of religious life and experience in favour of natural 
philosophy – in this case the doctrine of pure nature. Again, even if de 
Lubac overstated the deleterious power of pure nature, it is plausible to 
explore further whether a dimension of the rise of extrinsicism resulted, 
in part, from this rather unintentional dialectical negation. 
 A similar tension can be detected in Steven Long’s critique of David 
Schindler, a prominent thinker in the  ressourcement tradition. Accord-
ing to Long – and this is an extension of his critique of de Lubac and 
Balthasar mentioned above – Schindler “seemingly thinks that natu-
ral truth and prudence offer to the mind in search of God no point of 
analogical reference or middle term that is distinct from supernatural 
revelation.” 134 Rather, nature is constituted predominantly by its rela-
tion to the supernatural (de Lubac and Balthasar), which provides the 
basis for Christian discourse with the world. Schindler’s insistence on 
emphasizing nature’s orientation to the supernatural seems to depreci-
ate, for Long, the intelligibility of nature itself. An ontologically dense 
account of nature, on the other hand, offers “genuine but limited 
wisdom regarding creation, providence, and moral life” that “might 
develop and contribute to man’s public life.” With his intellectual com-
mitments, Schindler is “constrained to judge political, legal, social, and 
cultural order with too little aid from natural truth and prudence.” 135 
For Schindler, the privileging of an intelligible natural order tends to 
valorize  autonomy over  created receptivity in social life. Understanding 
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human dignity merely in terms of intelligence and freedom easily slips, 
in Schindler’s view, into an understanding of the human person as 
autonomously independent from God. Can such an image do justice to 
the ground of human dignity, which is a positive, constitutive relation 
to God received as gift? 136 
 Though Long rightly calls for a more robust retrieval of “nature,” the 
potential reach of his position may be stunted by a kind of “Christian 
epistemic superiority.” 137 Authentic social cohesion, for Long, requires 
agreement on the speculative truths of natural law and a recognition 
that the Church is “our tutor in the natural law.” 138 Though these truths 
are knowable apart from revelation, their “ full existential appropriation 
and application requires advertence to truths only accessible through 
revelation.” 139 
 I take seriously Long’s critique of the Lubacian position as presenting 
too anorexic an account of nature. My development of Lonergan’s rich 
and dynamic account of nature in subsequent chapters might be under-
stood in parallel with Long’s project of retrieving the intelligibility of 
nature. That said, I agree with Bushlack that the natural intelligibility of 
human nature can be safeguarded “without recourse to the chimerical 
state of pure nature and without adverting to a form of Christian epis-
temic superiority with regard to natural law reasoning.” 140 For Bush-
lack, Long’s proposal lacks a measure of epistemic humility. Bushlack’s 
alternative requires both a commitment to the human mind’s capacity 
to know the truth and the “requisite humility demanded of one’s pil-
grim status in this world.” The cultivation of “epistemological humil-
ity” and “intellectual solidarity” creates spaces for reasoning together 
with all people of good will about moral truth in pursuit of the common 
good. 141 Still, a more substantive account of integral nature not only 
preserves the gratuity of the supernatural order, but also creates more 
“conceptual breathing room for recognizing a public space for Chris-
tian engagement in rational deliberation about the natural, penultimate 
goods of the political community.” 142 Furthermore, my own retrieval of 
Lonergan’s thought later in this book provides of way of integrating, 
and not opposing, autonomy and receptivity. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter highlighted some of the central tensions between the fol-
lowers of de Lubac and contemporary neo-Thomists of various stripes, 
on issues related to the natural desire to see God. In light of these 
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tensions, I will highlight in summary fashion four sets of questions that 
emerged. 
 First, what human operations are at work in our natural desire to see 
God? Are they primarily associated with the intellect or the will? And 
is this human desire simply  natural or  naturally elicited and  conditional 
as Feingold argued? 
 Second, do human beings have both natural and supernatural ends? 
If so, are they intrinsically related or relationally constituted? And in 
what sense can we say that our natural end corresponds to a propor-
tionate human happiness, apart from our supernatural end? What place 
does an explanatory term like “obediential potency” have in a contem-
porary systematic-theological presentation of the human desire to see 
God, cast as it is in metaphysical discourse? Is it more adequate to turn 
to the phenomenological language of gift and receptivity? Is our orien-
tation to God more a question of fittingness or do we have by our very 
nature an innate orientation to the beatific vision? 
 Third, how might we navigate the tension between “pure nature” 
and “concrete nature”? Is “integral nature” a more potent explanatory 
term? How might this conversation look when nature is understood in 
more concrete terms – as suggested by de Lubac and Balthasar – but in 
a way that offers a less anorexic, more substantive and ontologically 
dense account, called for by many Thomists? 
 Finally, in light of de Lubac’s connection between the theory of pure 
nature and its implications for religious extrinsicism and political resis-
tance (or lack thereof), what is the relationship between the intelligibil-
ity of nature and the human good? Can a more substantive account of 
integral nature not only preserve the gratuity of the supernatural order, 
but also create space for a substantive engagement in intelligent delib-
eration about the natural, penultimate goods of the political commu-
nity, including the resources for cultural and political resistance? What 
is the relationship between substantive human goods and supernatural 
goods, and how might we avoid an extrinsicism in this regard? 
 In light of these tensions and questions, the next few chapters retrieve 
key aspects of Lonergan’s thought, mindful both of Lubacians’ legiti-
mate concern with the concrete and historical and of many Thomists’ 
equally pressing concern for a more substantive account of nature. 
 PART 2 
 A Lonergan Retrieval: Pure Nature to 
Concrete Subject 

 3  The Erotic Roots of Intellectual Desire 
 Part 2 of the book explores Lonergan’s distinctive contributions to the 
debate explored above. This chapter focuses on the question of what 
human operations are at work in our natural desire to see God. Are 
they primarily associated with the intellect or the will? For Lonergan, 
the natural desire to see God is rooted in intellectual desire – the pure, 
unrestricted desire to know, which constitutes the focus of this chapter. 
How Lonergan’s position relates to Feingold’s claim that this human 
desire is “naturally elicited” and “conditional” will be treated in the 
next chapter. 
 Although it is understandable that the current debates over the natu-
ral desire for God take this kind of desire for granted, human ratio-
nality’s intrinsic orientation to transcendence is no longer self-evident. 
Does not human desire, many conjecture, include more than the human 
subject on an intellectual quest asking and answering questions – as 
central as this is to human experience? Indeed, postmodern thinkers 
have challenged us to prioritize the  other or  what is otherwise . The fields 
of hermeneutics and sociology of knowledge have illuminated the 
contingent, historical, and socially constructed dimensions of human 
knowledge and the plurality and ambiguity that accompany such fluid-
ity. 1 There is something profoundly true about this – a reality that will 
be acknowledged in Part 3 of this book, which explores other-mediated 
and socially mediated desire. Still, even if Lonergan contextualized the 
human desire to know more broadly within the multidimensional expe-
rience of the life-world, he never diminished this human desire to know 
the truth, and the rich nobility that accompanies this desire. Lonergan’s 
thought addresses in a distinctive way the challenge to engage the 
“whole breadth of reason and not to deny its grandeur.” 2 
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 Analogy and Dialectic: Two Theological Trajectories 
 It is useful to situate this discussion of the relationship between intel-
lectual desire and divine transcendence within the two major concep-
tual frameworks that often frame systematic-theological tensions: the 
analogical and the dialectical. My aim is simply to outline the basic 
trajectory of these two distinct but not unrelated theological languages. 3 
Lonergan’s account of the eros of the human mind falls within the ana-
logical tradition – a tradition that nevertheless includes, as I note below, 
a dialectical moment. 
 The analogical framework prioritizes a “language of ordered relation-
ships articulating similarity-in-difference.” 4 Or as the oft-cited Fourth 
Lateran Council put it: within every similarity there is an ever-greater 
dissimilarity. Mindful of the goodness of the created order, analogical 
thinking emphasizes creaturely participation in meaning, truth, good-
ness, and love, which is the very meaning, truth, goodness, and love of 
the One who created the universe. Though it privileges the goodness 
of the human quest, a constitutive dimension of analogical thinking is 
also that of dissimilarity or negation. Hence, God is good, but not in the 
same way that creatures are good. God is the source of goodness, but 
to regard God as just another good in the great chain of goods would 
be to lose the ineffable core of the mystery of God. The moment of dis-
similarity – the negative dialectic within the analogy – negates “any 
slackening of the sense of radical mystery, any grasp of control of the 
event and the similarities in difference” of God, self, and the world. 5 
Analogical language surely focuses on experiences like trust, wonder, 
and giftedness, revealing a sense of harmony between human beings 
and the whole of reality. That said, when analogical theologies “lose 
that sense for the negative, that dialectical sense within analogy itself, 
they produce not a believable harmony among various likenesses in 
all reality but the theological equivalent of ‘cheap grace’: boredom, ste-
rility and an atheological vision of a deadening univocity.” 6 Perhaps 
one finds this tendency in the worst of the neo-scholastic manualist 
tradition described in chapter 1. This kind of conceptualism exhibits a 
capitulation to “the clear and distinct, the all-too-ordered and certain, 
the deadening, undisclosive and untransformative world of the dead 
analogies.” 7 It is committed to certitude and not understanding, to uni-
vocity and not unity-in-difference. 
 The dialectical theological linguistic framework suggests, on the 
other hand, that the “participatory trust in similarities and continuities 
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of the analogical language traditions” cannot account for “the rupture 
at the heart of human pretension, guilt and sin.” 8 A core dimension of 
this theological style is to develop a theoretical framework that miti-
gates the temptation to find any easy continuity between Christianity 
and culture. At its extreme, this trend tends to negate any possibility of 
a positive point of contact between God and humanity, and emphasizes 
instead the “irrevocably, dialectical reality of God’s revealed Word in 
Jesus Christ.” 9 
 Thomas Joseph White offers a helpful dichotomy that illuminates the 
dialectical and analogical traditions as they relate to the question of a 
natural point of contact between God and human beings. 10 For White, 
Karl Barth’s position offers a “radical vision of the extrinsic transcen-
dence of grace to nature” correlated to a “disavowal of any predispo-
sition or potential inclination in human nature for the gift of divine 
life.” 11 One cannot find in human nature a “natural point of contact” for 
grace to elevate; grace is required to create the conditions for its own 
reception. This Barthian position distrusts attempts by Thomists “to 
demonstrate a natural openness to God by way of philosophical assent 
through metaphysical analysis of created being and through a corre-
sponding reflection on the natural final end of man as made in some 
real way for the contemplation and love of God.” 12 De Lubac, on the 
other hand, as we discussed in the last two chapters, argues, more in the 
analogical tradition, for a natural inclination towards the supernatural 
that is inscribed in the human spirit from its creation. “We are always 
and everywhere,” writes White, “animated by a latent natural desire 
for the gratuitous gift of supernatural beatitude, the vision of God.” 13 
Unlike Barth’s rejection of a natural point of contact, de Lubac finds in 
the natural capacities of the human person an innate, inherent inclina-
tion towards divine life, even though paradoxically one cannot achieve 
this on one’s own. 14 White affirms that the Barthians and Lubacians 
are both safeguarding important truths. Whereas the Barthians aim to 
“uphold the transcendence and gratuity of grace vis-à-vis all natural 
dispositions or inclinations,” Lubacians wish to preserve “the deeply 
congruent rapport of nature’s inner aspirations and the teleological 
promptings of grace, sealed within one concrete economic providence 
of God with respect to spiritual creatures.” 15 In light of their respec-
tive emphases – gratuity of salvation vis-à-vis human effort (Barth) 
and the restless heart yearning for healing and elevating grace (de 
Lubac) – Whites suggests the need for harmonization, which he finds in 
“recourse to a certain kind of  philosophical reading of Aquinas regarding 
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the final end of man.” 16 In a related way, this book finds recourse in the 
thought of Lonergan. 
 The Diminishment of Intellectual Desire 
 Having just established a broad analogical-dialectical framework, I turn 
now to a trend that tends to diminish the analogical power of intellec-
tual desire – a trend largely dialectical in character. For heuristic pur-
poses, I focus the conversation on Girardian scholar James Alison and 
his critique of the natural desire to see God in light of mimetic theory. 
Alison’s  The Joy of Being Wrong and  Raising Abel represent a fundamen-
tal rethinking of theological anthropology, Christology, and soteriology 
in light of Girard’s groundbreaking contribution. 
 In Alison’s “anthropology of conversion,” the dimension of being 
human that most requires transformation is mimetic desire, and espe-
cially the violent expression of this desire that emerges ubiquitously in 
the human life-world. 17 In many ways, Alison communicates – in light 
of the analogical/dialectical discussion above – a more dialectical read-
ing of human desire. 
 This anthropological understanding links an understanding of the mimetic 
nature of desire with an understanding of the violent nature of desire, the 
resolution of that violence in the form of victimage, and eventually, the 
overcoming of the pattern of desire in question by a pattern of desire that 
is a rupture from, and yet in continuity with, the old pattern. 18 
 Any account of human desire requires, then, a reckoning with rivalistic 
desire, the resolution of this tension in scapegoating, and the arduous 
task of reorienting our patterns of desire in non-violent ways. I attempt 
to do justice to a Girardian account of the dark side of mimetic desire 
later in the book; here I focus on Alison’s account of natural desire, and 
especially on the natural desire for God. 
 Alison contrasts an “anthropology of grasping” with an “anthro-
pology of self-giving.” The anthropology of grasping perpetuates the 
romantic lie and the ongoing illusion of autonomy. It is rooted in what 
Girard calls “metaphysical desire” – the deviated desire to absorb the 
mediator of our desire into ourselves, especially the other’s imagined 
autonomy and uniqueness. The anthropology of self-giving, on the 
other hand, corresponds to another kind of desire – “an anterior desire” 
identified with the “creative love of God” and manifested “only as 
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self-giving.” 19 Grace is not lived by human beings who grasp the other. 
Alison extends his contrast of the “anthropology of grasping” and the 
“anthropology of self-giving” by considering more explicitly the themes 
of “self-transcendence” and “grace.” In this vein, he identifies what he 
understands as a problem with both “intrinsicist” and “extrinsicist” 
accounts of the relationship between nature and grace. He considers 
the problem to be not with the theology of grace itself but with a cor-
responding anthropology of reception: “The dilemma between grace as 
somehow ‘owed’ to a human and grace as somehow ‘already imbued 
in the human’ shows that the discussion is taking place entirely within 
an anthropology of grasping and appropriating and is not focusing on 
the necessary gratuity of the transformation into gratuitous receivers of 
what remains lived in gratuity.” 20 He relates this kind of grasping and 
appropriating to theologies that focus on universal human self-tran-
scendence and prefers, instead, a theology that prioritizes the gratuity 
of God made present in concrete human historical circumstances. 
 In this light, Alison is understandably ambivalent about affirming a 
natural desire for God, which we can only talk about, he suggests, if we 
first prioritize a God who forms us in purely non-rivalistic, self-giving 
desire. Without this foundation, our construction of desire remains 
within the dynamic of appropriation and exclusion. Alison recognizes a 
natural desire for being, but this is largely an idolatrous desire for being. 
In practice, we desire obstacles to God because we desire by grasping 
and not by receiving. It is only in the transformation of our receptivity 
that our desire becomes an authentic “desire from and for God and is 
discovered to be such not as something plastered over our distorted 
desires, but as the real sense behind even those distorted desires, as 
something anterior to them.” 21 This is a return to our original way of 
being in the world as gift and not as acquisition – as something to be 
recovered. 
 Although human desire is, for Alison, intrinsically good, he still 
emphasizes its idolatrous temptations. Thus, he is critical of transcen-
dental anthropologies that tend to pre-pardon “idolatry without trans-
forming the idolater, without giving him or her the chance of a real 
restructuring of heart.” 22 Here, his theological anthropology empha-
sizes not so much the critical choice between theism and atheism, but 
between the God of Life and the gods of idolatry. The nature-grace 
debates discussed in Part 1 are marred on both sides by a kind of resid-
ual rationalism. They tended to present a “rosy” view of human nature 
as a kind of a “neutral intellectual feat” and depended on a “rationalist 
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apologetics” that constructed “an intellectual scaffolding” in order 
to permit access to “the reality of God prior to the material proper to 
revelation.” 23 
 Many of Alison’s statements require both further examination and 
serious consideration. This book as whole attempts to do justice to his 
account of distorted desire, the need for conversion and the re-envision-
ing of reception, and the persistent temptation to idolatry (see chapters 
5 and 8). I will offer a more complex theology of religious love, grace, 
and receptivity in subsequent chapters. While Alison’s suspicions about 
erecting intellectual scaffolding that permits us access to God prior to 
revelation are warranted, it is still plausible to ask whether there are 
others ways to interpret the human desire for being – ways that cannot 
be reduced to residual rationalism or a neutral intellectual feat. 
 Beyond the “Erotic Cemetery”: Critical Realism and the 
Challenge of Intellectual Conversion 
 A substantive response to this plausible concern for residual rational-
ism and intellectual neutrality requires attention to the erotic roots of 
intellectual desire, the dimension of being human on which Lonergan 
builds his account of the natural desire for God. Accordingly, I frame 
Lonergan’s contribution to a recovery of the eros of the mind with a few 
images from the work of the phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion. It is 
not possible here to identify the variety of issues that would need to be 
worked out in a conversation with Lonergan and Marion. As I noted in 
the introduction, Lonergan deeply appreciated the phenomenological 
project, and one can detect the clear influence of phenomenology in the 
development of his thought. 
 Here I limit my framing to Marion’s call for the need to restore 
the erotic roots of human knowing. 24 Marion’s  The Erotic Phenomenon 
attempts to rethink the human person and the relationship of the human 
person to the other in terms of the “erotic reduction.” 25 The field of phi-
losophy is, in Marion’s words, an “erotic cemetery.” 26 He laments the 
loss of philosophy as the love of wisdom. Many contemporary visions 
of knowing, in his estimation, are impoverished by ideology – a knowl-
edge that sacrifices everything to power. The ubiquity of ideology dem-
onstrates that the human person does not automatically “love the truth” 
in practice and often “sacrifices it for a lie, provided this lie assures him 
power.” 27 By a forgetfulness of love and a corresponding loss of the erot-
ics of wisdom, the wider culture is condemned to “feed on the scraps” 
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of the “desperate sentimentalism of popular prose,” the “frustrated 
pornography of the idol industry,” and the “boastful asphyxiation” 
of “self-actualization.” 28 Marion identifies the loss of erotic rationality 
with the influence of Descartes. 29 With modernity’s emphasis on the 
primacy of thinking, love is relegated to the margins and reduced to a 
“passion.” The modern subject is “defined by the exercise of rational-
ity exclusively appropriate to objects and to beings,” exemplified by 
Descartes’s “ Ego cogito, ego sum ,” who principally thinks through the 
“ordering and measuring of objects.” 30 Within this horizon, our erotic 
events are considered “incalculable and disordered accidents” that are 
“happily marginalized,” and indeed can “do damage to the clear exer-
cise” of the primacy of our thinking. For Marion, however, we are pri-
mordially oriented to the world by the erotic. Descartes’s shocking and 
“monstrously mistaken description” points to the “erotic blindness of 
metaphysics.” 31 Marion finds it necessary then to prioritize erotic medi-
tations over metaphysical meditations – starting not with doubt but 
with “the fact that I  love even before being.” 32 For Marion, we desire 
to know for the pleasure of knowing – “perhaps the most exciting, the 
most durable, and the purest of the pleasures that is possible for us to 
experience in this life.” 33 
 Lonergan would reject the idea of substituting “erotic meditations” 
for “metaphysical meditations,” at least in the way that he himself 
defines metaphysics, which is certainly not Cartesian. But his thought 
deeply affirms the heart of Marion’s challenge, which is to recover the 
eros, the desire, the pleasure that constitutes the undertow of human 
knowing that precedes the actual content of knowing. To use Marion’s 
language, erotic meditations lead to metaphysical meditations. Or to 
put it in Lonergan’s own technical language: cognitional theory (What 
am I doing when I am knowing?) leads to epistemology (Why is doing 
that knowing?), which in turn brings us to metaphysics (What am I 
knowing when I am performing these activities?). In terms of the larger 
concerns of the nature-grace question, this a specifically Lonergan-
influenced way of affirming the Toulouse Dominican Gilbert Narcisse’s 
suggestion that “the problem is not only the relations of nature and 
grace, nor the natural desire for the supernatural, but above all that 
of being, of the consistency that we accord it and correlatively of the 
epistemological possibilities of attaining it in its ultimate meaning.” 34 It 
is unhelpful to “multiply hermeneutical worlds or ways of doing theol-
ogy” if we inadequately treat the desire to know and the ability to attain 
being. “For without being,” Narcisse writes, “grace vanishes, and we 
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risk falling into a kind of intellectual activism, as the mystics say about 
overly hurried disciples.” 35 
 Building on this conversation with Alison and Marion, let me sug-
gest that Lonergan offers a larger picture of self-transcendence that inte-
grates the eros of the human spirit and the gratuitous, gift-like realities 
prioritized by Alison. This chapter mainly focuses on the intellectual 
dimension. Subsequent chapters will examine other key dimensions 
of his holistic vision of self-transcendence: love, gift, intersubjectivity, 
among other themes. 
 Since I highlighted Narcisse’s defence of being above, it is pertinent 
to point the reader to Lonergan’s fuller philosophical system without, 
of course, having the space to explain it at length here. The epistemo-
logical correlates to the cognitional acts of experience, understanding, 
and judging are empirical, normative, and absolute objectivity. The 
metaphysical correlates are potency (material causality), form (formal 
causality), and act (existence). This cognitional-epistemological-meta-
physical framework constitutes, in a nutshell, what Lonergan calls the 
integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. 
 Lonergan’s critical realism is based on the fundamental “desire to 
know” as explained by Aristotle in the  Metaphysics. Building on Aristo-
tle, Aquinas provided a deeply penetrating theory of the nature of the 
human intellect. In his early work on Aquinas, Lonergan captures this 
complexity: 
 Hence the light of the intellect, insight into phantasm, acts of defi ning 
thought, refl ective reasoning and understanding, acts of judgment are 
above all psychological facts. The inner word of defi nition is the expres-
sion of an insight into phantasm, and the insight is the goal towards which 
the wonder of inquiry tends. The inner word of judgment is the expres-
sion of a refl ective act of understanding, and that refl ective act is the goal 
towards which critical wonder tends. The former answers the question, 
 Quid sit? The latter answers the question,  An sit? 36 
 In  Insight , Lonergan integrated what he discovered in Aquinas into a 
complex theory of human knowing – an explanatory theory that he sit-
uated within a differentiated account of the world process called “emer-
gent probability.” Human beings are endowed with the light and drive 
of intelligent inquiry, manifested through the asking and answering of 
questions. This drive is guided by the self-corrective process of know-
ing. Human beings possess a dynamically structured consciousness – 
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an awareness immanent in a dynamic pattern of cognitional acts. While 
some philosophers conceive of knowing in terms of perception, Loner-
gan conceives of knowing in terms of heuristic structure, in which dif-
ferent kinds of questions initiate sets of operations on different levels of 
conscious intentionality. Knowing is not simply a matter of deducing 
propositions, but of intelligent discovery made possible by the spirit of 
inquiry. This spirit of inquiry is the “prior and enveloping drive that 
carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understand-
ing, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete 
context of correct judgments that is named knowledge.” 37 
 In order to appreciate the rich nobility of intellectual desire, one 
must grasp the limitations of a naive realist position that identifies 
knowing with “taking a good look” at the “already-out-there-now-
real.” 38 Often, we think of consciousness as “in here” and being or 
the real as “out there.” This split is apparent, for instance, in Des-
cartes’s  res cogitans and  res extensa . Lonergan, however, overcomes 
this split by including conscious being as part of being. In chapter 11 
of  Insight , he challenges his readers to “an attentiveness of conscious 
operations” or a “heightening of consciousness.” After all, such an 
epistemology is not abstractly verified, but affirmed only through 
performance. Each person must ask, “Am I a knower?” Insofar as 
one performs these activities, and verifies in judgment that one is 
performing these activities, one is a knower on its way to further 
knowing. 39 This is a crucial move. Because if one affirms that one 
is a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, characterized by 
the acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, 
formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming, 
one is in fact transforming this conditioned into a virtually uncondi-
tioned. And because being is identified with correct judgments, and 
we have correctly judged that we in fact perform these activities, then 
conscious being is part of being. 
 Lonergan’s critical realism, then, affirms an Aristotelian account of 
consciousness-as-experience, which roots knowledge not in confronta-
tion but in identity: “the sense in act is the sensible in act, and in the 
case of immaterial beings that which understands is identical with that 
which is understood.” 40 With knowledge as identity, “it is not too dif-
ficult to conceive consciousness as experience strictly so called, which 
is in the operating subject on the side of the subject, and through which 
the operating subject is rendered present to itself under the formality of 
the experienced.” 41 Perhaps Walker Percy’s account of “knowledge by 
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identity” – which he is expressing to critique the reduction of knowing 
to a biological need – might illuminate Lonergan’s insight here: 
 For it will be knowledge, not in the sense of possessing “facts” but in the 
Thomist and existential sense of identifi cation of knower with the object 
known. Is it not possible that this startling semantic insight, that by the 
word I  have the thing, fi x it, and rescue it from the fl ux of Becoming around 
me, might not confi rm and illuminate the mysterious Thomist notion of 
the interior word, of knowing something by becoming something? That 
the “basic need of symbolization” is nothing more or less than the fi rst 
ascent in the hierarchy of knowledge, the eminently “natural” and so all 
the more astonishing instrument by which I transform the sensory content 
and appropriate it for the stuff of my ideas, and therefore the activity of 
knowing cannot be evaluated according to the “degree to which it fi lls 
a biological need,” nor according to the “degree to which the symbol is 
articulated,” but by nothing short of Truth itself. 42 
 The example of Augustine’s intellectual conversion in book 7 of the 
 Confessions can also illuminate the distinctiveness of critical realism. 
Though Augustine’s conversion transcends the intellectual, it would be 
inadequate to ignore the painful intellectual questions that plagued his 
quest. He experienced a real ontological dilemma of reasoning about 
God. Is God merely a supreme being? If so, then where is God? Can God be 
divided up so there is less God here and more God there? Can God 
be accounted for in spatial terms? Augustine reflects, “Whatever was 
not stretched out in space, or diffused or compacted or inflated or pos-
sessed of some such qualities, or at least capable of possessing them, 
I judged to be nothing at all.” 43 Extending this reasoning to God, he 
adds: “Hence, I thought that even you, Life of my life, were a vast real-
ity spread throughout space in every direction.” 44 The key to bringing 
his intellectual restlessness to rest involved an intellectual conversion: 
the transition from thinking about the real in terms of  spatial bodies to 
the real in terms of  intelligibility , which is a spiritual reality not intrinsi-
cally conditioned by space and time. In book 7, Augustine turns inward: 
“I proceeded further and came to the power of discursive reason, to 
which the data of our senses are referred to for judgment … And then 
my mind attained to  That Which Is … Then indeed did I perceive your 
invisible reality through created things.” 45 (This intellectual conversion 
was not the end of Augustine’s restlessness; in chapter 5, I turn to the 
religious and moral dimensions of his conversion.) 
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 In light of Lonergan’s account of the complexity of the knowing pro-
cess, I focus now on the fact that the kind of human knowing on which 
Lonergan grounds his account of the natural desire for God is rooted 
in a desire more erotic than is indicated by Alison’s critique of neutral, 
residual rationality. In fact, Lonergan refers to the desire to know – dis-
cussed above – as the “eros of the mind.” Lonergan’s identification of 
the erotic roots of knowing might be interpreted as an affirmation of 
Alison’s critique that a desire for being embodies a distorted anthropol-
ogy of grasping. After all, in his influential account of eros and agape, 
Anders Nygren represents eros as humanity’s longing for God – a long-
ing manifested in acquisitive desire and egocentric love. 46 While it is 
certainly true that eros longs for God in Lonergan’s account, it is not 
fully adequate to identify this longing as solely acquisitive and ego-
centric. In Lonergan’s account egoism, for example, distorts the pure 
desire to know. Egoism dismisses the “further pertinent questions” that 
would lead one to question one’s own selfish acts. The “cool schemer, 
the shrewd calculator, the hardheaded seeker” employ intelligence 
as an instrument for selfish purposes. Lonergan writes, “The egoist’s 
uneasy conscience is his awareness of his sin against the light.” 47 This 
experience of inner conflict is precipitated by both the eros of the mind 
to ask and answer further relevant questions and the fact that the ego-
ist refuses to grant licence to this erotic drive by declining to consider 
further relevant questions. To state it more positively, it is precisely con-
crete faithfulness to the eros of the mind that helps us overcome the 
dramatic, individual, group, and anti-theoretical biases that infect our 
minds and, by extension, human culture more broadly. 
 When considering the knowing process, Lonergan does not have in 
mind a dry rationality. As mentioned above, he characterizes the intel-
lectual dynamism as the “eros of the mind” – a desire that yearns for the 
“ecstasy of insight” and that parallels the way sexual climax brings sex-
ual eros to rest. The experience of insight releases the tension of inquiry. 
The dramatic example he offers is that of Archimedes’ discovery of the 
principles of hydrostatics. Lying in a bathtub, Archimedes experienced 
a “peculiarly uninhibited exultation” and ran into the streets proclaim-
ing “Eureka!” Lonergan highlights both his “outburst of delight” and 
the antecedent desire that fueled it: 
 Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is fi lled, 
there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, 
to fi nd the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted has many names. In what 
76 The Givenness of Desire
precisely it consists is a matter of dispute. But the fact of inquiry is beyond 
all doubt. 48 
 Lonergan does not identify human knowing first and foremost with 
arid concepts. In fact, Lonergan’s epistemological “enemy” is precisely 
what he terms “conceptualism.” A conceptualist account of knowing 
stresses universal concepts and propositions, over the prior acts of 
inquiry and insight. Lonergan emphasizes, however, the erotic roots of 
the pure desire to know. The fact of inquiry 
 can absorb a man. It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, 
in the narrow prison of his study or laboratory. It can send him on dan-
gerous voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from other interests, 
other pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can fi ll his waking 
thoughts, hide him from the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fab-
ric of his dreams. It can demand endless sacrifi ces that are made without 
regret though there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of success. 
What better symbol could one fi nd for this obscure, exigent, imperious 
drive, than a man, naked, running, excitedly crying, “I’ve got it”? 49 
 Lonergan’s later distinction between the “categorial” and the “transcen-
dental” modes of intending help illuminate this distinction between 
concepts and this eros of the human spirit. 50 This distinction relates 
to the worry of many  ressourcement theologians about the conceptual-
ism that shaped theological training in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Recall the emphasis placed on the memorization of proposi-
tions. “Categorial,” in Lonergan’s usage, denotes the use of categories 
as determinations. They are needed “to put determinate questions and 
give determinate answers.” But they also have a limited denotation and 
vary with cultural variations, whether the classification associated with 
Totemism or the Aristotelian categories or the achievements of modern 
physics, the periodic table of the chemist or the evolutionary tree of 
the biologist. The transcendental, on the other hand, are “comprehen-
sive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural 
change.” The transcendentals are the “radical intending that moves us 
from ignorance to knowledge.” They are unrestricted in the sense that 
answers are never complete and are always open to further questions. 
They are comprehensive in the sense that they “intend the unknown 
whole or totality of which our answers reveal only part.” Formation 
in the early-to-mid-twentieth-century neo-scholastic mode tended to 
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prefer categories at the expense of understanding and the pursuit of 
further questions. 
 This radical transcendental intending of the eros of the human spirit 
articulated by Lonergan can also be experienced as a kind of transcul-
tural call to be faithful to the transcendental precepts – precepts that 
correspond to the four levels of conscious intentionality: be attentive, 
be intelligent, be rational, be responsible, and, in anticipation of chap-
ters 5 and 6, be loving. 51 With an eye to history, Lonergan suggests that 
a failure to follow the precepts results in a basic form of alienation in 
the person, but also compromises and distorts social and cultural prog-
ress, resulting in cumulative decline. 52 Lonergan extends this ecstatic 
account of knowing into his analogical framing of his theology of God: 
“Our subject has been the act of insight or understanding, and God is 
the unrestricted act of understanding, the eternal rapture glimpsed in 
every Archimedean cry of ‘Eureka.’” 53 
 Eros of the Mind I: Natural Theology 
 In light of this analysis of the eros of the mind and the richness of human 
knowing, I turn to several ways this erotic spirit shapes Lonergan’s 
theological presentation. The first has to do with Lonergan’s natural 
theology. This treatment does not attempt to exhaust every nuance of 
Lonergan’s proof for the existence of God, but just to show the impor-
tance of the high nobility of intellectual desire as it shapes Lonergan’s 
intellectual project – a richness that is no longer evident in many strands 
of modern theology. 
 Natural theology finds a multitude of objectors in the modern world. 
On the one hand, those inspired by Kant would suggest that real knowl-
edge of God is not possible due to the limits of ontological reasoning 
by the a priori concepts of the human mind. On the other hand, the 
heirs of Luther might object that real philosophical knowledge of God is 
thwarted due to the fallen human mind and distorted will. God-claims 
set apart from the revelation of God in Christ are by their nature preten-
tious and idolatrous. 54 
 Natural theology in Lonergan’s Thomist-inspired system is not meant 
to indicate a “discipline that would attempt to construct an understand-
ing of God in separation from Christian theology so as to judge the 
latter according to the criteria of knowledge of the former.” 55 Rather, it 
is, as Thomas Joseph White notes, a discipline “that inquires into the 
distinctly natural or intrinsic capacity of the human mind to come to 
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some real knowledge of the existence and nature of God by philosophi-
cal means, even though this knowledge is mediate and analogical.” 56 
 David Bentley Hart has recently revisited with a kind of interreli-
gious consciousness the connection between the mystery of human 
consciousness and the mystery of God. 57 Hart’s aim is largely one of 
clarification. He is responding in part to the rhetoric of the so-called 
New Atheists, who tend to exhibit a rather thin and even caricatured 
understanding of what many of the world’s great religious traditions – 
Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Vedantic and Bhaktic Hinduism – mean 
when they employ the term “God.” There is, he contends, a lack of 
appreciation for the “sophisticated and self-critical philosophical and 
contemplative schools” present in the history of such traditions. 58 In 
fact, Hart highlights “the moments when our experience of the world 
awakens us to the strangeness – the utter fortuity and pure givenness – 
of existence.” 59 “No less wonderful than the being of things,” he writes, 
“is our consciousness of them: our ability to know the world, to pos-
sess a continuous subjective awareness of reality, to mirror the unity of 
being in the unity of private cognizance, to contemplate the world and 
ourselves, to assume each moment of experience into a fuller compre-
hension of the whole, and to relate ourselves to the world through acts 
of judgment and will.” 60 
 In light of Hart’s recovery of this kind of intellectual tradition as 
more than a dry, rationalist mode of discourse, let me highlight some 
salient points about Lonergan’s position in  Insight. Lonergan’s argu-
ment for the existence of God is conditioned by his grasp of emergent 
probability in general and by his shift to human knowing as a scheme 
of recurrence in the concretely operating universe that is both emergent 
and hierarchically structured. The argument in syllogistic form states: 
“If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is com-
pletely intelligible. Therefore, God exists.” 61 The crucial identification 
of being with the real, and of the real with intelligibility rather than 
with bodily aggregates is grounded in the human capacity to transcend 
biologically extroverted consciousness, described above. The intelligent 
conception and reasonable affirmation of this one contingent fact about 
being implies that being is not only intelligible, but completely intelli-
gible. If in a judgment we affirm that something that exists or occurs is 
intelligible, then it is reasonable to conclude that everything that “is” is 
intelligible. Since there is no such thing as a brute fact, one may argue 
to a general transcendent knowledge that not only explains every con-
tingent fact, but also understands itself as the ultimate explanation. 
The Erotic Roots of Intellectual Desire 79
Otherwise, being would not be completely intelligible. But it is incoher-
ent to affirm that the intelligibility of the whole is a mere matter of fact, 
rather than the result of an intelligent principle. 
 The analogical correlate to this erotic, unrestricted desire to know is 
God conceived as an unrestricted act of understanding – God as the 
source of being that understands everything about everything. “God 
is an act, the content of which is the idea of being.” 62 When human 
subjects reach a virtually unconditioned, they do so because there are 
no further relevant questions. One who knows everything about every-
thing would also understand why there are no further questions. In this 
regard, Lonergan speaks of primary and secondary components of the 
unrestricted act, whose content is the idea of being. The primary com-
ponent of the idea of being is the self-understanding of the unrestricted 
act of understanding. If such an act did not understand itself, then there 
would be something it did not understand. It understands its reasons 
for being (unlike us), and the reason is precisely to understand. 63 The 
secondary component is that the unrestricted act understands every-
thing about everything. 
 Hart notes that Lonergan’s “complicated and ingenious” treatment 
of God as unrestricted intelligibility – an argument that is “powerful 
and evocative” and “inductively persuasive” – serves as an eminent 
example of the relationship between consciousness and the quest for 
God. “The essential truth to which Lonergan’s argument points,” writes 
Hart, “is that the very search for truth is implicitly a search for God.” 
The mind’s ascent “toward ever greater knowledge is, if only tacitly 
and secretly and  contre coeur , an ascent toward an ultimate encounter 
with limitless consciousness, limitless reason, a transcendent reality 
where being and knowledge are always already one and the same, and 
so inalienable from one another.” 64 “To believe that being is inexhaust-
ibly intelligible is to believe also – whether one wishes to acknowledge 
it or not – that reality emanates from an inexhaustible intelligence.” 65 
 Eros of the Mind II: The Emergence of the Question of God 
 In his essay “Theology in Its New Context” (1967) – an essay framed 
explicitly within John XXIII’s call for  aggiornamento – Lonergan offers 
a distinction between the abstract and the concrete, a distinction that 
would become crucial to his subsequent thinking on the question of 
God. 66 His burgeoning aim was to move theology from foundations in 
“the static to the dynamic, from the abstract to the concrete, from the 
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universal to the historical totality of particulars, from invariable rules 
to intelligent adjustment and adaptation.” 67 And the new foundation 
is the concrete subject operating under the exigencies of intellectual, 
moral, and religious conversion – an “ongoing process” that is “con-
crete and dynamic, personal, communal, and historical.” 68 More will be 
said below about the concrete subject operating within an intellectual, 
moral, and religious horizon and its relationship to the question of God. 
 Lonergan shifts the emphasis from an intellectual proof for God’s 
existence in the tradition of natural theology to an emphasis on the 
variety of ways  the question of God arises in the intellectual, moral, and 
religious dimensions of our concrete lives. That is, he emphasized the 
human call to self-transcendence and the way acts of self-transcendence 
enable the  question of God to emerge in one’s conscious horizon. In the 
midst of our attempt to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and respon-
sible, we may raise the following questions: “Does there or does there 
not necessarily exist a transcendent intelligent ground of the universe? 
Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? 
Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically 
cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to 
us?” 69 Lonergan’s point is that a commitment to intellectual rigour and 
moral authenticity allow for the question of God to enter the horizon of 
human knowledge, that is, of course, if its dynamism is not mutilated 
or abolished by ideology or other constrictions of the human spirit. And 
this question can also arise in light of being-in-love, a state that lies at 
the heart of religious experience in Lonergan’s conception. Religious 
experience, of course, takes on many forms and is part of a variety of 
human cultures; these forms are often marked by aberration, as Girard 
has shown us, illuminating the “precariousness of the human achieve-
ment of authenticity.” Still, for Lonergan, underneath “the many forms 
and prior to the many aberrations,” there also exists “an unrestricted 
being in love, a mystery of love and awe, a being grasped by ultimate 
concern, a happiness that has a determinate content but no intellectu-
ally apprehended object.” The question of God arises here when we ask, 
“With whom are we in love?” The question of God arises on different 
levels, but it does not follow, for Lonergan, that these are distinct and 
separate questions. 70 
 The questions are distinct but they are also cumulative. The question of 
God is epistemological when we ask how the universe can be intelligible 
… It is moral when we ask whether the universe has a moral ground and 
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so a moral goal. It fi nally is religious when we ask whether there is anyone 
for us to love with all our heart and all our soul and all our mind and all 
our strength. 71 
 Lonergan then connects the question of God to the theme of “pure 
nature.” It could be argued, he suggests, that the last question about 
love would not occur if the human person existed in the state of pure 
nature. “But man at present,” he adds, “does not exist in the hypotheti-
cal state of affairs named pure nature.” 72 
 By including the realm of “religious love” in this discussion of the 
question of God, Lonergan is envisioning a more dynamic interplay 
between theology and philosophy. For him, the multiple ways that the 
question of God emerges are “cumulative” and “belong together.” 73 He 
marginalizes, once again, the idea of “pure nature”: 
 One must not think that the question of God fundamentally is philo-
sophic, that in the state of pure nature it would not extend into theological 
terrain, that accidentally in the present state of affairs it merely happens 
to move out of its proper sphere and touch on matters that are theological. 
The vast majority of mankind have been religious. One cannot claim that 
their religion has been based on some philosophy of God. One can easily 
argue that their religious concern arose out of their religious experience. 74 
 Thus we should “put an end to the practice of isolating” these two dis-
ciplines – one of the implications of static essentialism noted below in 
chapter 4. For Lonergan, “the world of the theologian” is not an “iso-
lated sphere” cut off from human affairs. The static viewpoint, of course, 
leads to such isolation. By rejecting the static viewpoint, by conceiving 
theology as an ongoing process guided by method, “one puts an end to 
isolationism.” The concern of the theologian, he adds, is not “just a set 
of propositions but a concrete religion as it has been lived, as it is being 
lived, and as it is to be lived.” 75 
 It is pertinent to note that Lonergan articulated his account of the 
dynamic interpenetration of intellectual, moral, and religious conver-
sion with the example of Augustine explicitly in mind. Augustine’s 
movement from restlessness to rest in the  Confessions exhibits this 
dynamic interplay. 76 In Augustine’s case, one cannot overlook, as I 
said above, the importance of his intellectual conversion described 
in book 7 of the  Confessions. There I highlighted his experience of 
the ontological dilemma and the way the neo-Platonists helped him 
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think about the real not in terms of bodies but in terms of intelligibil-
ity. That being said, this intellectual conversion was not the end of 
Augustine’s restlessness. He was still caught in the grip of lust; he 
came to a more adequate conception of God, but could not figure 
out how to enjoy the presence of God. Augustine had a divided will 
incapable of doing the good. His moral conversion would only come 
about in the narrative of the  Confessions with his religious conversion. 
Having surrendered his freedom in favour of enslavement, Augus-
tine did not have the power to retrieve it on his own. Only with grace – 
a gratuitous encounter precisely exhibited in the “take and read” 
episode – was Augustine able to experience God in a holistic manner, 
intellectually, morally, and religiously. 
 Nowhere is this new way of situating the question of God within 
the horizon of intellectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence 
more apparent than in Lonergan’s rethinking of his “proof” for the 
existence of God. Shortly after the publication of  Method in Theology 
(1972), Lonergan delivered three lectures at Gonzaga University that 
are now published under the title “Philosophy of God, and Theol-
ogy” (1972). 77 Lonergan’s development in these lectures reveals a 
progressive acknowledgment of the deeply historical, sociological, 
and contextual dimensions of knowledge. For Lonergan, “what lies 
beyond one’s horizon is simply outside the range of one’s interests 
and knowledge: one knows nothing about and cares less. And what 
lies within one’s horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object 
of interest and of knowledge.” 78 Furthermore, any rigorous “proof,” 
including a proof for the existence of God presupposes both “the erec-
tion of a system in which all terms and relations have an exact mean-
ing” and “a horizon, a worldview, a differentiation of consciousness, 
that has unfolded under the conditions and circumstances of a par-
ticular culture and a particular historical development.” 79 Reflecting 
on his earlier formulated “proof” for the existence of God in  Insight 
(1957), Lonergan writes: 
 The trouble with chapter 19 of  Insight 80 was that it did not depart from the 
traditional line. It treated God’s existence and attributes in a purely objec-
tive fashion. It made no effort to deal with the subject’s religious horizon. 
It failed to acknowledge that the traditional viewpoint made sense only 
if one accepted fi rst principles on the ground that they were intrinsically 
necessary, and if one added the assumption that there is one right culture 
so that differences in subjectivity are irrelevant. 81 
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 In these 1972 lectures, Lonergan argues not against this position in 
 Insight , but that a “philosophy of God” ought to be situated within 
the discipline of systematic theology. Systematic theology affirms the 
relentless, even scientific, quest for understanding, while at the same 
time presuming the context of faith and the ongoing process of intellec-
tual, moral, and religious self-transcendence. It is “only in the climate 
of religious experience,” Lonergan wrote, “that philosophy of God 
flourishes.” 82 The “static viewpoint” of “deductivist logic” critiqued 
by Lonergan in his repositioning of natural theology involves a one-
sided emphasis on the logical control of meaning. Lonergan shares the 
concerns of de Lubac, Daniélou, and others about the dominance of 
rationalism in early-to-mid-twentieth-century theological formation, as 
noted in chapter 1. 
 Lonergan’s shift in emphasis from “proof” to the religious experi-
ence wherein the question of God emerges reveals his shift from  logic to 
 method . To understand the human control of meaning as logic is to prior-
itize, for Lonergan, the “deductivist ideal.” In this view, systems of thought 
are either true or false. Objectivity is considered “the fruit of immediate 
experience, of self-evident and necessary truths, and of rigorous infer-
ences.” 83 Lonergan’s vision is to integrate the quest for understanding 
and truth that presumably lies at the root of logic within a methodi-
cal understanding of human inquiry. His methodical view emphasizes 
complex human subjectivity where objectivity is not viewed as self-
evident but as “the fruit of authentic subjectivity, of being attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.” Lonergan captures this syl-
logistic style of theology as follows: “What God has revealed is true. 
God has revealed the mysteries of faith. Therefore the mysteries of 
faith are true.” 84 Such an exaggerated and simplistic view of objectiv-
ity “insisted on true propositions” and neglected the human subject, 
along with the complex conditions required for advancing towards the 
truth. 85 
 This shift from logic to method has implications for how one imag-
ines the theological task. When deductivist logic prevails, theology is 
imagined only as “the science of God and of all things in their relation 
to God.” 86 Lonergan, of course, does not want to relinquish the “scien-
tific” dimension of theology, nor does he want to thwart a wisdom per-
spective that relates in a holistic manner God and created reality. What 
a methodical viewpoint adds is attention to the relationship between 
religion and culture. Theology, in this frame, is “conceived as reflection 
on the significance and value of religion within a culture, and culture 
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itself is conceived, not normatively as though in principle there was but 
one human culture, but empirically and so with a full recognition of the 
many different manners in which sets of meanings and of values have 
informed human ways of life.” 87 
 The shifting of emphasis from natural theology to the emergence 
of the question of God within one’s conscious horizon is one thing; to 
presume the legitimacy of the question of God within contemporary 
culture shaped by modernity is another. As Lonergan indicated in his 
vision of theology in a new context, the connection between religion 
and culture is an essential domain of inquiry. 88 
 Eros of the Mind III: The Challenge of 
Bias and the Human Good 
 If Lonergan’s account of the eros of the mind does substantive specula-
tive work in his theological understanding of the God-human relation-
ship, it is also intimately tied to his account of human progress and 
attention to the other. One of the central issues associated with the post-
modern critique is “the priority of the ethical, or concern for the other, as 
constitutive of philosophical reflection.” 89 Does not Lonergan fall prey 
to the postmodern critique levelled at the modern subject’s “disembod-
ied intellect unencumbered by its historicity, unaware that experience 
is mediated through body and culture”? 90 Concrete subjectivity, as this 
book envisions, resists this claim. In fact, what Lonergan offers is a com-
mitment to the concrete subject as knower, but a knower situated within 
the larger drama of human living. Furthermore, in anticipation of the 
next chapter, Lonergan’s account of natural desire bears the self-critical 
resources for cultural and political resistance, and hence is exonerated 
from the deleterious effects of pure nature, suggested in the previous 
two chapters by the Lubacian diagnosis. 
 Lonergan’s account of the dialectical tensions in the human subject 
and human communities helps clarify the demands of progress. Con-
tinuous growth seems rare. There are biases and breakdowns. Loner-
gan writes, “Just as insight can be desired, so too it can be unwanted. 
Besides the love of light, there can be a love of darkness.” 91 In  Insight , 
Lonergan discusses four types of bias: dramatic, individual, group, and 
general. 92 Dramatic bias pre-consciously affects the level of experience. 
Often because of their painful nature, a dramatically biased subject cen-
sors certain images from entering consciousness. Affecting the level of 
understanding, individual egoism refuses to entertain certain relevant 
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questions. Although a particular group achieves common meaning, 
group bias causes group egoism, with its hindrances to intelligence and 
reasonableness. Finally, the most insidious form of bias, general bias, 
indicates an anti-theoretical orientation linked to a lack of concern for 
long-term results. 
 To reiterate what was said above in response to Alison’s concern 
for an “anthropology of grasping,” the inner conflict of the egoist is 
precipitated by both the eros of the mind to ask and answer further 
relevant questions and the fact that the egoist refuses to grant license 
to this erotic drive, declining to consider further relevant questions. 
Perhaps it is fitting to say something about group bias and general 
bias as well to reinforce the fact that faithfulness to eros of the mind 
does not represent a modern rationalist disconnected from the ethical 
imperatives of the other, but a concrete subject who concretely affects 
social and cultural life. 
 Group bias indicates the blind spots that develop within different 
socioeconomic groups. We have different classes, in part, because we 
have so many different tasks to be performed in the present social 
ordering. In one respect, it is intelligent and reasonable to divide up dif-
ferent tasks and set up cooperative schemes that will provide for basic 
and surplus needs within our social, religious, economic, and political 
communities. Commonsense or practical intelligence generates succes-
sive social orders with their need for new and more specialized tasks of 
commonsense knowing and doing. But power plays tend to call upon 
group loyalties to repress relevant questions that would generate new 
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible courses of action. Group egoism 
tends to provide excuses, rationalizations, and socially supported ide-
ology. And group egoism is perhaps “more damaging that individual 
bias,” for it finds “reinforcement from others and from shared theories 
and doctrines.” 93 Group egoism creates the conditions, in Lonergan’s 
terms, for a shorter cycle of decline. It infects society with “deep feelings 
of frustration, resentment, bitterness, and hatred.” 94 The bright side of 
the shorter cycle of declines is that it “creates the principles for its own 
reversal.” 95 Over time, group bias becomes a “grotesquely distorted 
reality,” exposing the “concrete distortions” for “the inspection of the 
multitude.” 96 Of course, such an exposure might lead to a variety of 
responses, including violent revolution or a truly progressive correc-
tion of the distortions and a corresponding plan for preventing future 
recurrence. But the point here is that openness to further questions and 
to insight has real bearing on progress and decline. 
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 In addition to group bias, Lonergan also includes another kind of 
bias, general bias, which is responsible for a “longer cycle of decline.” 
General bias extends its “legitimate concern for the concrete and the 
immediately practical into disregard of larger issues and indifference to 
long-term results.” 97 The linking of group bias with general bias results 
in a deeper, more insidious decline. In this state, there is a “neglect of 
long-term solutions good for the whole of society,” and consequently 
a neglect of “the kind of ideas that would reverse decline.” 98 A failure 
to live up to the transcendental precepts to be attentive, intelligent, 
rational, and responsible produces objectively absurd situations, where 
mistaken solutions are deemed intelligent, reasonable, and good. As 
Lonergan writes, “Imperceptibly the corruption spreads from the harsh 
sphere of material advantage and power to the mass media, the stylish 
journals, the literary movements, the educational process, the reigning 
philosophies.” 99 When this kind of deep and all-pervasive penetration 
occurs, then a “civilization in decline digs its own grave with a relent-
less consistency.” 100 Just as self-transcendence promotes progress, its 
refusal leads to cumulative decline. Such social deterioration and cul-
tural retreat lead, at its extreme, to a totalitarian situation, which iden-
tifies “reality” falsely with “the economic development, the military 
equipment, and the political dominance of the all-inclusive state.” 101 
The means of such a false metaphysical totalitarianism include “not 
merely every technique of indoctrination and propaganda, every tactic 
of economic and diplomatic pressure, every device for breaking down 
the moral conscience and the secret affects of civilized man, but also 
the terrorism of a political police, of prisons and torture, of concentra-
tion camps, of transported or extirpated minorities, and of total war.” 102 
Though Lonergan did not experience the challenge of actively resisting 
the Nazis, as de Lubac did, the horrors of history significantly shaped 
his intellectual endeavours. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on the kind of desire on which Lonergan bases his 
account of the natural desire to see God. Rooted in the pure, detached, 
unrestricted desire to know, Lonergan’s account of knowledge resists 
identifying the knowing of being with an act of idolatry. Noting the 
complexity of Lonergan’s critical realism, along with the passionate eros 
of the spirit, the chapter captured several ways in which this account of 
intellectual desire continues to shape a contemporary analogical style of 
The Erotic Roots of Intellectual Desire 87
theological judgments in terms of natural theology, a shift to the “ques-
tion of God,” and the human good. Having established his account of 
the erotic roots of intellectual desire, I turn now to Lonergan’s distinc-
tive contribution to the neo-Thomist-Lubacian debate on the natural 
desire to see God. 
 4 Concretely Operating Nature: 
Lonergan on the Natural 
Desire to See God 
 I highlighted, in chapter 2, several tensions operative in conversations 
between the Lubacian and neo-Thomist positions on nature and the nat-
ural desire for God. This chapter begins to develop some of Lonergan’s 
contributions to the debate over the natural desire for God, building 
on his commitment to the intellectual desire of the concrete subject dis-
cussed in chapter 3, a topic that will be developed further in chapter 5. 
 These pages retrieve key aspects of Lonergan’s thought, mindful on 
the one hand of the Lubacians’ legitimate concern with the concrete and 
historical and on the other hand of the call of many Thomists to affirm a 
more substantive account of nature. In light of the eros of the mind of the 
concrete subject, Lonergan’s account of nature in scholastic terms and 
in his more dynamic and scientifically influenced account of emergent 
probability responds to both of these challenges. This chapter responds 
to the issues highlighted in chapter 2 on the de Lubac-Thomist tensions. 
Nature, after all, doesn’t come to grace first with deficiency, but as a plen-
titude. “In order to take account of this ‘wounded nature’ in its historical 
becoming of sin and death,” as Gilbert Narcisse notes, “we must again 
start out from this original plentitude of being. It alone is capable of not 
substituting for the light of being and of grace, the twilight of the tragic 
human condition.” 1 Lonergan’s dynamic account of nature responds in a 
historically conscious way to this call to articulate the plenitude of being. 
 Lonergan did not comment on de Lubac often. His main concern with de 
Lubac’s work, however, was its lack of systematic precision. He believed 
de Lubac was at times “mixed up” and found some of his solutions unsat-
isfactory. He refers to the articles de Lubac published in the 1930s as a 
series of learned articles about sixteenth-century theologians. The problem 
was with the republication of the same articles with an added epilogue as 
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 Surnaturel . Lonergan writes, “The epilogue was a mistake! While de Lubac 
is a man of extraordinary erudition and also respected as a very holy man 
by people who have lived with him in his own Province, he is not a com-
petent speculative thinker. At least I don’t find that in him.” 2 
 There is much to affirm in de Lubac’s vision. On the one hand, the 
animating force beneath de Lubac’s claim ought to be embraced, but on 
the other hand, his presentation of the relevant systematic issues often 
falls short when considered from a speculative perspective. Lonergan’s 
position can, I think, be reconciled with many aspects of de Lubac’s. In 
what follows, I argue that Lonergan offers many systematic resources 
for addressing the heart of Henri de Lubac’s project, which is an attun-
ement to concrete human persons oriented to the supernatural in the 
world order, as it exists. At the same time, I respond both sympatheti-
cally and critically to several contemporary critiques of de Lubac, as 
expressed by Feingold and other neo-Thomists. 
 This chapter first outlines key features of Lonergan’s uses of the terms 
“nature” and “natural” in his earlier writings, with specific attention to the 
theological question of the natural desire to see God. I respond in a nuanced 
way to Feingold’s and Mansini’s claims about “naturally elicited desire.” In 
light of Lonergan’s distinctive position on natural and elicited desire, I turn 
to his account of the twofold end of the human person – an account that 
resists a static-essentialist view of human finality. With this more dynamic 
opening in mind, I then examine Lonergan’s concrete account of nature as 
emergent probability, which reflects some key features of contemporary 
conversations in science and religion. This explanation of emergent probabil-
ity sets the stage for an account of the vocation of concrete human subjects to 
ongoing intellectual and moral self-transcendence and the construction of 
the human good. The human desire for ever-greater fulfilment in various 
human goods – according to the normative scale of values – makes room 
for a conversation about our transcendent orientation, on the one hand, 
and the gratuity of divinization, on the other hand. Finally, the chapter 
explains Lonergan’s distinctive account of obediential potency and vertical 
finality within the concrete world order – an account that paves the way for 
an understanding of aesthetic fittingness in relation to our desire for God. 
 Nature I: Lonergan’s Scholastic Context 
 Lonergan spent a significant amount of time in his early academic career 
coming to grips with the complexities of Thomas Aquinas’s theology of 
grace. As he gratefully acknowledged, the years spent “reaching up to 
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the mind of Aquinas” changed him profoundly. 3 He completed his doc-
toral dissertation on operative grace in the writings of Aquinas in 1940 
and rewrote and published his investigation in  Theological Studies in 1941 
and 1942. 4 Both of these writings together now constitute volume 1 of 
the  Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan . In 1946, Lonergan composed a 
treatise,  On Supernatural Being ( De ente supernaturali ), now translated and 
published in volume 19 of the  Collected Works . Throughout the 1940s he 
wrote a series of articles that treated the theme of nature and grace, cul-
minating in his 1949 address before the Jesuit Philosophical Association, 
“The Natural Desire to See God” – an address given in the wake of Henri 
de Lubac’s controversial study  Surnaturel . Lonergan’s lecture on the 
natural desire to see God prompted him to return to “The Supernatural 
Order” and insert a clarification of his position on this vexed question. 5 
 Lonergan’s first treatment of nature in the scholastic context concerns 
the explanatory role it plays in conversations about grace and freedom. 6 
To state it in summary form, without nature, one is left only with a 
grace-sin dialectic. The category of “nature” made possible a more 
rigorous articulation of grace as both healing and elevating. Lonergan 
highlights what he calls the Augustinian disjunction: “the will of man is 
always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then 
it is evil; or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good.” 7 In light of this 
grace-sin dialectic, Lonergan importantly points out that Augustine did 
not develop a speculative system of nature and grace. The theologi-
cal terms employed were not the theoretical specialties of later univer-
sity theology, but the familiar concepts of scripture. Rather, Augustine 
skilfully marshaled an array of texts and communicated certain truths 
about grace and freedom with masterful rhetoric. 8 
 For Lonergan, Phillip the Chancellor’s articulation of the “theorem 
of the supernatural” in the thirteenth century served as a watershed 
moment in the “blessed rage for order” that constituted university the-
ology. No one doubted that grace was a free gift from God beyond the 
desert of the human person. The difficulty was to explain why every-
thing was not grace. As Lonergan notes, Philip the Chancellor pre-
sented the theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate: grace, 
faith, and charity, on the one hand, and nature, reason, and the natural 
love of God on the other. The pivotal moment was Philip the Chancel-
lor’s formulation of the idea of the supernatural habit. With his theo-
rem of the supernatural, Philip did not posit simply the supernatural 
character of grace, but also the theoretical validity of a line of reference 
termed “nature.” 9 
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 The explanatory import of the hypothetical construct of “nature” is 
illuminated in Aquinas’s response to the question of whether human 
beings can wish or do good without grace ( Summa theologiae 1-II, 109.3). 
Recall my discussion of Torrell’s recommended use of “integral” rather 
than “pure” nature in chapter 2. Aquinas invites us to consider nature 
in two ways: the state of integrity prior to the fall and the state of cor-
ruption after the fall. For Aquinas, both states of human nature require 
the help of God as first mover, as creator, to wish or do the good. Yet, for 
Aquinas, human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin; even in this 
state, a person can work some particular good by virtue of his or her 
natural endowments. That being said, a person in this corrupted state 
does fall short of what he or she could do by nature in the state of integ-
rity. For Aquinas, grace is, in fact, required in both the state of integrity 
and the state of corruption. Adam did not live in the realm of pure 
nature without grace. For Aquinas, grace is always required to wish and 
do the good of infused, supernatural virtue. Thus in the state of integral 
nature, the human person only needs a gratuitous strength superadded 
to natural strength in order to do and wish supernatural good. In the 
state of corrupt nature, however, the human person needed gratuitous 
strength to be healed and to carry out the works of supernatural virtue. 
 For Lonergan, the grace/sin dialectic is dismantled with the theo-
retical construct of human nature. This explanatory term enables us to 
affirm human nature as good in itself prior to original sin. In this state 
of integrity, the human person can exercise the good of acquired vir-
tues and can wish and do the good proportionate to nature. Even in 
the fallen state, the human person is still capable of doing the good; in 
other words, this is not a doctrine of total corruption or total deprav-
ity. Avoiding the error of Pelagianism, Lonergan affirms, by way of his 
analysis of Aquinas, that the supernatural good of salvation requires 
that grace both heal and elevate. 10 
 Thomas’s concern is not with pure nature but with the intelligibility 
of this world order. Lonergan elucidates this in a response to a ques-
tion about natural and supernatural beatitude. 11 He clarifies that the 
Thomist distinction is between perfect and imperfect beatitude, and 
that perfect beatitude is natural to God alone. 12 Participation in the 
beatific vision then is a participation in God’s beatitude. In Thomist 
thinking, imperfect beatitude is “the beatitude of the philosophers, in 
which they understand the whole universe, in which they get Aristo-
tle’s metaphysics perfectly” – the “sort of beatitude that you can have 
in this life.” 13 Scotus, in Lonergan’s reading, changed the theological 
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landscape with his emphasis on what was necessary in all possible 
worlds. But Aquinas was not talking about all possible worlds. He was 
concerned with the intelligibility of this world, with the order chosen 
freely by divine wisdom. Aquinas is also humbly aware that he does not 
possess divine wisdom, and hence he does not emphasize the question 
of all possible worlds. This world order consists of what God has done 
and not what God might or must do. The world order is contingent; the 
divine essence is the only necessary concrete intelligibility. 14 
 Lonergan’s position on the “pure nature” question makes sense in 
light of his Thomistic concern for intelligibility of this world, and not 
other possible worlds. As he stated in  Insight , the “abstract metaphysics 
of all possible worlds is empty.” 15 Regarding de Lubac’s worry about 
“pure nature,” Lonergan presents a nuanced response. He affirmed de 
Lubac’s concern to point out that God created natures and that these 
natures are embedded in a concrete world order. 16 He believed, in 
accord with de Lubac’s later position, that a world order without grace 
is a concrete possibility. Nevertheless, he suggested that the concrete 
possibility of pure nature is not “a central doctrine but merely a mar-
ginal theorem.” 17 
 The Natural Desire to See God 
 Even if Lonergan marginalizes “pure nature,” he does emphasize the 
importance of integral “nature” and the theory of two entitatively dis-
proportionate orders as a breakthrough into the world of theoretical 
theology, as I noted above. This explanatory distinction shapes his posi-
tion on the natural desire to see God. In this sense, Lonergan’s thought 
works in consonance with Torrell’s suggestion (chapter 2) that it is more 
fruitful to work with “integral nature” than “pure nature” as we con-
tinue to engage these ongoing questions about nature and the natural 
desire for God. 
 Lonergan roots his position in the dynamism of the human mind, in 
the natural desire to know discussed at length in chapter 3. For Loner-
gan, the human desire to know is natural, insofar as the desires of the 
intellect are manifested in questions for meaning, truth, and value. It is 
transcendent, insofar as the adequate object is  ens . 18 Although the natu-
ral fulfilment is limited by a proportionate object, our desire to know 
is unlimited and hence wants to know everything about everything – 
ultimately, being itself. When we affirm that God exists through our 
natural knowledge of God, we seek to understand this affirmation with 
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the question, “What is God?” In this sense, we have a natural desire to 
know God. Still, the “best that natural reason can attain,” according to 
Lonergan, “is the discovery of the paradox that the desire to understand 
arises naturally, that its object is the transcendental,  ens , and that the 
proper fulfillment that naturally is attainable is restricted to the propor-
tionate object of the intellect.” This natural desire includes God and can 
only be fulfilled supernaturally in the beatific vision. 19 
 Feingold’s position on the natural desire for God is in tension with 
Lonergan’s position as just outlined. The tension revolves around the 
terms “natural” and “elicited.” 20 Joshua Brotherton helpfully points out 
the way that Lonergan’s critique of Báñezian Thomism creates a cer-
tain tension with Feingold, whose position certainly bears the stamp 
of Báñez, among several other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century neo-
scholastics. Feingold considers Báñez’s work as part of a larger devel-
oping consensus, as I noted in chapters 1 and 2, that includes Medina 
and Suárez (both of whom served as spiritual directors to St Teresa of 
Ávila). These three thinkers, in Feingold’s interpretation, are important 
because of their development of the positions of Cajetan and Sylvester 
of Ferrara. The principle importance of their interpretation involves the 
extension of the denial of an innate inclination for the vision of God, the 
affirmation of an elicited natural desire for the vision of God as a condi-
tional desire, and finally that Aquinas’s argument for the possibility of 
the beatific vision is ultimately an argument from fittingness and not a 
strict demonstration. 21 
 Báñez rejects an innate appetite for the vision of God, but he, along 
with Suárez and others, affirms that this natural desire is rooted in the 
natural desire to know, which flows from the possession of the intel-
lect and will. The natural desire for God spoken of by Aquinas, in his 
interpretation, is an elicited act. In other words, the desire to know the 
essence of the first cause is elicited upon knowledge of the existence of 
God. 22 For Báñez, this desire to see God does not presuppose supernatu-
ral knowledge, but only requires knowledge that God exists. In other 
words, this elicited desire does not reside in us from the beginning, but 
exists only once we possess knowledge of God’s existence. 23 In sum, the 
natural desire for God is ordered by God as a consequence of rational-
ity, but is not naturally ordered to its realization. This natural desire 
constitutes instead “a powerful argument from fittingness, first for the 
possibility of the beatific vision of God, as well as for its actual offer.” 24 
 A full consideration of Feingold’s position on natural desire (we con-
sider supernatural desire in chapter 5) requires attention to his account 
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of two states of the natural desire for God. As I summarized in chapter 
2, we have, first, a natural or “innate” desire for God – to know and love 
God through the mirror of creation. This expresses the very relation of 
our spiritual capacities to their proper ends, a kind of ontological incli-
nation or orientation. This dimension is “innate” and “unconscious.” 
Second, we have a “naturally elicited desire for the vision of God’s 
essence.” This naturally elicited desire is merely conditional without 
the aid of divine revelation and actual grace. This desire acts as a kind of 
mediator between the innate desire to know and love God through the 
mirror of creation and the supernatural acts and habitual inclinations 
associated with hope and charity. This constitutes, in part, Feingold’s 
differentiated response to de Lubac’s claims that we have a “natural 
desire for the supernatural” or an innate, absolute, unconditional desire 
for the vision of God. 25 
 In his treatment, Lonergan explicitly argues that the desire is “natu-
ral” and not “elicited.” The opposite of “natural,” in Lonergan’s sys-
tem, is “elicited,” not “supernatural.” This desire is not elicited in an 
appetitive power, but is the very ordering of the natural tendency of 
the potency itself – an ordering of potency to act. Lonergan’s claim for a 
“natural desire” excludes elicited acts, but at the same time is in no way 
meant to imply that the beatific vision is natural – that it is to be offered 
in accordance with the requirements of our nature. 26 
 Even if Brotherton is correct in pointing out the Báñezian-influenced 
tension, perhaps greater justice could be done to Feingold’s full position, 
especially his more constructive suggestions on the two states of the 
natural desire for God just highlighted. How different are the positions 
of Feingold and Lonergan really in this respect? The distinctiveness of 
Lonergan’s position as a whole will emerge as this chapter unfolds; it 
is a position that cannot always be reconciled with Feingold’s. Still, it 
is important to note that that Feingold identifies Lonergan’s position 
on this particular issue principally with Feingold’s own fittingness or 
 convenientia position, along with Scheeben, Maritain, and Garrigou-
Lagrange, and certainly not with the position of de Lubac. I will say 
more below about the fittingness position of Lonergan as it relates to the 
“aesthetic compromise.” For now, it suffices to reiterate that Lonergan 
roots the natural desire to see God in the natural desire to know. Once 
we affirm the existence of God through our natural reason, we naturally 
ask about the essence of God. For Lonergan this discovery creates a 
paradox: our ability to attain this knowledge is disproportionate to our 
unrestricted desire. Only supernatural beatitude can fulfil this desire. 27 
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 Again, how different is this position really from Feingold’s two states 
discussed in chapter 2? Guy Mansini correctly observes that Loner-
gan’s position pushes in the direction of Feingold’s. 28 Despite Loner-
gan’s apparent denial of an elicited desire to see God, he nevertheless 
“slides quite unmistakably into a discussion of what can be nothing but 
an elicited desire to see God.” 29 The following statement of Lonergan 
clearly implies an elicited desire: “The natural desire is to know what 
God is. That desire neither includes nor excludes the Blessed Trinity. 
It supposes knowledge that God is. It asks to know what God is.” 30 
The desire to know the essence of God is elicited by knowledge that 
God is. In this sense, Feingold helps to differentiate a key moment that 
Lonergan includes in his thinking but does not explicitly acknowledge 
as “elicited.” 
 Mansini notes that Lonergan also comes close to Feingold in his sug-
gestion that the natural desire and its fulfilment have the same material 
object, but not the same formal object. The object of the natural desire 
to know is the transcendental  ens , as highlighted above; the fulfilling 
object is the supernatural (beatific vision). The natural desire for God is 
presented not “as a determinate object to which there is an innate incli-
nation, but as simply included within the scope of an intellect whose 
adequate object is the transcendental  ens .” In other words, the “elic-
ited desire to know God,” as Mansini translates Lonergan’s position 
in terms amenable to Feingold’s, “is just a ‘corollary’ of a natural and 
transcendental desire to understand whatever there is.” 31 
 To substantiate Mansini’s hunch, I offer a key distinction of Loner-
gan’s from a work not cited by Feingold or Mansini, presumably 
because it did not appear in the  Collected Works of Lonergan until 2007. 
In his excursus “The Natural Desire of the Intellect,” Lonergan offers a 
distinction between the implicit and explicit objects of the intellect. 32 He 
reformulates his argument as follows: the human person possesses an 
innate desire to wonder that precedes intellectual knowledge and leads 
to it. This innate desire is manifested in questions for understanding 
(what is it?) and judgment (is it so?). This innate tendency to wonder 
is so extensive that it does not rest until it sees God in God’s essence. 
Hence it contains “ implicitly in itself that drive towards the vision of 
God” that Aquinas explains in particular passages in the  Summa contra 
Gentiles and the  Summa theologiae . 33 
 In light of the expansive nature of the intellect’s reach, Lonergan 
entertains an objection. The objection states that the object of the natu-
ral desire to see God through his essence is absolutely supernatural and 
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hence involves a supernatural act. Lonergan responds to this objection 
as follows: 
 The direct and explicit object of this natural desire is not to behold God in 
his essence; it is being. Since God as something to be seen in his essence 
falls within the formality of being, the consequence is that this natural 
desire does not rest until it beholds God in his essence. Yet this conse-
quence reveals not an explicit but only an implicit object; and because this 
consequence is not an affi rmation but a negation (namely, “it does not rest 
until …”), it indicates an object that is not only implicit but also, in a way, 
indirect. 34 
 Note that Lonergan’s subtle distinction between implicit and explicit 
objects differentiates “a desire’s object, technically understood, and a 
further ‘object’ or item that is included within the scope of a desire.” 35 
In this sense, the object of the desire to know, technically speaking, is 
being, while the desire for God’s essence is connected only implicitly 
by extension, and only becomes explicit after one affirms the existence 
of God. Lonergan also clarifies the importance of not confusing this 
natural desire with a specifically supernatural act. 
 Supernatural acts belong to a certain genus and are specifi ed by their 
proper objects. But a universal tendency, whether of the intellect 
towards being or the will towards good, is not specifi cally supernatu-
ral. Nor can the supernaturality of such a tendency be deduced from 
the fact that being implicitly includes supernatural beings and good 
implicitly includes supernatural goods. All that can be deduced from 
the tendency is that the supernatural is not utterly impossible; and thus 
does Aquinas conclude to the possibility of the beatifi c vision in  Summa 
theologiae I, q. 12, a. 1. 36 
 Those with onto-theological radars – attentive to the failure to employ 
analogical thinking in favour of the univocity of being – may worry 
that this comes dangerously close to imaging God as the highest being 
among beings. Brian Himes offers an important clarification: 
 One might say that because God’s essence is subsistent being and we 
explicitly desire to know being, we therefore explicitly desire to know 
God’s essence. However, to equate  ipsum esse with the transcendental, 
 ens , is naive and erroneous. God is not identical to all that exists. That 
Lonergan on the Natural Desire to See God 97
is pantheism. In explicitly desiring to know all that exists ( ens ), God 
is included in that universal set because he exists (‘God as something 
to be seen in his essence falls within the formality of being’), but this 
does not mean that we explicitly and innately desire knowledge of 
God as being the fulfilment of our desire to know. Failing to make 
the distinction between the implicit and explicit object of the intellect 
is to commit the error of onto-theology that Martin Heidegger and 
Jean-Luc Marion react against. God is not simply a bigger and better 
being among other beings, even though he can be included in the set 
of ‘things that exist.’ 37 
 As Lonergan clarifies, “To desire implicitly and indirectly the vision 
of God inasmuch as the intellect tends to being is one thing; but 
it is quite another thing to want to see God, for this would be a 
specifically supernatural act specified by an absolutely supernatural 
object.” 38 
 In sum, I want to highlight three consonances between Lonergan 
and Feingold. First, Lonergan’s accent on the pure desire to know cor-
responds in some ways to Feingold’s first state – the innate, ontologi-
cal inclination to know the causes of things and by extension to know 
and love God in the mirror of creation. I would add, however, that 
Lonergan offers a much richer epistemology, as I outlined in chapter 
3. Second, Lonergan’s argument about asking “What is God?” based 
on knowledge of God’s existence corresponds to Feingold’s second 
state – the naturally  elicited desire to see God. Third, Lonergan’s 
accent on the paradox and disproportionate fulfilment corresponds 
to Feingold’s emphasis that the beatific vision exceeds the limits of 
what is due to nature. Lonergan, then, does not ultimately fall into 
the trap of confusing innate desire and conscious desire as de Lubac 
may have done. 39 
 Although I have highlighted certain parallels between Feingold and 
Lonergan to avoid unnecessary oppositions, I also do not intend to 
paper over differences. 40 If Feingold’s account emphasizes our natural 
inclination to what is proportionate, Lonergan’s concrete account of 
nature, in terms of emergent probability, bears the mark of “vertical 
finality” – which is to say, we are concretely oriented towards an end 
beyond the proportion of nature. Prior to explaining his account of 
nature as emergent probability, I first explain Lonergan’s understand-
ing of the twofold end of the human person, along with his critique of 
a static-essentialist view of nature. 
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 Twofold End of the Human Person: 
Beyond Static Essentialism 
 Affirming both the natural desire to see God and the supernaturality 
of its fulfilment in the beatific vision raises a question about human 
ends. Does the human person have two ends, one natural and the other 
supernatural? In terms of the recurring debate over the  duplex ordo , 
Lonergan affirms two ends for human persons: the human natural end 
is an imperfect and analogical knowledge of the divine essence, and 
the human supernatural end is the beatific vision – a perfect vision of 
the divine essence. In Thomistic fashion, Lonergan frames the human 
desire for ends in terms of “restlessness” and “rest.” Rest is experienced 
when an end is attained. But, metaphysically speaking, one can speak of 
a variety of levels of perfection. For Lonergan, the perfection of the rest 
corresponds to the perfection of the end. Prior to elucidating these more 
or less perfect human ends, he importantly distinguishes human rest 
from the intrinsic immobility of God. Unlike the cessation of movement 
experienced in human rest, the intrinsic immobility of God is rooted 
in pure act, which does not involve passive potency. Pure act belongs 
primarily to the divine beatitude enjoyed by God and secondarily to the 
gift of divine beatitude offered supernaturally to creatures. 41 
 The distinctiveness of Lonergan’s argument as it relates to “nature” 
resides in his rejection of a particular way of framing the debate, 
namely, a static-essentialist view of the world order. Static essentialism, 
in Lonergan’s view, conceives finite natures as prior to world orders. 
In this view, God – who by God’s very essence knows all things – first 
sees the possibility of finite natures (men, horses, cows, cats) and only 
secondarily sees possible world orders. Finite natures, then, serve as 
the “ultimate element into which all else must be reduced.” 42 It is the 
static-essentialist view that resides at the root of the two-storey con-
ception of the universe associated with sixteenth- and seventeenth-cen-
tury neo-scholasticism brought to light by de Lubac. The consequence 
is a two-part vision of the world order: “a  necessary part which meets 
the exigencies of finite natures, and a  contingent part that may or may 
not be present” – the latter of which is the realm where “God’s free 
gifts over and above the exigencies of nature” is situated. 43 The two 
parts of the world order, in this view, are imagined as distinct and 
separate. Instead of envisioning, as Lonergan does, a “positive relation 
whereby the higher part subsumes the lower, retaining the intelligibil-
ity of the lower by perfecting it, there is simply the negative relation 
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of non-contradiction.” 44 The relationship between the supernatural and 
the natural is constituted merely by non-repugnance. The natural cer-
tainly does not resist the “excess” of the supernatural, but it is difficult 
to imagine within this frame a richer, more transformative, and vibrant 
relationship that might be detected in the mystics, for example. Within 
the static-essentialist view, our natural desire for God tends to find its 
satisfaction in the natural order. As a result, the beatific vision in the 
second part of the world order tends to take on the shape of a super-
added gift. But, one wonders, in this static-essentialist account, whether 
it perfects in any intrinsic way a natural potency in the subject. 
 The essentialist view also has implications for a particular concep-
tion of the relationship between philosophy and theology, rejected in 
Balthasar’s critique above, and the context out of which Lonergan was 
compelled to offer a fresh vision of doing theology within a new con-
text. The essentialist view of the relationship suggests that philosophy 
deals with the necessary part by the light of natural reason, while the-
ology deals with the contingent part of revelation. 45 As Stebbins notes, 
“The only relation between the two, in addition to that of non-contra-
diction, consists in the fact that theology borrows from philosophy its 
logical technique and various truths established on the basis of human 
reason.” 46 
 In contrast to static essentialism, Lonergan’s “open intellectualism” 
offers an account of unitary, dynamic cosmic world order that exists 
prior to finite natures. Within this frame, “God sees in his essence, first 
of all, the series of all possible world orders, each of which is complete 
down to its least historical detail,” and only consequently “does God 
know their component parts such as his free gifts, finite natures, their 
properties, exigencies, and so on.” 47 Christopher Malloy asks, in light of 
Lonergan’s critique of static essentialism, “what is ‘ordered’ if ‘order’ is 
intelligibility first?” 48 “And if we ask this question,” Malloy warns, “we 
run into the question of finality, since essence and finality are necessar-
ily correlative.” 49 A response to this helpful question requires more on 
Lonergan’s understanding of “emergent probability,” to be treated next, 
and also “vertical finality,” which will be explained later in the chap-
ter. In sum, finite natures are derivative possibilities in an intelligible 
world order where “lower natures are subordinate to higher natures, 
not merely extrinsically, but also intrinsically, as appears in chemical 
composition and in biological evolution.” 50 For Lonergan, the natural 
and the supernatural are “intrinsically related parts of a single cosmic 
order.” 51 
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 Nature II: Lonergan on Emergent Probability 
 Contemporary conversations about the natural and supernatural, espe-
cially the de Lubac-Thomist debates highlighted in a previous chapter, 
give little attention to ongoing science-religion conversations. A value 
of retrieving Lonergan’s thought for this conversation is his integra-
tion of the wisdom of Thomistic metaphysics in a more contemporary 
cosmological vein. A fuller treatment of Lonergan’s understanding of 
nature requires an account of his understanding of nature as emergent 
probability. Lonergan’s emergent probability represents his transpo-
sition of Aquinas’s account of contingent being into the terms of the 
complementarity of classical and statistical procedures in empirical sci-
ence. Emergent probability yields, “not a universe whose laws could be 
theoretically deduced according to some iron necessity, but a universe 
of emergent probability open to the rhythms of limitation and transcen-
dence, and constitutive of the dialectical tension between essential and 
effective human freedom.” 52 Emergent probability offers a theoretical 
framework that does justice to the “actual world order in which things 
persist and things change, in which some things are universal or gen-
eral and other things are particular or localized.” 53 It does not just con-
centrate on fixed natures related by unchanging laws, but persists in the 
quest to understand the essences of things. Ultimately, the aim is “an 
ongoing discovery of the intelligible relationships governing the world 
order as it concretely exists, an order in which new things have various 
probabilities of emerging.” 54 
 Scientists employing the classical heuristic method intelligently antic-
ipate an explanation of the way things relate to one another in terms 
of universal laws. Galileo’s law of falling bodies and Newton’s theory 
of gravitation were explanations formulated in invariant correlations 
among two or more changing variables. Galileo worked to understand 
the intelligibility of a free fall. 55 Confident that there was an intelligibil-
ity to be grasped, he took as his clue that some correlation could be 
found between the measurable aspects of the falling bodies. But in the 
process, he began to question the commonsense assumption that the 
weight of an object is the cause of falling bodies. Galileo focused on 
two measurable aspects of every free fall: distance and time. Through 
the process of gathering data and plotting measurements, he discov-
ered a general rule: “the distance traversed is proportional to the time 
squared”: a correlation between space and time. Classical laws such as 
the law of falling bodies are invariant, because such correlations and 
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laws are abstracted from the particular times and places in which laws 
are verified. Classical laws are concerned not with the concrete and 
complex features of actual events but with the systematic laws that are 
relevant regardless of particularity. Such concreteness provides matter 
for statistical method. 
 Whereas classical method anticipates systematic regularity, statistical 
investigations anticipate the non-systematic character of large popula-
tions. Unlike classical scientists who abstract from concrete situations, 
statistical scientists analyse concrete and particular events in order to 
discover the ideal, possible, probable, and actual frequency of events. 56 
Cynthia Crysdale offers an example of the contrast and complementar-
ity of such investigations: 
 The classical laws of biology explain what occurs when a sperm fertilizes 
an egg and conception takes place. In doing so, they delineate the conju-
gates that defi ne conception. Without these conjugates it is impossible to 
determine fertility rates. But the biological defi nition and explanation of 
conception cannot, in and of themselves, determine fertility rates. In order 
to determine these, one must count and calculate, considering a range of 
variables, such as age, education, health, and frequency of intercourse, 
among couples within a certain geographic location. 57 
 Statistical method, however, investigates the concrete details that are 
an empirical residue for classical method. Thus “frequency of inter-
course” or the “health of the partners” may be helpful in determin-
ing the probability of conceiving a given child specifically, or fertility 
rates in general. But in determining fertility rates, classical laws are only 
helpful inasmuch as they explain what would happen under the ideal 
circumstances, approximated by scientists under laboratory conditions. 
Combinations of classical laws in the abstract begin, continue, or cease 
to function concretely in accord with statistical probabilities. 58 
 For Lonergan, such a world process is open, and while it may be 
increasingly systematic through the successive realization of schemes 
of recurrence, it also admits breakdowns and blind alleys. 59 So far our 
analysis has left the intelligent nature of inquiry only implicit. Both 
classical and statistical investigations seek intelligibility, although they 
are asking different questions. The heuristic nature of human inquiry 
underlies both investigations. Emergent probability recognizes that 
there is immanent intelligibility or order or design by conceiving of 
classical and statistical heuristic methods as yielding a distinct yet 
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unified intelligible account of the world process. There is, then, the 
intelligibility of “directionality” in the universe. This is to say that the 
universe as a whole has been continually evolving towards more com-
plex and highly differentiated configurations over the past 13.7 billion 
years. 60 Systems and organisms have also been gradually evolving from 
simpler to more complex, but such an evolution is not always clear, 
smooth, and inevitable. Rather, it occurs by natural selection as entities 
and organisms undergo modifications in ongoing interaction with their 
environments. Still, this directionality happens with stops, starts, and 
significant reversals. Furthermore, directionality remains only a direc-
tion. It does not involve the strict control of a divine micromanager. 
Rather, similar to the language of emergent probability, “for any par-
ticular system or organism within a particular environmental context, 
there is an orientation toward a well-defined, limited range of proximate 
outcomes.” 61 The possibility and probability of “outcomes are based 
on the conditions of the present time and the processes, regularities, 
relationships, and constraints to which it and its environment are sub-
ject.” 62 Evolution – the continual emergence of more complex systems 
and organisms – does depend on the “decay and break-up of earlier 
systems and organisms,” suggesting that “fragility and transience” are 
necessary in such a complex and open-ended universe. 63 It also involves 
a certain sense of randomness and chance. But such randomness and 
chance operate within the larger intelligible framework of the dynamic 
order just discussed. 
 In sum, Lonergan’s concrete account of nature as emergent prob-
ability reflects some key insights from contemporary conversations in 
science and religion. 64 His thought expresses a “formational and func-
tional unity and integrity of nature.” The integrity of nature – a phrase 
highlighted in chapter 2, but reframed here with more attention to the 
natural sciences – includes an evolution towards complexity and life. 
This complexity involves “the critical roles of relationality, hierarchical 
organization, directionality, transience and fragility, and emergence.” 65 
Lonergan’s account of the intelligibility of both classical laws and sta-
tistical laws, of regularity and chance, along with the relative autonomy 
of intelligent and free human persons to shape the world, contributes 
to this understanding. As I suggest later in the chapter, Lonergan’s 
account of “vertical finality” expresses an understanding of the world 
process that is both emergent and hierarchically structured – a universe 
where the “supernatural” is both a gift and at the same time a real, and 
not extrinsic, part of the world process. Before exploring these terms, 
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however, I turn to the relationship between this concrete account of 
nature and the human good. 
 The Intelligibility of Nature and the 
Human Good Revisited 
 Human knowing, in Lonergan’s account of emergent probability, is 
intimately connected with the concrete, dynamic working out of the 
human good. In chapter 2, I highlighted the Thomist-Lubacian ten-
sion over the theme of nature and the building of the common good 
(Long, Schindler, Bushlack). In this section, I introduce some of the key 
components of Lonergan’s account of the human good as a dimension 
of “nature” within the concrete world order. This serves as a way of 
responding to scholars who have argued for a more robust account 
of integral nature. An account of integral nature preserves the gratu-
ity of the supernatural order, but also creates more room for rational 
deliberation among diverse people about the connection between intel-
lectual and moral transcendence and the human good. As a way into 
the conversation, I first highlight the position of Peter Ryan, which is 
noteworthy for the way it reframes the question of the natural desire for 
God in terms of human goods. The terms Ryan employs resonate with 
Lonergan’s emphasis on the human good. 
 Ryan argues that we “naturally seek neither the beatific vision itself 
nor perfect natural happiness.” 66 Rejecting both de Lubac’s natural 
desire for the beatific vision and Aquinas’s claim about the human 
desire for perfect happiness, he reframes the conversation in terms of 
human goods. Though not uncritical of Rahner, he credits Rahner with 
showing that the views of the pure nature theorists and the Lubacians 
are untenable. He also credits Rahner with identifying that human 
nature is unconditionally oriented to ever-greater happiness, but not 
perfect happiness. 67 Such a framing requires an explanation of how the 
beatific vision is not simply an extrinsic addition. What do we desire 
naturally, if not the beatific vision, nor perfect happiness? The human 
person naturally desires ever-greater fulfilment in a variety of human 
goods, including life and health, truth, friendship, creative work and 
play, marriage and family, and so forth. Of course, we do not pursue 
all of these goods in every act, and often choose not to purse some of 
these goods: a monk decides against marriage, for example. Still, we are 
naturally drawn to these goods – an indication that a creator creates us, 
sustains us, and directs us to these goods. 68 
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 Natural religious desire seeks peace and friendship with God. For 
Ryan, “the natural human aptitude for friendship with God makes it 
possible for us to receive a greater-than-human good: a share in the 
divine nature” – divinization as a “dynamic principle ordered to the 
fullness of divine life, the beatific vision.” 69 The beatific vision, in this 
framework, is not “a direct fulfillment of human  nature but of human 
 persons insofar as they share in  divine nature.” 70 What are the implica-
tions of this position in an era where catechetical instruction, parish 
formation, and evangelization have presupposed the restless heart? In 
Ryan’s view, the focus on the beatific vision as the answer to the rest-
less heart tends to diminish the role of human goods as essential to both 
present happiness and heavenly happiness. Conversely, he urges us to 
heed the intimate connection displayed in  Gaudium et Spes 39 between 
earthly and eschatological goods: 
 The expectation of a new earth must not weaken but rather stimulate our 
concern for cultivating this one. For here grows the body of a new human 
family, a body which even now is able to give some kind of foreshad-
owing of the new age. Hence, while earthly progress must be carefully 
distinguished from the growth of Christ’s kingdom, to the extent that the 
former can contribute to the better ordering of human society, it is of vital 
concern to the Kingdom of God. For after we have … nurtured on earth 
the values of human dignity, brotherhood and freedom, and indeed all 
the good fruits of our nature and enterprise, we will fi nd them again, but 
freed of stain, burnished and transfi gured, when Christ hands over to the 
Father: “a kingdom eternal and universal, a kingdom of truth and life, of 
holiness and grace, of justice, love and peace.” On this earth that Kingdom 
is already present in mystery. When the Lord returns it will be brought 
into full fl ower. 71 
 Lonergan’s thought contains the resources for responding to Ryan’s 
account of natural desire as a desire for ever-greater fulfilment in vari-
ous human goods. Lonergan’s historical account of nature as emergent 
probability is constituted in part by concrete human subjects called to 
ongoing intellectual and moral self-transcendence in a universe marked 
by emergent probability. This ongoing quest for the human good always 
takes place concretely, and, as we noted in chapter 3, it does so in the 
midst of decline, whether the lack of authenticity in an individual sub-
ject, the shorter cycle of decline brought about by group egoism, or the 
longer cycle of decline precipitated by a general, anti-theoretical bias. 
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 In Lonergan’s system, understanding nature requires attention to the 
concrete, dynamic working out of the human good. “The specific differ-
ence of human history,” writes Lonergan, “is that among the probable 
possibilities is a sequence of operative insights by which men grasp 
possible schemes of recurrence and take the initiative in bringing about 
the material and social conditions that make these schemes concretely 
possible, probable, and actual.” 72 In the language of the previous sec-
tion, human persons become the executors of the emergent probability 
of human affairs. In other words, instead of being passively shaped 
by our environment, we can transform our environment as we commit 
to the arduous and ongoing task of self-development. This takes place 
through the intelligible, reasonable, and responsible working out of con-
crete possibilities and probabilities in a dynamic world order. In sum, 
Lonergan importantly highlights how human beings with the capacity 
for understanding and judgment, deliberation and action are, in part, 
“shapers” of history. Hence, the practical dimension of human intel-
ligence and choice has consequences for the realization of the human 
good, or of human bias and decline. Lonergan’s explanatory treatment 
of nature in terms of conscious historical subjectivity must be situated 
within his theological analysis of human history. First, as intelligent and 
reasonable, human beings yield the fruit of progress. Second, however, 
human bias causes unintelligent and unreasonable conduct, resulting in 
decline. Finally, there is the “redemptive process resulting from God’s 
gift of his grace to individuals and from the manifestation of his love in 
Christ Jesus.” 73 
 Lonergan extends his understanding of concrete human subjects as 
“shapers” of history in his later development of a framework for the 
human good. The human good is constituted by the higher integra-
tion of natural processes, by human aesthetic-dramatic (psychic), intel-
lectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence, and by the common 
meaning of communities committed to such self-transcendence. It is 
not my intention to elaborate in detail the structure of the human good 
within the dialectics of history. For Lonergan it involves, as a whole, an 
integration of (1) individuals and the realization of their potentialities; 
(2) cooperating groups; and (3) reflection on the purpose, end,  telos of 
human operations and cooperation. 74 This heuristic framework offers a 
foundational language as we ask questions about the concrete human 
situation. Such questions capture the heart of what first motivated 
practical and political philosophy: What’s the right way to live? What 
constitutes the good life? This reveals an appropriation of the ancient 
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virtue tradition, but recast in terms not confined by a Greek classicist 
notion of culture, and more open to an empirical, dynamic account of 
culture as “the domain in which society reflects upon and appraises its 
way of life.” 75 “Classicist culture,” in Lonergan’s account, refers to the 
assumption that there is “one culture” that is “both universal and per-
manent.” 76 Attentive to the concrete, this book is more sympathetic to 
an empirical understanding of culture: a culture is the set of meanings 
and values that inform a way of life, and there are as many cultures as 
there are different ways of life. 77 An empirical understanding of cul-
ture recognizes the dynamism of culture and that cultures may be “in 
process of slow development or rapid dissolution.” 78 In this light, what 
is normative is not culture itself, but the transcultural core of human 
nature that is the source and measure of every culture. In other words, 
culture is not the normative measure of human beings; rather, human 
beings in their authenticity are the normative measure of cultures. If 
Lonergan’s account of the human good both affirms and transposes the 
ancient Greek concern about the priority of the question of the good life, 
it simultaneously rejects modernity’s replacement of the normativity 
of virtue and the desire to know with the fundamental desire for self-
preservation, as evident in Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza, just to 
name a few. 79 This repositioning recognizes Milbank’s suggestion that 
pure nature declined into self-sufficiency and power politics, while at 
the same responding to the Thomist concern for a thicker account of 
nature. 
 A key dimension of Lonergan’s explanatory framework for the 
human good is the “integral scale of values,” developed more fully by 
Robert Doran and his contextualization of the scale within the matrix 
of a “set of distinct but related and currently distorted dialectics of the 
subject, culture, and community.” 80 I cite at length Robert Doran’s inter-
pretation of this scale: 
 From above, then, religious values condition the possibility of personal 
integrity; personal integrity conditions the possibility of authentic cultural 
values; at the refl exive level of culture, such integrity will promote an 
authentic superstructural collaboration that assumes responsibility for the 
integrity not only of scientifi c and scholarly disciplines, but even of every-
day culture; cultural integrity at both levels conditions the possibility of a 
just social order; and the just social order conditions the possibility of the 
equitable distribution of vital goods. Conversely, problems in the effective 
and recurrent distribution of vital goods can be met only by a reversal of 
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distortions in the social order; the proportions of the needed reversal are 
set by the scope and range of the real or potential maldistribution; the 
social change demands a transformation at the everyday level of culture 
proportionate to the dimensions of the social problem; this transformation 
frequently depends on refl exive theoretical and scientifi c developments at 
the superstructural level; new cultural values at both levels call for pro-
portionate changes at the level of personal integrity; and these depend 
for their emergence, sustenance, and consistency on the religious develop-
ment of the person. 81 
 Doran outlines here in heuristic fashion the complex relationship 
between religious, personal, cultural, social, and vital values. In fact, 
this five-scale level of values “can be best understood as an unpacking 
of the traditional nature-grace distinction.” 82 Similar to the dynamism 
of nature as expressed in emergent probability and vertical finality (dis-
cussed below), the scale of values represents an interrelated, dynamic 
scheme whereby “vital needs are taken up by the higher-level opera-
tion of the social, the social into the cultural and the cultural into the 
personal.” 83 Moreover, the personal realm is “open to a higher level of 
integration through the incorporation of schemes of operation (theo-
logical virtues/religious values) that order us to higher-level goals, that 
is, incorporation into the divine life itself.” 84 This scale preserves the 
metaphysical structure of the higher and the lower in the human per-
son, but also integrates more concretely the social, cultural, and histori-
cal dimensions of human existence. 85 
 The introduction of key components of Lonergan’s account of the 
human good as a dimension of nature responds in a distinctive way 
to scholars who have called for an ontologically dense account of inte-
gral nature. This particular account affirms the human desire for ever-
greater fulfilment in various human goods as a sign of our transcendent 
orientation, and at the same time preserves the gratuity of the super-
natural order.  
 Obediential Potency and Vertical Finality in the 
Concrete World Order 
 In light of the extended discussion of “nature” within a concrete frame-
work, it is fitting to reinterpret the categories of finality and obediential 
potency through the prism of this account of the dynamic world order. 
Both terms are important to the neo-Thomist–de Lubac tension, as 
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discussed in chapter 2. They constitute two essential themes in Loner-
gan’s explanation of the natural desire for God wherein the natural 
order and the supernatural order are conceived as intrinsic parts of the 
concretely operating universe, indicative of a kind of analogical think-
ing prioritized in this book. 
 If static essentialism focuses on horizontal finality, emergently prob-
ability considers a variety of finalities – horizontal, vertical, and abso-
lute – that more adequately captures the complexity of divine-human 
relationship. Avoiding the pitfalls of both mechanistic determinism and 
chaotic relativism, emergent probability accounts for a wise ordering of 
the universe, but an ordering that is fertile, dynamic, unpredictable, and 
at the same time constituted by intelligible and interrelated schemes of 
recurrence. 
 As a way of framing this section, I focus briefly on Christopher Mal-
loy’s suggested solution to the contestability of obediential potency. 
Malloy challenges those sympathetic to Lubacian critiques of Thomism 
to ask whether the category of specific obediential potency really implies 
a dualism or extrinsicism. Many theologians – de Lubac included – 
have offered this charge. Hopefully a grasp of the meaning, suggests 
Malloy, would at least mitigate attempts to uncritically caricature this 
explanatory term. But Malloy also recognizes the need to explain this 
reality in a way that avoids the loss of the dynamism of the divine-
human encounter. He proposes a loose conception of Hegelian subla-
tion as a possible way of explaining how grace builds on nature without 
destroying the intrinsic intelligibility of nature. What is the difference 
between a person in the state of nature and a person called and divin-
ized, asks Malloy? As a way of responding to de Lubac, he emphasizes 
the overarching difference that God is drawing the called and divinized 
person to himself. This Hegelian sublation enables us to show, Malloy 
suggests, that the divine call affirms and expands the goodness of the 
natural life on a higher plane. “When God calls a man to himself in inti-
macy,” writes Malloy, “he galvanizes all properly human dynamisms 
for an all-embracing end inclusive of every other licit and practicable 
end.” 86 Malloy has offered a worthy, albeit tentative, proposal. I suggest 
that Lonergan’s account of vertical finality and obediential potency in 
a concrete world order contains the explanatory resources for meeting 
Malloy’s challenge. 87 
 I first consider Lonergan’s distinction between horizontal finality 
and vertical finality, and then connect it to his particular understand-
ing of obediential potency. “Horizontal finality” refers to the abstract 
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connection between nature, potency, and act. For example, animals by 
nature have the capacity to realize in act their potency for self-move-
ment. Human beings by nature possess the capacity to realize in act 
their potency for intellectual knowledge. These two examples point to 
a certain correspondence in horizontal finality between the kinds of 
potencies and acts proper to the essence of the particular nature under 
consideration. Vertical finality, however, acknowledges the possibility 
in the concrete universe not only for horizontal unity but also for emer-
gence. For Lonergan, the world process is both emergent and hierar-
chically structured into physical, chemical, biological, psychological, 
intelligent, rational, and volitional manifolds. Hierarchical structure 
means that “reality is organized in levels of complexity nested within 
one another.” 88 The human body or any multicellular animal 
 is composed of many organs, all working together and each composed of 
different types of structures. Each structure within an organ and within 
the body as a whole functions the way it does because of different types of 
cells (muscles, blood, nerve and brain, bone, heart, kidneys, etc.) of which 
it is composed. But each of those cells is itself a very complicated function-
ing unit in its own right, with many different components. Furthermore 
each of the tens of thousands of different molecules that make up cells or 
that cells produce has its own basic structure and special ways of interact-
ing with other molecules. The type of interaction depends on the structure 
and the properties of various types of atoms that constitute the molecule, 
and particularly on the relationships among the atoms. If one magnifi es 
one’s investigation suffi ciently, one eventually arrives at the stage of the 
fundamental particles, the protons, neutrons, and electrons. 
 This hierarchical structure manifests, at the same time, a profound 
relationality. Such constitutive relationships make things what they are 
as contributing aspects of the formal cause of each system, entity, and 
organism. 89 
 In Lonergan’s account of hierarchical structure and profound rela-
tionality, plants comprise the physical, chemical, and biological. 90 Ani-
mals comprise physical, chemical, biological, and psychological levels. 
Human beings comprise physical, chemical, biological, psychologi-
cal, intelligent, rational, and volitional levels of being. For Lonergan, 
lower levels are not annihilated but rather sublated by the higher. 
Hence, in the instance of human beings, the biological and chemical 
levels are raised up, enriched, and unified by the overarching levels 
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of intelligence, reason, and choice. Vertical finality denotes an emer-
gent, upward-directed drive that gives lower beings the capacity to 
set the conditions for the emergence of higher beings. Vertical finality 
embraces science’s dynamic perspective of the world. A static concep-
tion does not do justice to the emergence of new entities, structures, 
and processes. As Arthur Peacocke says, “The traditional notion of God 
 sustaining the world in its general order and structure now has to be 
enriched by a dynamic and creative dimension – the model of God sus-
taining and giving continuous existence to a process which has a cre-
ativity built into it by God.” 91 
 The important insight for this conversation on the natural desire for 
God is the way Lonergan, in his explanatory account of the universe, 
preserves the distinction between nature and supernature, derived 
by analogy from the interactions among the gradations of being, and 
enables us to understand more clearly the absolute gratuity of grace. 
Accordingly, higher levels on the natural plane, if you will, are  relatively 
supernatural to lower ones, that is, chemical compounds are relatively 
supernatural in relation to subatomic particles. By vertical finality there 
is an upward-directed dynamism from the lower to the higher. Lower 
levels set the conditions for the emergence of higher levels. 
 The second key term is obediential potency. Lonergan distinguished 
the human natural end and supernatural end in terms of their respec-
tive potencies. In metaphysical terms, the potency that corresponds to 
the natural end is a natural potency; the potency to the supernatural 
end is an obediential potency. While these potencies are distinguished, 
Lonergan emphasizes that they possess “the same formal object of 
knowledge,” namely, the divine essence. 92 At the same time, they pos-
sess different ways of knowing this object. The knowing associated 
with natural potency is natural and analogical; the knowing associated 
with the supernatural end is supernatural and univocal. 93 Despite these 
important distinctions, Lonergan stresses that natural potency and obe-
diential potency are, in reality, the same insofar as they are intrinsically 
one and the same potency. They differ, however, according to the causal 
agent proportionate to each respective actuation. A finite agent actuates 
a natural potency; an infinite agent actuates an obediential potency. This 
extrinsic difference gives rise, then, to the diversity of ends. 94 Within this 
framework, obediential potency is a passive potency, which means that 
no finite being can cause or produce absolutely supernatural realities. 
Since obediential potency can only be actuated by God, it constitutes 
the capacity for receiving, but not producing, an act. This explanatory 
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term enables Lonergan to argue that the desire for the vision of God is 
“innate” rather than “elicited” while at the same time denying a natural 
exigency for grace. 95 This point provides a response to the Lonergan-
Feingold tension noted above between natural and elicited desire. 
 In sum, this natural desire only reveals, for Lonergan, that there is an 
“obediential potency for this vision of God.” 96 Vertical finality opens 
up an analogical possibility. Just as the lower can set the conditions for 
the emergence of the higher, the concrete plurality of human beings, 
analogously, have the obediential potency to receive the free self-com-
munication of God. Grace does not annihilate our upward-directed 
drive to understand, judge, and choose, but fulfils such a drive with a 
disproportionate, absolutely supernatural reality. The supernatural is 
not extrinsic to but a really integral part of the concrete, evolutionary 
world process. In light of this integral vision, it is relevant to note that 
Lonegan’s articulation of sublation in  Method in Theology corresponds 
nicely to Malloy’s intention, highlighted above. Lonergan mentions 
that he is using “sublation” in Rahner’s and not Hegel’s sense, to mean 
“that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces some-
thing new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from 
interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, 
includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries 
them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.”  97 
 Obediential potency understood within a static-essentialist view, 
however, looks quite different. For Lonergan, the difference between 
natural and obediential potency is only extrinsic. Obediential potency 
is a kind of “amplification of the innate virtualities of finite nature.” 98 As 
a higher dimension of being, “grace preserves and is conditioned by the 
lower grades that it subsumes. Hence, there is no obediential potency 
without a corresponding natural potency.” But in the “bifurcated cos-
mic scheme” of static essentialism, finite natures have no innate inclina-
tion towards anything lying beyond their own proportion. Within this 
worldview, “obediential potency represents the mere ‘non-repugnance’ 
of any creature to God’s action on it.” In other words, natural and obe-
diential potency are “no longer intrinsically linked: the former is neces-
sary and determinate, the latter contingent and wholly indeterminate.” 
The danger of this perspective – a perspective that seeks to maintain the 
transcendence of grace – is that it may unintentionally distort a more 
unified vision of nature and grace. 
 Lonergan’s explanatory framework concerning the intelligibility of 
the world order helps to elucidate, as Raymond Maloney has argued, 
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de Lubac’s insistence on the human desire – the orientation of the mind – 
to the beatific vision. 99 Lonergan’s framing of the issue in terms of the 
concrete world order – emergent probability, vertical finality, and obe-
diential potency – responds to de Lubac’s and Balthasar’s emphasis on 
concrete, historic human nature. On one level, then, Lonergan’s frame-
work enables us to respond to Lubacian concerns, but still suggests that 
a “relentless insistence on ‘natural desire for the supernatural’” is “at 
best an oxymoron, if not a contradiction in terms.” 100 
 Still, Maloney lends some credence to this conviction of de Lubac. If 
nature and, by extension, natural desire are a function of the world order, 
and if the world order has a supernatural character, then one might say 
that we are called to our supernatural end – the beatific vision – by our 
very concrete nature in this concrete world order. 101 With the emphasis 
on the priority of the world orders over natures highlighted above, it 
is reasonable to suggest that because we are ordered to a supernatural 
end, God has built into us an innate and natural tendency to see God. 
Lonergan’s concrete account of the supernatural here is very similar 
to de Lubac’s, as Mansini suggests: “I am what I am only because God 
has called me to himself.” 102 Or framed in a distinct but complementary 
way, if we consider “the emergence of the supernatural, not according 
to classical and necessary laws, but according to statistical laws and 
schemes of probability, then one can retain the intelligibility de Lubac 
was reaching for while disowning any intrinsic and necessary ordina-
tion of natural to supernatural.” 103 
 The Aesthetic Compromise Revisited 
 In light of our discussion of complex intelligibility of the world order, it 
is fitting to return to Milbank’s discussion (chapter 2) of the possibility 
of compatibility between the Thomist “aesthetic compromise” and de 
Lubac’s “natural desire for the supernatural.” To reiterate, consonance 
remains possible if one understands the  convenientia of human nature 
for supernatural elevation as intrinsically participating in divine wis-
dom. This view envisions human nature as teleologically drawn to the 
beatific vision without claiming that human nature elicits it. Incompat-
ibility abounds if  convenientia is presented in a more extrinsic manner; 
recall Milbank’s image of a railway carriage that turned out to be an 
ideal home for gypsies after the closure of the branch line. 
 In chapter 2, I highlighted Feingold’s claim that the natural desire to 
see God does not provide a strict proof for the possibility of the beatific 
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vision, but only an argument of fittingness. De Lubac, of course, sug-
gests that the natural desire for God exhibits that the beatific vision is 
not fitting, but rather probable and actual. The relevant point here is 
that Feingold identifies Lonergan with the fittingness or  convenientia 
position, along with Scheeben, Maritain, and Garrigou-Lagrange, and 
not with the position of de Lubac. Feingold’s judgment seems largely 
correct, though this chapter has attempted to retrieve de Lubac’s legiti-
mate concerns and show how resources in Lonergan’s thought can 
respond favourably and in a more systematic way. 
 Lonergan expresses his predilection for fittingness in both “The Natu-
ral Desire to See God” and his treatise “On the Supernatural Order” – a 
position that, in my estimation, passes Milbank’s extrinsicist test. Ear-
lier in this chapter, I highlighted Lonergan’s claim that the best that 
natural reason can attain is the discovery of the paradox that the desire 
to understand arises naturally, but that the ultimate fulfilment of this 
natural desire is the beatific vision. To use the terms noted above, our 
natural potency reaches limits in its search for answers, and our under-
standing of this same desire as an obediential potency “capable of 
being actuated in some mysterious fashion by the divine essence itself, 
is dependent upon a prior revelation and a prior series of judgments 
of faith.” 104 Hence, the beatific vision is an absolutely supernatural 
mystery known only through revelation. When one presupposes rev-
elation and the fact of this vision, then one can find, says Lonergan, 
“arguments of fittingness to demonstrate its possibility in the case of 
man.” 105 Lonergan situates his emphasis on fittingness in the context 
of his understanding of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas wrote primarily as 
a theologian, he insists, and “in the absence of some positive evidence 
to the contrary we must believe that he was presupposing truths of the 
faith rather than prescinding from them.” In terms of the knowability 
of the beatific vision, Lonergan suggests that Thomas did not “work out 
a concept of ‘pure nature’ and so wrote about what actually exists, not 
mere possibilities.” To conclude, for example, that Aquinas held that the 
vision of God is naturally owed to human beings in  Summa Theologiae 1, 
q. 12, a. 1 supposes that Thomas was speaking “more as a philosopher 
than a theologians” and fails to consider “his habitual way of adduc-
ing arguments of fittingness.” 106 The fittingness of the natural desire for 
God and its fulfilment in the beatific vision aids us in “understanding 
how our supernatural end” is “the fulfillment of the innate tendency 
towards being that characterizes us as incarnate spirits.” 107 Our super-
natural end, in other words, is not something extrinsically tacked on 
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to our nature. Lonergan’s form of “aesthetic compromise” passes Mil-
bank’s extrinsicism test, especially when considered in the context of 
this chapter as a whole, which framed this desire within an account of 
the dynamic world order and the concretely operating subject – uncon-
fined by static essentialism. In this sense, an emphasis on Lonergan’s 
use of fittingness exonerates him, perhaps not from all of Mansini’s 
concerns, but at least from the concern that Lonergan’s position tends 
towards the Lubacian innate and absolute desire for the supernatural. 108 
 Lonergan’s argument from fittingness can also respond to Milbank’s 
claim that the  convenientia of human nature for supernatural elevation 
ought to be understood as intrinsically participating in divine wisdom. 
In his lecture on this theme, Lonergan identified fittingness as some-
thing that is intelligible and yet not necessary in terms of its essence 
or existence. 109 And in a theological context, what is fitting “cannot be 
perfectly understood by us in this life.” The connection between the 
human desire for God and its fulfilment in the beatific vision is, at its 
core, a mystery – not because it is per se unintelligible, but “because 
of its excess of intelligibility.” 110 Fittingness is rooted in the divine wis-
dom and recognizes that all things are possible with God, except that 
which contains a contradiction. Still, “since divine wisdom is coexten-
sive with divine power, it is clear that all things possible are ordered 
in such a way that nothing in fact could exist without being consonant 
with divine wisdom and divine goodness.” The natural, erotic desire 
for meaning, truth, and goodness fittingly corresponds to the beatific 
vision. It reveals the “excellence of order.” 111 This thrust for self-tran-
scendence is part of the good of the order of the universe, as expressed 
above in this chapter. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter retrieved key aspects of Lonergan’s thought with height-
ened awareness of both the Lubacian concern with preserving the con-
crete and historical and the Thomist concern with the need for a more 
substantive account of nature. In light of the eros of the mind of the 
concrete subject, Lonergan’s account of nature in scholastic terms and 
in his more dynamic and scientifically influenced account of emergent 
probability responds to both concerns. His distinctive use of explana-
tory terms like “vertical finality” and “obediential potency” offered a 
reconciling voice to the debate. In terms of the natural-elicited question, 
I argued that, for Lonergan, the natural desire to see is a natural desire, 
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but mainly a desire for an implicit object. Hence, though their posi-
tions cannot be fully reconciled, I pointed out much consonance with 
Feingold’s insistence on the natural desire for God as a naturally elic-
ited desire. Lonergan includes an elicited moment in his account of the 
natural desire to see God, even if he does not name it so. Furthermore, 
Lonergan’s account of nature as emergent probability responds to the 
call for a more robust account of integral nature as more than a remain-
der concept. His account of nature not only preserved the gratuity of 
the supernatural order, but also created space for the role of intellectual 
and moral self-transcendence in rational deliberation about the human 
good. Finally, Lonergan’s own discussion of fittingness contributed to 
the Thomist aesthetic compromise, as described by Milbank. 
 5 Being-in-Love and the Desire 
for the Supernatural: Erotic-Agapic 
Subjectivity 
 If the natural desire for meaning and truth, propelled by the erotic drive 
of the mind, orients us to desire God’s essence, do we also possess a 
supernatural desire that orients us to the beatific vision, which is, as we 
noted in chapter 4, the ultimate fulfilment of our natural desire for God? 
What shape might this take if we acknowledge the shift in emphasis 
from a natural desire for God conceived within the categories of scho-
lastic faculty psychology to the variety of ways  the question of God arises 
in the intellectual, moral, and religious dimensions of our concrete 
lives? Does the very language of “supernatural desire” itself indicate 
an “extrinsicist” account of the relationship between the natural and 
the supernatural? 
 An extrinsicist account of nature and grace tends to depict the rela-
tionship between the natural and supernatural as if there were one set 
of desires “over here” hermetically sealed off from another set of desires 
“over there.” The “supernatural” is presented as superimposed, as a 
kind of artificial superstructure or arbitrary imposition on the real or 
natural aspirations of the human spirit. 1 One of de Lubac’s central con-
cerns with an extrinsicist account of the supernatural is that has iso-
lated the church into “ghettos that we have made our prisons.” 2 How 
does the Church address all aspects of human personal, social, and his-
torical life? The pastoral implications of an extrinsicist account of the 
supernatural tended in the direction of the private and the personal – a 
trend he sought to correct in his book  Catholicism . Nevertheless, there is 
the challenge of formulating the relationship between the natural and 
supernatural in new ways – ways that constitute a more organic, more 
unified conception. 3 
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 One finds at the end of de Lubac’s  The Mystery of the Supernatural an 
explanation of the “the call of love.” De Lubac privileges the recovery of 
interpersonal and spousal images: “Seeing face to face, speaking mouth 
to mouth, being in the presence of the bridegroom, drinking the life of 
beatitude from its fount.” 4 Even if his formulation – “natural desire for 
the supernatural” (see chapter 1) comes uncomfortably close to collaps-
ing the supernatural into the inner orientation of the desiring subject, he 
does nevertheless maintain that the supernatural is essential gift: “God 
could have refused to give himself to his creatures, just as he could 
have, and has, given himself.” 5 The supernatural order is gratuitous 
by its very nature and can never be something simply owed to human 
beings. He recalls at the end of his study the utter gratuity of love – the 
“revelation of love – not merely of the love of God, but of God who is 
love.” 6 
 In light of de Lubac’s concerns, the aim of this chapter is to present 
a non-extrinsicist account of the relationship between the natural and 
the supernatural – an account that preserves the language that has been 
privileged in the tradition (metaphysical), but transposes it into terms 
revelatory of the interpersonal experience of being in love (intentional-
ity analysis, phenomenology). 
 To this end I respond to Lawrence Feingold’s challenge to construct 
an alternative model that develops the relationship between the natu-
ral and the supernatural in a non-extrinsicist way, but that gives prior-
ity to the language of Aquinas, especially an account of the  supernatu-
ral habitual inclination for the vision of God resulting from sanctifying 
grace. This analysis integrates the work of Lonergan and his contem-
porary interpreters in order to transpose the elevating habits of sanc-
tifying grace and the habit of charity into the interpersonal language 
of being-in-love. And, in a related manner, the chapter draws on the 
Trinitarian four-point hypothesis, to envision this “supernatural being-
in-love” as a graced participation in Trinitarian life. Finally, I explore, 
with Lonergan and Marion, a specific dimension of love – spousal love 
and the love of family vis-à-vis the love of God – in a way that both pre-
serves the metaphysical control of meaning and transposes it with the 
phenomenological language of interiority and intersubjectivity. This 
chapter ultimately argues that the supernatural – understood within a 
Trinitarian framework and transposed into phenomenological terms – 
does not establish a  new end to human nature (extrinsicism), but rather a 
 new relation to that same end (elevating, inner unity). If the  natural desire 
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for meaning and truth orients one to desire God’s essence, the super-
natural gifts of sanctifying grace (being on the receiving end of God’s 
unrestricted love) and the habit of charity (loving God in return with all 
our hearts and minds and souls and strength and loving our neighbour 
as ourselves) constitute a  new relation – a habitual inclination –  to this 
same end, the fullness of Trinitarian life. Sanctifying grace and the habit 
of charity – articulated in terms of being-in-love – are not extrinsic to, 
but permeate and shape, our most intimate loves. 
 The Extrinsicism of Supernatural Desire 
 Feingold’s trenchant critique of de Lubac highlighted in an earlier chap-
ter should not be read as an embrace of extrinsicism. “Contemporary 
critiques of extrinsicism,” notes Feingold, “often frame their critique 
as a rejection of the two-story conception of nature and grace,” where 
“the supernatural is envisioned as an extrinsic superstructure added 
on top of human nature.” 7 This metaphor obscures the unique interre-
lation between the orders. In a clear rejection of extrinsicism, Feingold 
submits that the two orders cannot be sealed off from one another, since 
human nature has a specific obediential potency to receive the beatific 
vision. 
 Feingold’s critique of de Lubac should also not imply a minimization 
of de Lubac’s indispensable contribution to contemporary theology. 
Feingold believes that de Lubac identified a great pastoral problem – 
that the contemporary human person has lost a sense of the supernatu-
ral. De Lubac was correct, according to Feingold, in emphasizing the 
natural desire to see God, and the organic relationship between human 
natural aspirations and supernatural vocation. If de Lubac has rightly 
identified a key pastoral problem, and if indeed he is correct about 
the inadequacies of the extrinsicist two-storey model, a new model is 
needed to replace both the extrinsicist framework and de Lubac’s own 
inadequate proposal. 8 
 I pointed out in chapter 2 that Feingold offers an initial attempt to 
build such a vision. He substantiates his use of the term “supernatural 
desire” in selected texts from Aquinas, especially his commentary on 2 
Cor. 5. In this commentary, Aquinas distinguishes between “natural” 
and “supernatural” desire: “God produces natural desires and super-
natural desires in us: the natural, when he gives us a natural spirit 
suited to human nature,” and “supernatural desires when he infuses 
in us the supernatural spirit, i.e., the Holy Spirit.” 9 In light of Aquinas’s 
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distinction, Feingold identifies two states of supernatural desire, which 
it is useful to reiterate here: an elicited and unconditional desire for 
the vision of God made by possible by knowledge of God’s promise in 
Revelation, together with the assistance of actual grace; and the super-
natural habitual inclination for the vision of God rooted in sanctifying 
grace. The second is more relevant to this chapter. This supernatural 
inclination consists in the theological virtues of hope and charity. The 
habitual inclination is present whenever a soul is in a state of grace. It 
is, according to Feingold, “independent of knowledge,” a commonly 
held position in the tradition. 10 I suggest below that sanctifying grace 
– when understood as being in love with God in an unrestricted man-
ner – may not be  known , but it may be a state we are  conscious of at the 
level of  experience . 
 According to Feingold, a full flowering theology of nature and grace 
must account for the rich distinction and interpenetration of our natural 
and supernatural desires. As he comments, “The natural desire to see 
God is not sufficient to naturally incline or order us to our supernatu-
ral end. For that purpose we need the supernatural virtue of charity 
which flows from sanctifying grace by which we are mysteriously made 
somehow proportionate to God, having become ‘partakers in the divine 
nature.’” 11 The natural desire to see God prompts us to recognize that 
“only the promise given to us in the Gospel to see God face to face will 
fully and perfectly satisfy the dynamism of the human intellect and 
will.” 12 
 Feingold’s positing of distinct natural and supernatural desires 
might strike one initially as a derailment into an extrinsicist account of 
nature and grace. Closer attention to Feingold’s presentation, however, 
reveals a deliberate attempt to avoid an extrinsicist account of natu-
ral and supernatural desire. Feingold refers, for example, to the four 
“states” of the natural desire for God, and the “transformation” and 
“conversion” of this desire. The “dynamism of the intellect and will” 
discloses our “fittingness for the supernatural end promised to us by 
Christ.” 13 Feingold’s reference to “states,” along with his use of the lan-
guage of “conversion,” “transformation,” and “fittingness,” represent 
an attempt to avoid the often caricatured extrinsicist account. 
 Even if we grant that Feingold explicitly avoids extrinsicism, are there 
not other ways to envision the relationship between sanctifying grace 
and the human person? What transpositions might help us account for 
the shift from the scholastic language of natural human inclinations to 
the language of concrete subjectivity, which gives greater attention to 
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concrete intellectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence, operating 
within the climate of religious experience and the level of interpersonal 
relations? 
 Sanctifying Grace and the Habit of Charity 
 In the course of his career, Lonergan ultimately identified sanctifying 
grace with the dynamic state of being in love with God in an unre-
stricted manner. As noted throughout this book, Lonergan envisioned 
in his later work a methodical theology that finds its starting point in 
intentionality analysis, with a focus on human self-transcendence, and 
not first on metaphysical terms and relations. 
 In his work  Grace and Freedom (1941–2), for example, Lonergan 
employs the metaphysical category of habit to articulate the operative 
habitual grace that is called sanctifying grace. For Lonergan, habits are 
a human necessity. The frailty of the human condition suggests that we 
cannot reason ourselves into the right attitude before each act. Habits 
make action easier, and more agreeable. Deliberate vigilance will not 
sustain: “If only he puts his mind to it, the sinner can resist every temp-
tation. But he cannot constantly be putting his mind to it.” 14 Human 
beings cannot always be on, and hence it is inevitable that we find 
recourse in the spontaneous orientation of our wills. A life of flourish-
ing rests on the kind of habitual orientation that shapes our desire – the 
desire that orients our inquiring, knowing, choosing, and loving. “The 
human will,” as Lonergan notes, “does not swing back to a perfect equi-
librium of indifference with every tick of the clock.” 15 Present orienta-
tion tends to be determined by past operations, though not absolutely 
determined. 
 This “change-agent” is what Lonergan, following Aquinas, calls 
sanctifying grace. In the world of discourse informed by Aquinas, it is 
important to note that different kinds of graces are correlative terms: 
operative and cooperative grace, habitual and actual grace, and sanc-
tifying and gratuitous grace. The kind of grace Lonergan has in mind 
is operative (God acts in us without us), habitual (abiding habit giv-
ing us new powers for acting), and sanctifying (it makes us holy and 
unites us with our ultimate end). The infusion of grace “constitutes a 
permanent change in the inclination or spontaneous orientation of the 
will: it plucks out the heart of stone that made the sinner a slave to sin; 
it implants a heart of flesh to initiate a new continuity in justice.” 16 In 
Lonergan’s technical language, it is the “remote proportionate principle 
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of the operations by which we attain God as he is in himself.” 17 Sanctify-
ing grace is the root of charity, and charity is the kind of love that can 
only exist between friends; it makes us friends with God. 18 
 In  Method in Theology, Lonergan transposes this scholastic articulation 
of grace in the more intimate language of the state of “being in love with 
God in an unrestricted manner” and identifies this state with sanctify-
ing grace. 19 As he says, the two are only notionally different. Lonergan 
writes, “Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an 
unrestricted fashion.” 20 Although all love involves self-surrender, this 
love is being in love without limits or conditions. Though this state does 
not result from human initiative, from our knowing and choosing, it is 
a conscious and dynamic state of love, joy, and peace, along with the 
other fruits of the Spirit. For Lonergan, this state is  conscious without 
being  known . In other words, it is a mysterious reality  experienced but 
not necessarily grasped in  understanding or affirmed in  judgment . This 
unmeasured love is attractive, fascinating, awe-inspiring, and holy; it is 
a gift we are possessed by and grasped by. If the language of sanctifying 
grace speaks of a “permanent change in the inclination or spontane-
ous orientation of the will” in a more metaphysical fashion, this new 
language speaks of a “new horizon in which the love of God will trans-
value our values and the eyes of that love will transform” our know-
ing. 21 Intentionality analysis, to connect the point to the two previous 
chapters, “brings into focus human nature in its spiritual dimensions by 
specifying the remote and proximate principles of self-transcendence 
(movement) and integration (rest). The human being is a being ‘on the 
way,’ a being in the constant tension of self-transcendence.” 22 The ineffa-
ble, open-endedness of our capacity for self-transcendence “transposes 
the Scholastic concept of obediential potency” and is “transformed, 
enlarged, sublated by a love that is otherworldly, a love in search of 
meaning beyond the confines of this world.” 23 
 Lonergan’s identification of sanctifying grace with being in love with 
God in an unrestricted manner prompts us to ask about the  habit of 
charity , identified, as we just saw, in Lonergan’s early treatments on 
grace. The Aristotelian framework on which a Thomistic theology of 
sanctifying grace was based required a distinction between sanctifying 
grace and the habit of charity. Sanctifying grace was considered entita-
tive – rooted in the essence of the soul – while the habit of charity was 
accidental – rooted in the potency of the soul. 24 When one is attempting 
to transpose these distinctions from a metaphysical context to religious 
interiority, one must ask whether this distinction survives. It could be 
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that sanctifying grace and the habit of charity appeal to the same reality 
in conscious experience. Lonergan even admitted that his identification 
of sanctifying grace and being in love with God represented an amalga-
mation of sanctifying grace and charity. Though there has been debate 
over its preservation, Robert Doran, following Aquinas, maintains the 
distinction in order to avoid a retreat into the “undifferentiated com-
mon sense about interiority,” and for its systematic explanatory power 
in providing a “hypothetical understanding of how it can be true that 
we do indeed enjoy distinct created relations to each of the three uncre-
ated divine persons as terms of these relations.” 25 Doran argues, then, 
that the metaphysical distinction of sanctifying grace and the habit of 
charity ought to be transposed into the categories of being on the receiv-
ing end of God’s unqualified and unconditional love (sanctifying grace) 
and loving God in return with all our hearts and minds and souls and 
strength and loving our neighbour as ourselves (habit of charity). 26 
 The Four-Point Hypothesis: Trinitarian 
Structure of the Supernatural 
 Having just highlighted Doran’s transposition of sanctifying grace and 
the habit of charity, I turn now to his account of these same supernatu-
ral realities in a more explicitly Trinitarian context. In the four-point 
hypothesis, Lonergan and Doran identify grace as a set of created 
participations in the supernatural life of God. Grace, in other words, 
possesses a distinctly Trinitarian structure. The four-point hypothesis 
identifies four absolutely supernatural ways of imitating God through 
a created participation in the divine relations. Guided by the logic of 
contingent predication, these “participations do not constitute a change 
in the divine relations themselves, but do create a real, albeit created, 
participation in the divine nature.” 27 
 Though there are four supernatural realities in Lonergan’s schema, 
I limit my analysis here to the particular divine relations connected to 
created imitations and participations of sanctifying grace (active spira-
tion) and the habit of charity (passive spiration). (I extend these catego-
ries in chapter 7 in my development of an explanatory theology of the 
saints.) Doran states his analogy clearly as follows: 
 The starting point in unpacking that four-point hypothesis is the link 
between sanctifying grace and charity as created participations in, 
respectively, active spiration and passive spiration. From the standpoint 
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of religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness, these created 
participations are (1) the recalled reception ( memoria ) of the gift of God’s 
love (that is, of sanctifying grace as it affects consciousness) grounding 
a subsequent set of judgments of value (faith), as these together partici-
pate in active spiration and so set up a special relation to the indwelling 
Holy Spirit, and (2) a return of love (charity) participating in the Proceed-
ing Love that is the Holy Spirit, which establishes a special relation to 
the indwelling Father and Son. Memory and Faith combine to imitate and 
participate in active spiration, and charity imitates and participates in pas-
sive spiration. 28 
 First, the divine relation of active spiration connects to the created real-
ity of sanctifying grace. In other words, sanctifying grace imitates and 
participates in the Father and the Son together as they “breathe” the 
Holy Spirit, and so bears a special relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit. 
Second, the divine relation of passive spiration connects to the created 
reality of the habit of charity. The habit of charity proceeds from the 
reception of sanctifying grace and participates in the “proceeding Love 
‘breathed’ by and proceeding from the Father and the Son, and so bears 
a special inverse relation to the Father and the Son.” 29 The habit of char-
ity animates the return of good for evil in an abiding friendship with 
God. 30 
 The Shift to Interpersonal Relations: 
New Relation to the Same End 
 Sanctifying grace and the habit of charity directly relate to this chap-
ter’s theme of supernatural desire, or, as I will rearticulate the matter 
below, the elevation of human desire to a new created (supernatural) 
relation to that end. Scholars have debated the question of how sancti-
fying grace ought to be articulated in a methodical theology, a theology 
grounded in the conscious operations and states of the existential sub-
ject. In a methodical vision, metaphysical terms and relations are not 
prioritized. But does this mean that such metaphysical terms should be 
discarded? Doran recommends against their dismissal. The metaphysi-
cal terms provide a fruitful and much-needed control of meaning, and 
hence Doran suggests a preservation and transposition of these terms 
into the language of interiority, as I noted above. 31 
 For Doran, the key to this transposition is more explicit treat-
ment of the level of interpersonal relations. 32 When marked with 
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self-transcendence, this level includes the love of intimacy, devotion to 
the human community, he reception of God’s love, and the return of love 
for God in charity. 33 The distinguishing character of this level is not the 
supernatural as opposed to the natural, but a concern with the “other” – 
with the presence of the beloved in the lover. 34 This interpersonal level 
makes possible the “conscious relation between the conscious subject 
and the other with whom the subject is in love.” 35 This level of interper-
sonal relations is constituted by self-gift, the very handing over of one’s 
central form to the determination of another in love. 36 One may even dis-
cern a fourth stage of meaning that sublates the conscious interiority of 
the subject more fully in the context of a community of loving persons. 37 
 In light of this relational matrix, I propose that the supernatural does 
not offer us a new end, but a new relation to the same end, who is 
God. 38 In terms of final causality, the “supernatural cannot add a new 
end beyond what is already given naturally but must be a new mode of 
attainment of that goal.” 39 Since grace perfects nature rather than replac-
ing nature, it is more fitting to frame this in the language of relationality 
and continuity. In other words, human beings have a natural orienta-
tion to God as knowable and loveable with an unrestricted reach, as I 
claimed in chapter 4. The supernatural is not a new final cause then, but 
a new created relation to that end. In this instance, it is not simply a mat-
ter of the relationship between creature and creator. This is because, if 
the human person actually attains here God as God  in se , then these new 
supernatural relations would be created participations in the internal 
relations of Trinitarian life. 40 This solution involves the rich intercon-
nection between Trinitarian theology and the grace-nature distinction 
that I attempted to highlight above. This line of reasoning contributes 
to Feingold’s challenge to account for the elevation of natural desire 
into a supernatural inclination to the vision of God through the recep-
tion of sanctifying grace. Lonergan, along with Doran’s and Ormerod’s 
developments, preserves the distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural, but also transposes this distinction into the context of 
interpersonal relations, which helps us avoid an extrinsicist account of 
natural and supernatural ends. 
 Metaphysical and Phenomenological Accounts of Love 
 I turn now to Doran’s challenge to both preserve the metaphysical cat-
egories of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity and to situate them 
in the realm of the interpersonal. How might we think about spousal 
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love and the love of family as infused love with God in a way that 
preserves the metaphysical control of meaning, but transposes in the 
phenomenological language of the interpersonal? Such a transposition 
offers resources for articulating the relationship between natural loves 
and supernatural loves in a more organic, less extrinsic way. 
 Metaphysics of Love: Vertical Finality and a 
Critique of Extrinsicism 
 In the previous chapter, I noted the importance of the explanatory term 
“vertical finality,” which indicated, in the concrete universe, the poten-
tiality not only for horizontal unity but also for emergence. “Vertical 
finality” denotes an emergent, upward-directed drive that gives lower 
beings the capacity to set the conditions for the emergence of higher 
beings. If the emphasis in chapter 4 was on the upward dynamism of 
intellectual operations, I now focus on the upward dynamism of love – 
from natural love to charity, the only virtue to remain in the beatific 
vision. 
 In his essay “Finality, Love, Marriage” (1949), Lonergan extends the 
term “vertical finality” to the theme of love. He notes this upward-
directed dynamism of human love from the level of nature to the level of 
the beatific vision 41 and the transformation that happens when the heart 
is startled by a beauty and shifts the centre of desire out of the self to the 
other. This experience of eros prompts a yearning for the other. And, in 
the course of the relationship, a shift occurs from “the merely orgiastic 
tendencies of nature to the rational level of friendship with its enduring 
basis in the excellence of a good person.” Hence, there is a “dispositive 
upward tendency from eros to friendship, and from friendship to a spe-
cial order of charity.” 42 Married life offers the matrix of conditions that 
shows this upward tendency from human to supernatural perfection – 
an upward movement to love of God and neighbour. 43 Marriage is a 
human friendship that embodies horizontal finality in the procreative 
process and vertical finality in its pointing to “our eternal embrace with 
God in the beatific vision.” 44 Lonergan’s account here comes close to 
Steven Long’s argument in chapter 2 about marriage in the natural and 
supernatural orders, though Lonergan’s use of vertical finality situates 
this dynamism within the concretely operating world order. 
 In  Insight, Lonergan also discusses the role of charity in the con-
crete world process, but does so in this context with the problem of 
evil explicitly in mind. I bring this to light because it is an explicitly 
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anti-extrinsicist argument. Charity, along with faith and hope, are con-
sidered the higher conjugate forms with which God meets the evils of 
sin and bias. While general transcendent knowledge is the knowledge 
of God that answers the basic questions raised by the question of being, 
special transcendent knowledge includes God’s solution to the problem 
of evil. 45 Lonergan describes the general characteristics of the divine 
solution as follows: 
 Thus any solution would be one; it would be universally accessible and 
permanent; it would be a harmonious continuation of the actual order of 
the universe; it would consist in some reversal of the priority of living over 
the knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to fol-
low knowledge; this reversal would be effected through conjugate forms 
that in some sense would transcend human nature, that would constitute 
a new and higher integration of human activity, that would pertain not 
to static system but to system on the move, that would be realized with 
man’s apprehension and consent and in accord with the probabilities of 
world order. 46 
 The point especially relevant to this inquiry into the natural and 
supernatural is Lonergan’s claim that the solution would be a harmo-
nious continuation of the actual order of the universe. This provides a 
way of recognizing the absolute supernaturality of grace, while at the 
same time avoiding a presentation of the supernatural as extrinsically 
added on to human nature. Here, charity is indeed envisioned as tran-
scending human nature in some sense. But this kind of transcendence 
would constitute not a new desire or a new activity, but “a new and 
higher  integration of human activity,” and would be realized in accord 
with the probabilities of world order. 47 This new and higher integration 
is a harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe willed 
by God. 
 It is this actual order of the universe – not some ideal of perfection 
divorced from the complexity of the world process – that is a “good and 
value chosen by God for the manifestation of the perfection of God.” 48 
Apart from the distortion of sin, then, the universe is in love with God. 
The person of good will – the person who wills concretely the good of 
the universe of emergent probability – is in love with God. 49 To love God 
and to affirm the good of the universe is then to embrace a universe 
shot through with contingency, a universe that operates according to 
probabilities. In the midst of all this complexity, Lonergan can say that 
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the good of the universe “includes all the good that all persons in the 
universe are or enjoy or possess.” 50 
 The conjugate forms that Lonergan proposes are the supernatural 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are part of the complex heuris-
tic structure of the supernatural solution to the problem of evil, willed 
from all eternity by the one God within the one world order. 51 Lonergan 
identifies charity with the dialectical attitude of returning good for evil, 
self-sacrificing love, repentance, and joy: 
 For it is love of God above all and in all, and love is joy. Its repentance 
and sorrow regard the past. Its present sacrifi ces look to the future. It is at 
one with the universe in being in love with God, and it shares its dynamic 
resilience and expectancy. As emergent probability, it ever rises above past 
achievement. As genetic process, it develops generic potentiality to its 
specifi c perfection. As dialectic, it overcomes evil both by meeting it with 
good and by using it to reinforce the good. But good will wills the order 
of the universe, and so it wills with that order’s dynamic joy and zeal. 52 
 The operation of charity in this one world order is not limited to a par-
ticular conclave in the world or a particular church as if it were extrinsic 
to the fact that all human beings have a natural desire for meaning, 
truth, goodness, and love. And the higher integration given by faith, 
hope, and charity elevates and transforms these natural desires in har-
monious continuation of the actual order of the universe. 53 This is not 
to deny the centrality of Christ and his mystical body, the Church. Later 
in this chapter and in the next, more will be said about Christian par-
ticularity, created participation in the Trinitarian relations, and the pos-
sibility of the vestiges of the Trinity to be discerned inside and outside 
concrete ecclesial life. But Lonergan recognizes the presence of charity 
in a variety of walks of life. He does so, however, not in a naive fashion, 
but in a way that challenges us to discern the pitfalls of imperfect char-
ity and the half-loves that constitute our actual concrete relations in the 
world. 
 Phenomenology of Love: Lonergan and Marion 
 Having offered a metaphysically oriented account of love, I turn now 
to Lonergan’s later treatment of love, from  Method in Theology (1972) on. 
Although Lonergan has established a helpful framework – a heuristic 
structure, if you will – I contend that a more sustained treatment of the 
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interpersonal dimension of intimate family love requires the help of 
other thinkers who have explored these kinds of loves in a phenomeno-
logical way. In this section, I integrate selected themes from the work of 
Jean-Luc Marion (and by extension insights from Balthasar, Jean Vanier, 
and Wendell Berry) into the analysis. Scholars have noted the attention 
both thinkers devote to the priority of love and “the excess of the gift 
of God.” 54 
 The phenomenological tradition’s focus on intersubjectivity aims 
to account for the other as a subject – a subject endowed with a rich 
inner life in a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value – 
rather than as a substance, to employ the scholastic terminology. There 
is indeed a thread of intersubjectivity and the interpersonal that runs 
throughout much of Lonergan’s work. That said, Lonergan’s heuristic 
framework could benefit from richer phenomenological descriptions of 
interpersonal love. Perhaps a central motif from the writings of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar – one of the key influences on Marion – will help 
initiate us into this mode and offer us a glimpse of the fundamental 
reordering of priorities, to be described below. For Balthasar, a child 
does not awaken into consciousness with the question of why there is 
something rather than nothing nor ask, with more existential urgency, 
“Why am I here?” 55 In interpersonal categories, Balthasar writes, “Its 
‘I’ awakens in the experience of a ‘Thou’: in its mother’s smile through 
which it learns that it is contained, affirmed and loved in a relationship 
which is incomprehensibly encompassing, already actual, sheltering 
and nourishing.” 56 Balthasar continues: 
 The body which it snuggles into, a soft, warm and nourishing kiss, is a 
kiss of love in which it can take shelter because it had been sheltered there 
 a priori . The awakening of its consciousness is a late occurrence, in com-
parison with this basic mystery of unfathomable depth. It fi nally sees only 
what has always been, and can therefore only confi rm it. A light which 
has been perpetually asleep awakens at some point into an alert and self-
knowing light. But it awakens at the love of the Thou, as it has always 
slept in the womb and on the bosom of the Thou. The experience of being 
granted entrance into a sheltering and encompassing world is one which 
for all incipient, developing and mature consciousness cannot be super-
seded. 57 
 It is within this interpersonal matrix – captured here by Balthasar – that 
Lonergan situates the role of multidimensional loves in human living. In 
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his later writings, he envisions a movement in human living – a move-
ment “from above downwards” – as the “transformation of falling in 
love” in its multiple forms – marriage, family, friendship, and civic. 58 
Beyond these forms of human love, religious experience discloses a 
being in love with God in an unrestricted fashion. This is sanctifying 
grace in a metaphysical context. Whereas our unquenchable desire to 
know reveals our quest for self-transcendence, religious love fulfils this 
capacity, dismantling and abolishing “the horizon in which our know-
ing and choosing went on” and setting up “a new horizon in which the 
love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will 
transform that knowing.” 59 
 In terms of accounting for love as the fundamental horizon for human 
knowing and acting, it is relevant to note that both Lonergan and Mar-
ion turn to Blaise Pascal. For Lonergan, there is a kind of knowledge 
only possible through love. In his explanation of this love-knowledge, 
Lonergan draws on Pascal’s dictum that “the heart has its reasons which 
reason does not know.” Lonergan identifies reason with the three levels 
of cognitional activity – empirical, intellectual, and rational. He identi-
fies the “heart’s reasons” as “feelings that are intentional responses to 
values,” and the “heart” as the subject operating on the “fourth, exis-
tential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of 
being in love.” 60 In other words, in addition to factual knowledge, there 
is another kind of knowledge reached only by a person in love. Divine 
love neither results from nor is conditioned by human knowledge of 
God. Rather, it is a gift that precedes such knowledge and prompts the 
very cause of our seeking. 61 Lonergan cites Pascal’s reflection in  Pensees 
vii: “Take comfort, you would not be seeking me if you had not already 
found me.” This gift orients us to transcendent mystery – a mystery to 
love with all one’s heart, soul, mind, and strength. 62 
 In similar fashion, Pascal provides Marion with the resources for 
thinking about the primacy of love in terms of a phenomenology of 
charity and not metaphysical proofs. To contextualize, Marion’s work is 
animated in part by overcoming the kind of metaphysics that emerges 
in modernity – a thought-form that prioritizes epistemology and the 
thinking subject’s knowing of being in the manner of Descartes and 
Kant. And for Pascal, thinking of God solely in terms of metaphysical 
proofs is an exercise in vanity. Thus, Pascal helps Marion articulate a 
phenomenological reduction rooted in charity. In  On Descartes’ Meta-
physical Prism, Marion writes of Pascal that love does not dispense with 
knowing, but becomes the road to knowledge. 63 In the tradition of the 
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saints, we should love in order to know; we can enter the truth by way 
of charity. Love, for Marion, functions as a “hermeneutical principle 
that opens onto a new world.” 64 “To see the ‘order of charity,’ one has 
not so much to know a new object, as to know according to a new con-
dition, loving.” 65 In sum, one finds here in both Lonergan and Marion a 
kind of reversal of the axiom that “knowledge precedes love” – that you 
cannot love what you do not know. In terms of God’s love in relation to 
human yearning, “love precedes knowledge,” and the “very beginning 
of faith is due to God’s grace.” 66 Lonergan and Marion give priority to 
love and suggest that there is a desire and knowledge that only love 
can give. 
 Erotic Subjectivity and Divine Grace 
 I now focus on Marion’s more sustained account of intimate love as a 
way of establishing a kind of supernatural desire for God that is rooted 
in sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. If Lonergan and Doran help 
us both preserve the natural-supernatural distinction in a non-extrinsicist 
way and transpose sanctifying grace and the habit of charity within 
an interpersonal, and ultimately Trinitarian, matrix, then Marion helps 
us penetrate in phenomenological fashion the relationship between the 
human love of intimacy and the love of God. This integration of Marion 
relates, in part, to Dadosky’s attempt to expand Lonergan’s patterns 
of experience to the sexual pattern. The sexual pattern of experience 
is closely related, Dadosky argues, to the biological pattern (desire for 
sexual gratification in a similar manner to water quenching our thirst or 
food meeting our need for sustenance), but also interpenetrates the aes-
thetic and dramatic patterns – patterns that embody spontaneity, play, 
and freedom. Human sexuality bears the capacity to mediate “the mys-
tery of another person.” 67 And a successful negotiation of the dialectic 
involves both a “commitment to a person in a way that brings about 
and furthers one’s development and self-transcendence” and deepens 
one’s commitment to ultimate transcendent value. 68 It is important to 
note that this chapter does not offer a full account of the nuances of  The 
Erotic Phenomenon , but attends in a selective manner to some of Mar-
ion’s overarching themes as a way of enriching a framework already 
established by Lonergan and Doran. Thus, I take the liberty of illumi-
nating Marion’s rather elusive style with some concrete examples from 
other writers. A fundamental point, however, to keep in mind is that 
the human capacity to love, for Marion, is ultimately made possible 
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by finding ourselves “always and already loved” by God. Marion’s 
phenomenological approach enables us to account for a more intrinsic 
relationship between human and divine love than a neatly partitioned 
extrinsicist account. 
 In  The Erotic Phenomenon, Marion challenges us to rethink the ques-
tion that matters most. He prioritizes erotic meditations. “I thus had to 
admit,” he reflects, “that no question reached me more radically that 
that which asked me not, ‘Am I thinking?’ but ‘Does anyone out there 
love me?’ To be or not to be is no longer the question, but only ‘Does 
anyone out there love me?’” 69 Rather than certitude in being, the radical 
question involves assurance in love. Hence, the questions that shape 
Marion’s phenomenological analysis are: Am I loved by another? Can I 
love first? And, in a more declarative manner: You have loved me first. 70 
 Desire to Be Loved 
 In terms of the first question – “Am I loved by another?” – one inquires 
into one’s own “loveableness” and consequently one’s worth. Marion 
treats this question in relation to our experience of space, time, and 
identity, along with the temptation to vanity that the question prompts. 
For the sake of my attempt to navigate this question in a way that 
enriches the priority of love affirmed by Lonergan in his later work, 
I offer an example from the life and work of Jean Vanier, the founder 
of the L’Arche communities for the severely mentally disabled. Vanier 
says that, upon entering L’Arche, they often blame themselves. “If I am 
not loved,” they seem to say, “it is because I am not lovable, I am no 
good. I am evil.” 71 When Vanier started living at L’Arche, he quickly 
realized that he was surrounded by men and women crying out, “Will 
you be my friend? Am I important to you? Do I have any value?” 72 While 
those who do not experience severe mental disabilities are able to mask 
over this fundamental need through a variety of defence mechanisms, 
Vanier notes that the rejected and institutionalized cannot hide the pain 
and loneliness of abandonment. At L’Arche, he witnesses tense, fearful, 
and angry bodies become relaxed, peaceful, and trusting. He offers the 
example of a woman named Jane who came to the community from 
the psychiatric hospital. Full of anger and pain, she would continually 
hit her head with her fist: “Over the ten years she has been with us, 
she has grown more peaceful. Her eyes are now bright with life. She 
still cannot speak or walk, but it is as if her flesh has in some way been 
transformed.” 73 Vanier’s life with the mentally disabled reveals that the 
132 The Givenness of Desire
most fundamental human question is not about  certitude in being , but 
about  assurance in love , and that an affirmative answer to this question 
significantly shapes the flourishing of our relationships, families, and 
communities. 
 Loving in the Flesh: Sexual Pattern of Experience 
 Although the question “Does anyone love me?” indicates the deep 
desire for love in the human condition, Marion challenges us to refocus 
the question in favour of one that does not presume love is reciprocal, 
and that leads us into the realm of charity: Can I love first? This recast-
ing conditions us to think about self-emptying, of gift, and not simply 
of mutuality and reciprocity. In what follows, I concentrate more on 
sexual expressions of love that challenge us to advance towards the 
other and to see the other not as an object but as a person. In  The Erotic 
Phenomenon , Marion offers a more personal signification of the other 
in the faithful performance of the oath in a deliberate distancing from 
the primacy of the ethical in Levinas’s phenomenology of the face and the 
height of the other. According to Marion, we must indeed recognize the 
privilege of the face. 74 But our encounter “no longer depends here on a 
distance, nor on an ethical height,” as it does with Levinas, but rather 
on intimacy with particularity. In this intimate encounter, the face of 
the other person is not saying to me “Thou shall not kill!” 75 In other 
words, this encounter does not disclose itself as a fundamentally ethical 
encounter concretizing a universal commandment. But in more deeply 
personal, intimate, and erotic language the other “says to me, in sighs 
or words, ‘Here I am, come!’” 76 Marion’s key claim is that when we 
love a person – when we make love in person – our experience is not 
ordered by an abstract universal ethic; rather, it is surrounded by and 
imbued with particularity – “mine and his or hers, since it is a question 
of me and of you and surely not of a universally obligating neighbor.” 77 
In the mutually erotic zone, each gives to the other in the flesh, thus 
transgressing the universal. 
 The theme of flesh is crucial for Marion’s phenomenological render-
ing of conjugal sexual intimacy. Recognizing the formative nature of 
love, he says that each act of love is “inscribed forever in me and out-
lines me definitively.” We do not love by proxy, but only in the flesh. 78 
We do not have flesh, but are flesh. As bodies, we are flesh in the world. 
But not every encounter of nakedness with another is an encounter of 
the flesh. Medical nudity, for example, does not manifest me in the flesh. 
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It re-transforms me instead into “an object of examination, measurable 
under every angle, diagnosable like a physical machine, a chemical 
metabolism, an economic consumer, etc.” 79 The denuding of  flesh, for 
Marion, is opposed to the uncovering of the  object . In erotic intimacy, 
provoking the desire of the other paradoxically consists most often in 
“showing that one does not show – for the flesh distinguishes itself from 
the body precisely in that it cannot and must not appear on an equal 
footing with objects, on the same stage as the things of the world.” 80 
Rather, it is to be faithful to a phenomenological principle: no flesh can 
appear simply as a body. That is, “if one understands this appearing in 
the simple sense of offering itself naked to the gaze, it is only fitting for a 
body and never for a flesh, precisely because that which gives the flesh 
its privilege – the capacity to feel and feel itself feeling – cannot appear 
directly under any light.” 81 We often feel and experience other bodies in 
the daily happenings in the life-world. This experience is marked by our 
day-to-day encounter with others’ bodies, but predominantly as resis-
tance or impenetrability or unavailability. And this happens because 
of spatiality. To avoid misunderstanding, this is not a matter of “I in 
the flesh” attempting to encounter every other body as flesh. Rather, 
it is to set the stage for distinguishing how different it is to experience 
another as flesh. This fleshly encounter “feels that something  puts up no 
resistance to me, and that, far from turning me back into myself and thus 
reducing me, this something withdraws, effaces itself and makes room 
for me, in short that this something opens itself, I know that I am deal-
ing with flesh – or better, with a flesh other than my own, the flesh of 
an other.” 82 To be flesh with another – whether the relationship between 
mother and child or an authentic sexual experience – is to experience 
the kind of sheltering that is fully human. “I can only free myself and 
become myself by touching another flesh, as one touches a land at port, 
because only another flesh can make room for me, welcome me, and not 
turn me away or resist me – that is, comply with my flesh and reveal it 
to me by providing it a place.” 83 
 Marion’s distinction between  gazing at a body and  feeling in the flesh 
finds expression in the reflections of the agrarian poet, novelist, and 
essayist Wendell Berry. One of the boasts of our contemporary age, 
reflects Berry – from artists, psychologists, and therapists to anthropol-
ogists and pornographers – is that the bedroom door has been opened 
wide and now we see what sex really is. 84 Voyeurs, for Berry, in fact are 
“the most handicapped of all the sexual observers; they only know what 
they see.” 85 True intimacy cannot be known by an outsider; it cannot be 
134 The Givenness of Desire
shown. In a fashion that illuminates Marion’s point, Berry claims that 
the intimacy of the union itself cannon be observed: “One cannot enter 
into this intimacy and watch it at the same time, any more than the 
mind can think about itself while it thinks about something else.” 86 It’s 
not that sexual intimacy ought to be avoided as a subject of the imagina-
tion; Berry’s point is that voyeurism often drains sex of its mystery and 
sanctity. After all, Homer, Shakespeare, the Bible, and Jane Austen have 
imaginatively depicted the intimacy and power of sexual love, while 
at the same time respecting its privacy and honouring its dignity. The 
best representations of sex make one aware “with profound sympathy, 
of the two lives, not just the two bodies that are involved; they make 
one aware also of the difficulty of full and open sexual consent between 
two people and of the history and the trust that are necessary to make 
possible that consent. Without such a history and trust, sex is brutal, no 
matter what species is involved.” 87 The profoundest artistic expressions 
of sex help us imagine “the sweetness continuing on through the joys 
and difficulties of homemaking, the births and upbringing of children, 
the deaths of parents and friends – through disagreements, hardships, 
quarrels, aging, and death.” 88 And this is precisely what Marion alerts 
us to: misdirected eroticization and the importance of oaths. 
 Marion recognizes the potential pitfalls associated with misdirected 
eroticization. Although erotic love individualizes us, it is not always 
directed to the person as person; the temptation to treat the other as an 
erotic object endures. The way to overcome this difficulty, for Marion, is 
to enter into an eroticization that is marked by freedom and not instinct 
or coercion, where not only flesh but access to the person is gained. 
 You Have Loved Me First: Human Oath and Divine Love 
 Marion concretizes this phenomenological vision with a reflection on 
fidelity – the kind of fidelity called for with the arrival of children. The 
priority of love – the call to make love in person – is nourished by fidel-
ity, and fidelity is what allows the phenomenon to be seen. The erotic 
phenomenon in this richer sense demands long and deep faithfulness. 89 
“I thus receive myself, in the end, from the other person. I receive from 
the other my ipseity, as I have already received my signification in his 
or her oath, my flesh in the eroticization of his or hers, and even my 
proper fidelity in the other’s declaration ‘You truly love me!’” 90 In this 
vein, Marion invokes the Levinasian third, as a possible witness to the 
oath of fidelity between the lovers. The child receives the gift of origin, 
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but can never return it. The child can, however, embody the gift: “The 
child certainly reproduces the oath of the lovers on his face.” 91 While 
the child may embody the oath of fidelity, he or she cannot ultimately 
assure the permanence of the oath; hence, Marion invokes God as the 
eternal witness. 
 For Marion, then, the lovers “accomplish their oath in the  adieu – in 
the passage to God, who they summon as their final witness, their first 
witness, the one who never leaves and never lies.” 92 Which leads us 
to the final formulation of the erotic reduction: “You loved me first.” 93 
In a way that complements Doran’s transposition of sanctifying grace 
and the habit of charity, Marion says that our capacity to love is actu-
ally made possible by finding ourselves always and already loved. 94 
In this erotic reduction, the lovers realize that “there has been another 
lover who has preceded me there and, from there, calls me there in 
silence.” 95 Marion’s invocation of a theological foundation for our 
“loveableness” resonates with and can be integrated into a systematic 
theology by way of Doran’s formulation of sanctifying grace as being 
on the receiving end of God’s unqualified and unconditional love. For 
Marion, the first lover is eternally God. We love God because God has 
loved us first. In fact, “God practices the logic of the erotic reduction 
as we do”; God loves “in the same way we do.” 96 Marion immediately 
qualifies this with a note on the “infinite difference” that is also opera-
tive here: 
 When God loves (and indeed he never ceases to love), he simply loves infi -
nitely better than we do. He loves to perfection, without a fault, without 
an error, from beginning to end. He loves fi rst and last. He loves like no 
one else. In the end, I not only discover that another was loving me before 
I loved, and thus that this other already played the lover before me, but 
above all I discover that this fi rst lover, from the very beginning, is named 
God. God’s highest transcendence, the only one that does not dishonor 
him, belongs not to power, nor to wisdom, nor even to infi nity, but to love. 
For love alone is enough to put all infi nity, all wisdom, and all power to 
work. 97 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter attended to Feingold’s challenge to develop an alternative 
model that develops the relationship between the natural and the super-
natural in a non-extrinsicist way that still gives priority to the language 
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of Aquinas, especially an account of the  supernatural habitual inclination 
for the vision of God resulting from sanctifying grace. With Lonergan, 
and the developments of Doran and Ormerod, this chapter argued on 
the one hand for the ongoing relevance of Aquinas’s language of the 
elevating habits of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and on the 
other hand for the need for these explanatory terms to be rearticulated 
in the interpersonal language of being-in-love. Situating these elevat-
ing habits within a Trinitiarian context equipped us with the resources 
to argue that the supernatural is not an abstract essence that hovers 
over the natural and descends to relate to our natural lives in a vague 
and extrinsic way; rather, “supernatural being-in-love” is a graced par-
ticipation in the specific divine relations of Trinitarian life. Aiming to 
present a phenomenologically informed account of the relationship 
between human and divine love, the chapter presented a transposition 
of Lonergan’s metaphysically informed account of love to his later phe-
nomenological account. In light of this guiding framework, a selective 
turn to Marion helped us to penetrate in phenomenological fashion the 
relationship between the human love of intimacy and the love of God. 
Marion challenged us to prioritize the question of love as fundamental, 
to explore what it means to make love in person within the context of 
an oath and the fecundity of children, and ultimately showed us that 
we can only love truly because we were already deemed loveable by 
God. Placed within the natural-supernatural framework, the language 
of Marion helped us imagine in a more intrinsic way the interconnection 
of human and divine love, and what it might mean experientially to 
receive the supernatural gifts of sanctifying grace and the habit of char-
ity. 98 These gifts do not create a new human end, but constitute instead 
a new relation to this same end. The desire we have for God’s essence 
naturally is transformed into a new way of relating – a way of relating 
that instils in us a desire for the beatific vision – the very  patria of Trini-
tarian life. And our experience of human love in all its vulnerability – 
with children, with the vulnerable, in sexual intimacy – is not extrinsic 
to, but inextricably intertwined with, this supernatural inclination. 
 PART 3 
 Mimetic Desire, Models of Holiness, and 
the Love of Deviated Transcendence 

 6 Incarnate Meaning and Mimetic Desire: 
Saints and the Desire for God 
 This part of the book shifts our attention, in a more concentrated way, to 
other-mediated and socially mediated desire, recognizing the growing 
emphasis in theological scholarship on the saints as models of desire. 
How might a consideration of the human desire for God be broadened 
when the socially mediated, mimetic character of concrete subjectivity 
is taken seriously? Recall Girard’s claim that mimetic desire is also the 
desire for God. 1 
 An exploration of the relationship between theology and models of 
holiness can be found, for example, in the work of Michael Buckley. 
Buckley argues for the restoration of religious experience to its legiti-
mate place in theology. Accordingly, he has posed the challenge of 
developing a more robust account of “religious intellectuality,” which 
is couched in terms of two dynamisms: (1) the permanent orientation of 
the human mind to truth, goodness, beauty, and justice; and (2) concrete 
historical disclosures of holiness – persons and encounters that create 
the conditions for assent to the reality of God. 2 
 The former dynamism was treated in chapters 3–5; this chapter 
and the one to follow respond to Buckley’s challenge of discern-
ing the role of the saints in theological discourse. 3 In fact, he finds it 
“extraordinary that so much Christian formal theology for centuries 
has bracketed this actual witness,” offering it very little intellectual 
weight. 4 He asks, “Is it not a lacuna in the standard theology, even of 
our day, that theology neither has nor has striven to forge the intel-
lectual devices to probe in these concrete experiences the disclosure 
they offer of the reality of God and so render them available for so 
universal a discipline?” He adds that this “would be a difficult and 
complex task.” 5 
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 In an attempt, then, to restore concrete disclosures of religious expe-
rience to their legitimate place in theology, this chapter first outlines 
Doran’s heuristic framework for integrating the dynamism for self-
transcendence and mimetic desire. Building on the ongoing Lonergan-
Girard conversation, it then links Lonergan’s category of “incarnate 
meaning” with René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire as a means of 
developing some general-theological terms on which to build a theol-
ogy of religious disclosure. Finally, it highlights a distinctive feature of 
a Girardian account of sanctity, humility and resistance to scapegoating, 
and further suggests a way of integrating Lonergan’s account of nature, 
understood as self-transcendence, into Girard’s schema. This will pave 
the way for a discussion of the metaphysics of holiness and the habit of 
charity in the next chapter. Both incarnate meaning and mimetic desire 
recognize the primacy of the interpersonal in human experiences of 
meaning and truth. The integration of these categories enables us to 
envision the saints as both sites of incarnate meaning and, more specifi-
cally, incarnate models of desire. 
 Intellectual Desire and Mimetic Desire 
 I frame this chapter in terms of a more constructive integration of 
intellectual and mimetic desire. As I mentioned in the introduction 
to this book, Girardian scholar Kevin Lenehan has suggested that 
Girard’s anthropological emphasis on intersubjectivity, relational-
ity, and the phenomenon of “knowing and willing according to a 
model” as a ground for “human openness to divine revelation” might 
complement “the more cognitive approaches of scholasticism and 
transcendentalism.” 6 
 In  The Trinity in History , Doran establishes a framework, based on 
Lonergan’s work, for integrating natural desire and mimetic desire. 7 
He grounds this integration in his account of  two ways of being conscious . 
The first way of being conscious highlights the passive character of the 
human spirit. In Thomistic terms, this is a movement from potency to 
act. This first way involves undergoing passively “what we sense and 
imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and 
sadness.” 8 Doran refers to this way as the psychic dimension of con-
sciousness. As the kind of data to be understood by depth psychology, 
it lies in the polyphony or cacophony of our “sensations, memories, 
images, emotions, conations, associations, bodily movements, and 
spontaneous intersubjective responses.” 9 Doran identifies this first way 
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of being conscious with elicited desire, and contrasts elicited desire 
with natural or innate desire. 10 
 The second way of being conscious involves the unfolding of the 
transcendental, spiritual, autonomous, and active desire for being and 
value. It is the pure, unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire for 
what is, what is true, and what is good. Lonergan’s remark about chil-
dren is especially relevant for the navigation of mimetic and natural 
desire: “Wearing their parents out with a virtually endless stream of 
questions is something that children neither are taught nor learn.” 11 In 
Thomistic terms, it is the spiritual dimension of human consciousness 
that becomes the created analogy for the Trinitarian processions. This 
is an instance, not of elicited desire, but of natural desire. This is where 
human consciousness “provides instances of autonomous spiritual pro-
cessions.” The term “autonomous” must be qualified. For Doran, this 
term does not indicate the “sense of a self-asserting effort at what Ernest 
Becker called the  causa sui project.” 12 Rather, it recognizes that in the 
second way of being conscious we are operating under transcendental 
exigencies for the intelligible, the true, and the real. This is the realm of 
natural (not elicited) desire, spiritual (not psychic) desire. Lonergan’s 
and Doran’s positive references to the “autonomous subject” pose a ten-
sion with Girard’s and Alison’s consistent critique of the romantic lie 
and metaphysical autonomy. (Recall that the anthropology of grasping 
perpetuates the romantic lie and the ongoing illusion of autonomy.) 13 
It is rooted in what Girard calls “metaphysical desire” – the deviated 
desire to absorb the mediator of our desire into ourselves, especially 
the other’s imagined autonomy and uniqueness. Doran affirms their 
critique of autonomy; but he also consciously wants to maintain the 
language of autonomy, not to defend the enlightenment subject or the 
romantic subject, but to substantiate the spiritual acts, the intelligible 
emanations of the human mind that participate in uncreated light and 
that serve as an analogy for the Trinitarian processions. 14 
 For Doran, however, it would be a mistake to separate these two ways 
of being conscious in hermetically sealed spaces. The first way of being 
conscious, in fact, “precedes, accompanies, and overarches the inten-
tional operations that constitute the second way of being conscious.” 15 
In this vein, Doran reorients Heidegger’s  Verstehen (understanding) and 
 Befindlichkeit (mood) into his context of vertical finality. “Vertical final-
ity,” as we noted in chapter 4, indicates an upward-directed dynamism 
from the lower to higher levels of being; lower levels set the conditions 
for the emergence of higher levels. In this context,  Befindlichkeit is the 
142 The Givenness of Desire
state of mind, the mood, the dispositions that shape and accompany 
the human quest for meaningful, intelligent, rational, moral, and loving 
modes of living. 
 The following question must be posed to Girard: If one is committed 
to an account of the second way of being conscious, that is, to the natural 
desire for meaning, truth, and goodness (to the autonomous spiritual 
processions), is all desire really mimetic desire? According to Doran, 
Girard’s mimetic desire concerns the first way of being conscious, but 
also “penetrates our spiritual orientation to the intelligible, the true and 
the real, and the good, for better and for worse.” 16 In other words, dis-
torted mimetic desire can infect the unfolding of the intellectual quest, 
while positive mimesis may strengthen, enhance, and deepen our com-
mitment to the exigencies of the mind. Positive models have the power 
to elicit the desire to be faithful to the natural desire for meaning, truth, 
and goodness. Doran’s appropriation of Girard’s work emphasizes that 
Lonergan’s first “way of being conscious” is “precisely interdividual in 
many of its manifestations.” For Doran, psychic development entails 
the negotiation of this interdividual field, which often distorts this sec-
ond way of being conscious and yet, if authentically negotiated, will 
allow the second way to flourish in the development of the person. 17 
“The intersubjective presence of that other evokes my innate drive for 
self-transcendence, that is, for fuller or more authentic being-myself.” 18 
 Doran insists that Girard is correct that “almost all learning is based 
on imitation” and that even “satisfying the desire to know involves 
mimetic behavior, however natural the desire to know may be, and 
however elicited mimetic desire always is.” 19 Still, the desire to know, 
he further insists, is not a matter of acquisitive mimesis, which – recall 
Alison’s “anthropology of grasping” – is a perversion of the pure, 
detached, disinterested desire to know. It thwarts the eros of the mind. 
Doran suggests that Girard and Lonergan exhibit both mimetic desire 
and the natural desire to know. Girard exhibits the latter in integrating 
his insights over the years into a rational framework and transforming 
them into real knowledge; his own intellectual performance cannot be 
reduced to acquisitive mimesis. Similarly, Lonergan was surely influ-
enced by Aquinas in mimetic fashion, but so many of his judgments 
and decisions – his pioneering intellectual achievements – were also 
his own. 20 
 In light of Doran’s integration of these two desires, it is pertinent 
to note that Girard would probably be more sympathetic than one 
might at first imagine. As Grant Kaplan has pointed out, Girard does 
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acknowledge other kinds of explanatory tools besides mimetic desire. 
He is interested in mimetic desire because of its ubiquity and wide 
application, 21 but his emphasis on mimetic desire ought not to be taken 
as excluding other types of explanation. For example, Girard says, “I 
believe in the love that parents have for their children, and I don’t see 
how you could interpret that in mimetic fashion.” 22 In a further response 
to a question about whether all desire is religious, Girard responded, 
“All desire is a desire for being.” 23 Kaplan comments, “Here we have 
the inchoate basis … for the possibility of a love that exists apart from 
the vagaries of mimesis, and desire unrestricted in the sense insisted on 
by Doran and Lonergan.” 24 
 In light of this integrating framework, my aim is to widen the scope 
of desire beyond the intellectual desire associated with the natural 
desire for God debates discussed in previous chapters. Here I develop 
an account of the “living texts” of saints as both sites of incarnate mean-
ing and, more specifically, incarnate models of desire. This integration 
of incarnate meaning and mimetic desire builds primarily on the ongo-
ing Lonergan-Girard conversation. It is not self-evident, however, that 
Lonergan and Girard should be regarded as pioneers in this task. After 
all, Lonergan’s thick retrievals of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas 
focus overwhelmingly on their scholarly contributions to theology and 
philosophy. Granted, he refers in many places to St Ignatius Loyola, in 
whose spirituality Lonergan was formed as a Jesuit. But, in his corpus 
as a whole, one cannot find the kind of thick and sustained reflection 
on particular saints as constitutive sites of theological meaning that one 
can, for example, in Balthasar’s use of Thérèse of Lisieux. In addition, 
Girard’s corpus, although his later work is deeply attentive to biblical 
revelation, offers a more sustained analysis of literary authors – Proust, 
Dostoevsky, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Flaubert, among others – than it 
does of the lives and insights of the saints. 
 Lonergan and Girard, nevertheless, have an important contribution 
to make to the question of the development of a contemporary theology 
of the saints as models of desire for God. As much as the saints pervade 
Balthasar’s theology, what is needed is a set of categories to control and 
illuminate the kind of meaning that a concentration on the saints might 
provide. Can the integration, then, of Lonergan’s category of incarnate 
meaning with René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire contribute to the 
connection between the saints and the human desire for God? This 
chapter argues that Lonergan’s category of incarnate meaning and its 
manifestation in art offers a way of articulating the saints as symbolic 
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worlds wherein we may dwell for theological and religious inspiration. 
Furthermore, Girard’s emphasis on mimetic desire enables us to speak 
of saints not only as sites of incarnate meaning, but more specifically as 
incarnate models of desire for the Christian community. In this sense 
Girard’s account of mimetic desire illuminates, extends, and comple-
ments Lonergan’s account of incarnate meaning. 
 Lonergan on Incarnate Meaning 
 In  Method in Theology , Lonergan states that meaning “is embodied or 
carried in human intersubjectivity, in art, in symbols, in language, and 
in the lives and deeds of persons.” 25 Lonergan labels this latter kind of 
embodiment or carrier of meaning “incarnate meaning.” At the begin-
ning of his very modest section on incarnate meaning, Lonergan quotes 
one of his most beloved influences, John Henry Newman:  “Cor ad cor 
Loquitor ” – heart speaks to heart. In  Grammar of Assent , Newman writes, 
“The heart is commonly reached, not through reason but through the 
imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts 
and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt 
us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us.” 26 In his body of work, Lonergan 
offers several definitions of the term “incarnate meaning.” In  Method , 
it is “the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his 
deeds.” 27 With a slight variation to this definition, Lonergan writes else-
where: “A person, either in his totality or in his characteristic moment, 
his most significant deed, his outstanding achievement or sacrifice,  is a 
meaning. That meaning may be cherished, revered, adored, re-created, 
lived, or it may be loathed, abominated, contemned.” 28 He recognizes 
that, while the meaning discovered might be limited to one person, more 
often it may be meaningful for a group or even “for a whole national, or 
social, or cultural, or religious tradition.” This kind of meaning “may 
attach to group achievement, to a Thermophylae or Marathon, to the 
Christian martyrs, to a glorious revolution.” According to Lonergan, 
incarnate meaning may also be “transposed to a character or characters 
in a story or play, to a Hamlet or Tartuffe or Don Juan.” 29 
 In his essay “Time and Meaning,” Lonergan employs the example 
of John of the Cross to explain his understanding of incarnate mean-
ing. 30 What is noteworthy about Lonergan’s account here is his par-
ticularly theological interpretation of incarnate meaning. He explains 
this interpretation by distinguishing the respective ways in which mys-
tics and metaphysicians encounter reality. To put it succinctly, whereas 
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metaphysicians  think of reality in its totality, mystics more comprehen-
sively and holistically  experience this reality. “John of the Cross,” writes 
Lonergan, “is a manifestation, a symbolic manifestation, of that experi-
ence of reality in its totality.” 31 
 Lonergan’s emphasis on John of the Cross as a paradigmatically theo-
logical example of incarnate meaning is quite fitting in the context of 
Buckley’s challenge mentioned above. Not only has Buckley initiated 
hundreds of students into the mystical world of John of the Cross, but 
he has also employed the Spanish mystic as a specifically theological 
response to the respective critiques of Feuerbach and Freud, and their 
agreement that “what is believed in religion is a projection of the human, 
that the divine must be ‘deconstructed’ and disclosed as the human.” 32 
Buckley’s analysis serves as an example of the way incarnate meaning 
can bear fruit in a theological setting. As Buckley envisions, the task of 
theology “should be less to refute Feuerbachian and Freudian analysis 
than to learn from them what they have to teach about the relentless 
remolding of the image of God by religious consciousness and to sug-
gest alternative stages to the processes they elaborate of anthropologi-
cal recognition and reduction.” 33 The model for an alternative, accord-
ing to Buckley, is St John of the Cross. Apophatic theology, after all, is 
not primarily about theological propositions, but is rather a process of 
religious experience that points beyond language. The dark nights of 
John of the Cross, in their active and passive dimensions, are “finally 
dialectical movements in which the human is purified from projection 
by a ‘no’ which is most radically a ‘yes,’ a ‘no’ that is generated by the 
initial ‘yes.’” In sum, Freud, Feuerbach, and John of the Cross agree that 
much projection resides in our conceptualization of God. For Freud and 
Feuerbach, the proper response is to deny the reality of God; for John of 
the Cross, and other mystics of the apophatic tradition, such an affirma-
tion of projection recognizes that “the evolution or personal develop-
ment of faith must pass through the contradictions that are the desert 
and the cross.” 34 With Buckley’s illumination of Lonergan’s category, 
we can argue that John of the Cross incarnates a theological meaning, 
namely, the incomprehensibility of God. The example of John of the 
Cross, in other words, embodies Buckley’s own retrieval of a “specifi-
cally religious intellectuality” that does not “bracket or excise religious 
evidence and religious consciousness and the interpersonal that marks 
authentic religious life and experience.” 35 
 In light of this connection between incarnate meaning and John of the 
Cross, I now consider Lonergan’s claim that incarnate meaning often 
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combines many of the other carriers of meaning. 36 I confine my explora-
tion to artistic meaning because it offers further resources, in a parallel 
way to Buckley’s theological use of John of the Cross, for envisioning 
the encounter with the incarnate meaning of a saint as a withdrawal 
into a symbolic world of dramatic holiness, offering contemplative 
insight into the holiness of God and the challenge of discipleship. I have 
examined Lonergan’s theory of art in more depth elsewhere. 37 Here I 
simply highlight three features relevant for this chapter. 38 
 First, the artistic experience, for Lonergan, reveals our orientation to 
transcendent mystery. Lonergan writes, “But the fundamental meaning 
important to us in art is that, just as the pure desire to know heads on to 
the beatific vision, so too the break from the ready-made world heads 
on to God. Man is nature’s priest, and nature is God’s silent communing 
with man. The artistic movement simply breaks away from ordinary 
living and is, as it were, an opening, a moment of new potentiality.” 39 
Lonergan isolates two fundamental human experiences that naturally 
orient us to God: the unquenchable desire to know and the artistic break 
from the ready-made world into a world of transcendent possibility. 
 Second, for Lonergan, art constitutes a withdrawal into a symbolic 
world. He isolates art’s connection to the complexity of human con-
sciousness and articulates the kind of meaning that it communicates. It 
is not primarily the kind of meaning we would associate with scientific 
demonstration. Rather, Lonergan refers to the meaning apprehended 
in the artistic experience as “elemental” meaning. Elemental meaning 
is the transformation of one’s world. It occurs when one slips out of 
the ready-made world of one’s everyday living – such as one’s func-
tions in society, ordinary conversation, and the media. It is the opening 
up of a new horizon that presents something that is “other, different, 
novel, strange, remote, intimate – all the adjectives that are employed 
when one attempts to communicate the artistic experience.” 40 Lonergan 
describes this slip out of the ready-made world as a “withdrawal for 
return.” It is an invitation to participate, to explore a symbolic world. 
Art is a 
 withdrawal from practical living to explore possibilities of fuller living in 
a richer world. Just as the mathematician explores the possibilities of what 
physics can be, so the artist explores the possibilities of what life, ordinary 
living, can be. There is an artistic element in all consciousness, in all liv-
ing. Our settled modes have become humdrum, and we may think of all 
our life simply in terms of utilitarian categories. But in fact the life we are 
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living is a product of artistic creation. We ourselves are products of artistic 
creation in our concrete living, and art is an exploration of potentiality. 41 
 In this artistic experience, we are “transported from the space in which 
we move to the space within the picture, from the time of sleeping and 
waking, working and resting, to the time of music, from the pressures 
and determinisms of home and office, of economics and politics to the 
powers depicted in dance.” 42 Lonergan proceeds to demonstrate this 
theory by illuminating the function of different types of art: the picture, 
the statue, architecture, music, poetry, narrative, drama, and the lyric. 
In doing so, he supports his central claim that art is the exploration 
of the potentialities of concrete living. Unlike the language of science, 
whose words have meaning based on logical calculations, deductions, 
and propositions, literary language has resonance in our consciousness. 
Literary language, in short, reveals the multidimensional field of sub-
jectivity as experienced, the world of human potential, exhibiting in a 
concrete manner the many ways in which human beings “apprehend 
their history, their destiny, and the meaning of their lives.” 43 
 Finally, art has a kind of sacramental character. Lonergan acknowl-
edges that this withdrawal may be illusory; but he also suggests that 
it may be regarded as “more true and more real.” 44 Just as our myste-
rious and unquenchable desire to know ultimately reveals our tran-
scendent orientation within the intellectual pattern of experience, the 
artistic experience can reveal our orientation to the divine within the 
aesthetic and dramatic patterns. For Lonergan, then, good art has an 
ulterior significance. It presents “the beauty, the splendor, the glory, the 
majesty, the ‘plus’ that is in things and that drops out when you say 
that the moon is just earth and the clouds are just water.” 45 Art has the 
capacity to direct our attention to the reality “that the world is a cipher, 
a revelation, an unveiling, the presence of one who is not seen, touched, 
grasped, put in genus, distinguished by difference, yet is  present .” 46 The 
sacramental possibility of art points to the tension between the visibility 
and invisibility operative in the revelation of transcendent mystery. As 
the patristic scholar Frances Young writes, a “contemplative insight” is 
required to witness the sacramental depths of reality: that “Scripture 
along with nature, the incarnation, baptism and eucharist has the qual-
ity of witness, revealing yet concealing the hidden reality to which it 
points, evoking the powerful presence of transcendent mystery.” 47 
 What then is the connection between artistic meaning and incarnate 
meaning? Similar to artistic meaning, an experience of the incarnate 
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meaning of the saints – their way of life, their words, and their deeds – 
constitutes a withdrawal from the ready-made world into the symbolic 
world of dramatic holiness, and facilitates a return to daily living enriched 
by contemplative insight into the holiness of God and the challenge of 
authentic discipleship. This kind of withdrawal mediates elemental 
meaning and enables us to explore the self-disclosure of God in every-
day living. As a way of illuminating this “withdrawal for return,” it is 
relevant to note Cunningham’s reflections on the connection between 
Christian practice and music. The Bible is studied primarily as a text to 
be embodied, similar to the relationship between a musical score and a 
musician, namely, “to establish the authenticity of the text” at its deep-
est level, which is revealed in its performance. 48 “That meaning derives,” 
writes Cunningham, “both from fidelity to the text and as the score is 
enhanced by the performance of the musician.” 49 Recognizing that not all 
performances are equal, Cunningham adds that “there are those who give 
a passing nod to the demands of the gospel life, but it is quite something 
else when someone grasps the same message and performs at a profound 
level.” The saint represents “a classical performer of the word of God.” 50 
 An Expansion of Incarnate Meaning: 
Girard’s Mimetic Desire 
 I have explored Lonergan’s category of incarnate meaning and enriched 
it with Buckley’s use of John of the Cross. With Lonergan’s sugges-
tion in mind, I also integrated incarnate meaning and artistic mean-
ing, envisioning the saints as symbolic worlds wherein we may dwell 
for theological and religious inspiration. Turning now to the work of 
René Girard, I show how the French thinker’s account of mimetic desire 
enables us, in a complementary fashion, to speak of saints not only as 
sites of incarnate meaning but as incarnate models of desire for the 
Christian community. Girard has written widely about the problematic 
nature of mimetic desire, especially its tendency towards conflict and 
violence. In fact, if one were to read selectively from Girard’s corpus, 
one might get the impression that mimetic desire itself is an evil to over-
come. In  Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World , for example, 
Girard writes that “following Christ means giving up mimetic desire.” 51 
 For Girard, mimetic desire leads to envy, rivalry, and violence. A 
full account of the dark side of mimetic desire would require a longer 
explanation. For the purposes of this chapter, however, my aim here 
is only to give the reader a feel for this complex dynamic. For Girard, 
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the fact of mimetic desire in human living is incontestable, evident in 
the success of the advertising industry. Do we desire products for their 
intrinsic value or because we imitate the desires of the beautiful person 
selling the product? And, in terms of human relations, mimetic desire 
manifests a triangular structure constituted by the “I – object – other” 
dynamic, whether it is two toddlers fighting over a toy, one family’s 
envy of another family’s larger house, or one political leader’s imita-
tion of the desire of another political leader for territorial expansion. 
Girard’s claim is that mimetic desire often leads to tension, conflict, and 
violence. When mimetic desire escalates, cultures experience a crisis. 
Those involved in a web of rivalry end up transferring their frustrated 
desires onto a third party, in what Girard calls the single-victim mech-
anism. This act of scapegoating relieves cultural tension and restores 
peace to divided communities. 52 Scapegoating takes place in sibling 
rivalry, in playground disputes, in neighbourhood gossip, in the fields 
of sports, politics, and religion. It occurred in Hitler’s Germany and in 
the Jim Crowe era in the United States. 
 I will return to the dark side of mimetic desire below. Here I want 
first to develop some conceptual foundations on which to build a the-
ology of the saints, to which end a key insight is that “desire itself is 
essentially mimetic, directed toward the object desired by the model.” 53 
In other words, mimetic desire is not by its nature violent. The mimetic 
quality of childhood desire is “universally recognized,” according to 
Girard. In fact, Girard has argued that we should not renounce mimetic 
desire as such: 
 But as to whether I am advocating “renunciation” of mimetic desire, yes 
and no. Not the renunciation of mimetic desire itself, because what Jesus 
advocates is mimetic desire. Imitate me, and imitate the Father through 
me, he says, so it’s twice mimetic. Jesus seems to say that the only way 
to avoid violence is to imitate me, and imitate the Father. So the idea 
that mimetic desire itself is bad makes no sense. It is true, however, that 
occasionally I say “mimetic desire” when I really mean only the type of 
mimetic desire that generates mimetic rivalry and, in turn, is generated 
by it. 54 
 In fact, mimetic desire is not only “the basis of rivalry and murder but 
of heroism and devotion to others.” 55 Girard’s emphasis on heroism and 
devotion in relation to mimetic desire offers a fruitful avenue of investi-
gation in the context of a theology of the saints. He writes, “Nothing is 
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more mimetic than the desire of a child, and yet it is good. Jesus himself 
says it is good. Mimetic desire is also the desire for God.” 56 Girard rein-
forces this distinction in his more recent work: “Mimetic desire is intrin-
sically good.” 57 He adds that if desire were not mimetic, “we would not 
be open to what is human or what is divine.” 58 Recall that for Lonergan, 
two experiences reveal the human orientation to transcendent mystery: 
the pure desire to know and the capacity to break from the ready-made 
world, the type of experience captured by the artist. For Girard, the 
fundamental experience of mimetic desire also discloses our human 
orientation to the divine. 
 Girard’s exploration of mimetic desire is worked out under the for-
mula of “interdividual psychology.” 59 For the purposes of this chap-
ter, it is fitting to note Charles Hefling’s suggestion of ways in which 
the work of Girard might complement Lonergan’s. Whereas in  Insight , 
Lonergan focuses on individual psychology and the patient/therapist 
relationship, Girard’s use of “interdividual” emphasizes dramatic rela-
tionships that constitute everyday living. Hefling explores mimesis in a 
horizon that privileges the language of Lonergan’s later  Method in Theol-
ogy . He writes, “In ‘dramatic,’ everyday, commonsense interaction with 
others, with the  dramatis personae of my living, I can and do respond to 
the ‘ontic’ value of an other, to someone else as be-ing and as a being.” 60 
“The intersubjective presence of that other,” Hefling writes, “evokes my 
innate drive for self-transcendence, that is, for fuller or more authentic 
being-myself.” 61 The specifically Girardian insight here is that “ being-
like another involves wanting what he or she wants. For in this way, in 
and with admiration for someone, there is evoked a further feeling, or 
a differentiation of feeling, as a response, not to the ‘ontic’ value of the 
other, but more specifically to the value of what the other values.” 62 As a 
complement to Hefling’s suggestions, I have argued in this chapter that 
Lonergan’s account of incarnate meaning belongs in this conversation 
about the drama of interpersonal relations. Incarnate meaning captures 
the personal and interpersonal concreteness of the human life-world. 
Depending on how it is construed, it also articulates how the lives and 
deeds of persons of the past might symbolically shape the dynamic situ-
ation of the present, a point that relates to the following key distinction 
offered by Girard. 
 In his further specification of mimetic desire and mimetic drama, 
Girard distinguishes between external and internal mediation. In 
 Desire, Deceit, and the Novel, he speaks of external mediation “when the 
distance is sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres 
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of  possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respec-
tive centers.” 63 Internal mediation, on the other hand, relates to the 
situation where “this same distance is sufficiently reduced to allow 
these two spheres to penetrate each other more or less profoundly.” 64 
Whereas spatial proximity in internal mediation heightens the possibil-
ity for mimetic rivalry, in external mediation rivalry with the media-
tor is impossible. 65 As Girard puts it, “The hero of external mediation 
proclaims aloud the true nature of his desire. He worships his model 
openly and declares himself his disciple.” 66 The work of Buckley pro-
vides some apposite examples. 
 In his discussion of the categorical dimension of Christian religious 
experience, Buckley privileges concrete encounters with models of holi-
ness that create the conditions for a desire for and assent to the real-
ity of God. 67 He offers the stories of Edith Stein and Raïssa Maritain 
as examples of such categorical religious experiences. The noteworthy 
connection – a connection not explicitly pointed out in Buckley’s own 
commentary – is the mimetic desire operative in both stories. That is, 
the respective conversions of Edith Stein and Raïssa Maritain were both 
“socially mediated.” 
 As Buckley recounts, Edith Stein’s acceptance of God “emerged from 
her ability to read personal and intersubjective experience.” 68 In the 
summer of 1921, she by chance picked up the  Autobiography of Teresa of 
Avila . After reading through the night she closed the book and reflected: 
“This is the truth.” Buckley comments, “This is not the chance reading 
of a pious tale by a religious enthusiast. It is the disclosure of the divine 
within a very complex human history to one who was able to interpret 
it as such.” 69 The relevant point is that mimetic desire was central to 
Stein’s judgment. Stein’s desire and recognition for God were mediated 
through Teresa’s desire and recognition. As we stated earlier, for Girard, 
to say that our desires are imitative or mimetic is to root them neither 
in objects nor in ourselves, but in a third party, the  model or  mediator , 
whose desire we imitate in the hope of being like the model. Not only 
did Stein accept the truth of God mimetically, she also became a Car-
melite like Teresa and was later canonized under her monastic name as 
St Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. This corresponds to the phenomeno-
logical disclosure of truth discussed in the introduction to this book. 
 The conversion story of Jacques and Raïssa Maritain, as recounted 
by Buckley, also has a deeply mimetic quality. In terms of social media-
tion, the novelist and essayist Léon Bloy was deeply influential on the 
Maritains. Instead of employing the “apologetic of demonstration,” 
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Bloy placed before them “the fact of sanctity. Simply, and because he 
loved [the saints], because their experience was near his own – so much 
so that he could not read them without weeping – he brought us to know 
the saints and the mystics.” 70 Buckley comments that Bloy “introduced 
this young couple not to argument and inference, but to narrative, to the 
lives and writings, i.e., to the experience and holiness, of the saints.” 71 
 Finally, the conversion of St Ignatius Loyola further illuminates 
this connection between mimetic desire and the lives of the saints. As 
recounted in Loyola’s  Autobiography , while he was recovering from 
injury his usual books of interest – “worldly books of fiction” – were 
unavailable and so he was given instead a life of Christ and a book 
of the lives of the saints. 72 Ignatius was prompted to think: “What if I 
should do what St. Francis did, and what St. Dominic did?” He contin-
ues, “St. Dominic did this, therefore, I have to do it; St. Francis did this, 
therefore I have to do it.” During this period of deep reading, Ignatius’s 
desire for the life of God flourished. 73 Similar to the narratives above, 
Ignatius’ desire for God was rooted in the third party, in this case Fran-
cis and Dominic; Ignatius desired the object of their desire. 
 Girardian Sanctity: Pacific Mimesis and the 
Graced Resistance to Violence 
 Girard provides the impetus for a further insight into the desire for 
God, one involving resistance to the dark side of mimetic desire, the 
lure to envy, scapegoating, and violence, and cultivation of the peace-
ful desire exhibited by Christ. (My discussion of Thérèse of Lisieux 
and Etty Hillesum in the next chapter will build on this particular 
account of sanctity.) Drawing on the work of Grant Kaplan, I suggest 
that Girard’s account of holiness bespeaks of the “humble saint” and 
not the “Romantic hero.” 74 As noted above, Girard was suspicious of 
the language of autonomy whether in its Kantian or romantic form. 
Even though I affirmed the use of “autonomy” in a qualified way, I 
am also sympathetic to the heart of Girard’s critique. Romanticism 
emphasizes the individual’s inherent goodness, with sinfulness aris-
ing through co-mingling with sinful society: “the Romantic hero … 
abandons society’s norms and lives freely,  naturally, unencumbered 
and uninfluenced by culture’s fallenness.” 75 Qualities such as creativity, 
imagination, and originality mark the romantic hero. Girard’s vision of 
sanctity, on the other hand, emphasizes humility and receptivity over 
and against autonomous achievement. Although we are often inspired 
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by the “asceticism, the devotion, and the self-sacrifice” of the saints, 
the most fundamental disposition of the saints, in Girard’s reading, is 
“the awareness that they have not achieved their holiness on the basis 
of personal merit.” 76 This is Girard’s post-romantic account of sanctity. 
 Girard’s mimetic interdividuality – his claim that we are so often 
given our desires – “does not doom one to non-being or even to sin-
fulness.” 77 Though we are inextricably intertwined with others, Girard 
finds a solution in Paul (“Be imitators of me, as I imitate Christ”; 1 Cor. 
11:1) and Jesus (“Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”; Mt. 
5:48). 78 His solution resides not in refusing to admit we are affected by 
this reciprocity but in finding “Christ a model for peaceful, non-violent 
imitation.” 79 This entails at its core the exchange of rivalrous imitation 
for peaceful imitation. 
 In light of Girard’s emphasis on humility and positive mimesis, a 
specifically theological account requires a more robust mining of reli-
gious realities. This is the task of the next chapter. But as a bridge, I will 
highlight Kaplan’s suggestion that “mimetic theory makes available a 
pneumatology that can inform the role that the Holy Spirit plays in the 
process of sanctification. Just as mimetic theory lends greater precision 
to the virtue of humility, so too does it make explicit what is meant by 
the gift of the Holy Spirit.” 80 
 In his book  Scapegoat , Girard argues that the Spirit is working in his-
tory “to reveal what Jesus has already revealed, the mechanism of the 
scapegoat, the genesis of all mythology, the nonexistence of all gods of 
violence.” 81 Thus, a Girardian-coloured account of sanctity involves the 
overcoming of the dark side of mimetic desire – antagonistic mimesis, 
envy, scapegoating, and the like. The unity of the Son’s and the Spirit’s 
mission becomes clear, as Kaplan suggests, in Jesus’s words and actions 
during John’s farewell discourse. In his non-violent acceptance of the 
cross, “Jesus reveals the mechanism by which the Accuser creates false 
community at the expense of a hapless victim.” 82 Furthermore, in his 
peaceful return to the disciples, “the risen Jesus uncovers the very struc-
tures in our religious psychology that move us from denial, through 
horrific realization, to true forgiveness.” 83 If to be animated by the 
Holy Spirit “in a real and concrete way means to cultivate the habits 
and practices made available through the supernatural gift of divine 
indwelling,” then a Girardian pneumatology offers “a fuller picture of 
what it might mean to be holy in today’s postmodern world.” 84 “Our 
imitation of Christ does not mean,” suggests Kaplan, “that we grow a 
beard and speak Aramaic while honing our skills in wood-working. 
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It means the creative living out of a response to the scapegoating into 
which we are inculturated.” 85 
 Sacrificial Violence, Self-Transcendence, and Self-Sacrifice 
 I end by revisiting the Lonergan-Girard conversation that has framed 
this chapter in the first place. What is the relationship between Girard’s 
account of mimetic desire and Lonergan’s natural desire, which is ulti-
mately, as I argued above, an incipient desire for God? 86 Is it possible 
to give full weight to Girard’s account of conflict and the emergence of the 
scapegoat mechanism as the way in which we typically resolve the tri-
angular structure of mimesis, while at the same time suggesting that 
there are other ways of resolving the tensions that arise from mimesis? 
The others ways require a different account of the origins of culture. 87 
Neil Ormerod maps out three possible responses. 
 The first way is illuminated by Girard’s account of  “ sacrificial vio-
lence, ” described above. To reiterate, this involves the resolution of 
mimetic conflict “by turning the focus of hostility onto a third party, 
a scapegoat or innocent victim, whose life is sacrificed, uniting the 
original combatants in a common purpose and restoring some degree 
of social harmony.” 88 For Girard, this is the emergence of “religion 
and culture” which, for him, is rooted in “the primal murder of the 
innocent victim, whose power to bring about reconciliation between 
the original combatants raises the victim to semi-divine status.” 89 This 
phenomenon was replaced, in large part, by the sacrifice of animals 
and other goods. 
 The second possible response is the way of cognitional or moral “self-
transcendence,” which involves the identification of other means for 
dealing with the tension. Girard fails to fully account for this response. 
The way of natural desire, the way of self-transcendence, includes 
“acts of practical intelligence which identify patterns of sharing in the 
desired goods, or means of increasing the production of goods” – acts 
that would diminish the rivalrous conflict. 90 It involves the recognition 
of the common good, which transcends individual desires, discussed in 
our account of the human good in previous chapters. This model iden-
tifies the origins of culture in terms of the human desire for meaning, 
truth, and goodness. While this account may not pay enough attention 
to the distortions of desire and the darkness of the human condition, 
it does imply that “the way of violent sacrifice is not primordial, but 
derivative, indeed parasitic upon the more primordial orientation to 
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meaning, truth, and goodness.” 91 Recall my account of the importance 
of “nature” and “natural desire” in chapters 3 and 4 of this book. 
 The third possible response is that of “self-sacrifice.” This mode of 
resolution is found not in “self-assertion and a sacrifice of the inno-
cent, nor in an appeal to a higher good that may mediate the conflicting 
desires that arise from mimesis, but in a willing self-sacrifice on the part 
of one of the participants, who gives up claims on the object of desire, 
who lays aside the demands of justice and turns the other cheek in the 
face of threats from the other.” It means, Ormerod adds, to hand over 
“the resolution of the conflict to a divine agency who acts in history to 
provide both mercy and justice.” 92 
 According to Ormerod, some forms of political theology neglect the 
way of self-transcendence and “read human history simply in terms of 
the clash between sacrificial violence and self-sacrifice.” 93 Without an 
account of “nature,” there emerges the temptation to eschew dialogue 
with the world; there is no common ground between the earthly city 
and the city of God. With an account of self-transcendence and the natu-
ral desire that permeates such acts, the way of violent sacrifice is envi-
sioned as “parasitic on an underlying good” and the “clash between the 
two ways is no longer ultimate.” 94 In sum, there is a tendency to set an 
“anthropology of grasping” in opposition to an “anthropology of self-
giving,” recalling my engagement with Alison in chapter 3. I am arguing 
here for a more integrated, less oppositional account of self-donation 
and self-transcendence, and submit that that the sacrifice of love does 
not replace but  restores human culture to the path of self-transcendence. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter aimed to widen the scope of desire in light of Lonergan’s 
turn to concrete subjectivity, religious experience, and religious love 
described in previous chapters. With Doran’s framework of natural 
and mimetic desire as background, this chapter attempted to inte-
grate Lonergan’s category of incarnate meaning in relation to Girard’s 
account of mimetic desire, in the context of a theology of the saints. 
Both incarnate meaning and mimetic desire recognize the primacy of 
the interpersonal in the human experience of meaning and truth. Fur-
thermore, in a complementary fashion, Girard’s emphasis on mimetic 
desire helped us to envision the saints not only as sites of incarnate 
meaning but as incarnate models of desire – a dynamic that resides at 
the root of our encounter with the saints. If it is plausible to affirm the 
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deeply mimetic nature of human desire, then it is also fitting to envision 
saints as models or mediators, whose desire we imitate in the hope of 
resembling him or her. The chapter ended by highlighting a distinc-
tive feature of a Girardian vision of sanctity – the call to nurture pacific 
mimesis, on the one hand, and to overcome the dark side of mimetic 
desire, on the other hand, through a sustained resistance to envy and 
scapegoating. This distinctive feature paves the way for our more spe-
cifically theological analysis of models of holiness in the next chapter. 
 7 The Metaphysics of Holiness and the 
Longing for God in History: Thérèse of 
Lisieux and Etty Hillesum 
 The last chapter widened the scope of desire beyond the intellectual 
desire associated with the natural desire for God debates, to encom-
pass the saints as sites of incarnate meaning and specifically as incar-
nate models of desire. I considered a specifically Girardian account of 
sanctity, marked by the “humble saint” and not the “Romantic hero.” 
Integral to that explanation was Girard’s account of cultivation of the 
peaceful desire exhibited by Christ, and I noted in passing the Trinitar-
ian roots of this desire. The task of this chapter is to articulate these roots 
with more explicit attention to the categories being developed through-
out this book: what is needed is a “rich and theologically grounded 
phenomenology of the graced life.” 1 This involves, in part, a return to 
Doran’s four-point Trinitarian hypothesis, with particular attention to 
sanctifying grace and the habit of charity – two supernatural realities 
that make possible the kind of humble love and nonviolent resistance so 
integral to Girard’s expression of Christian holiness. In light of both the 
natural-supernatural framework developed throughout the book and 
the shift of attention to socially mediated, incarnate models of desire, 
this chapter turns to two specific examples of incarnate meaning in a 
secular age: Thérèse of Lisieux and Etty Hillesum. 
 In many ways, the French Carmelite and the Dutch spiritual seeker 
occupy quite different terrain in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
spiritual landscape. Thérèse was reared in a French pious Catholic 
household with all of her surviving sisters entering cloistered religious 
life. Etty was raised in a largely secular Jewish household smattered 
with an eclectic mix of Christian, Jewish, philosophical, literary, and 
poetic influences. Thérèse lived as a celibate religious behind the walls 
of Carmel. Etty lived in the heart of cultured Amsterdam, socialized in 
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circles influenced by Jungian psychology, and engaged in her spiritual 
seeking in the context of an ongoing, complicated sexual life. In fact, 
she considered herself “accomplished in bed,” just about “seasoned 
enough” to be “counted among the better lovers.” 2 
 And yet there are also striking points of contact. Both achieved a 
level of spiritual maturity at a young age, meeting early deaths in their 
twenties. Both communicated to us through journals and letters. Both 
embody not so much a large political program of rooting out system-
atic injustice, but the “little way” of love alone. This is not to deny a 
mysterious connection between contemplative life and public-political 
significance, but only to emphasize that their mutual commitment to 
simplicity of life and daily contemplative practices fueled their heroic 
works of charity. 
 Both women have also been employed for feminist concerns in theol-
ogy. Despite Thérèse’s caricature as saccharine and sentimental, femi-
nist scholars have emphasized that in fact she was “an adult, in a mature 
stage of faith” who understood “the meaning of her trial of darkness as 
an experience of profound and mutual relationships.” 3 With emphasis 
on egalitarianism and individuality, Thérèse struggled for autonomy 
and acquired “an original vision of religious life while living accord-
ing to the Carmelite Rule which values obedience and conformity to 
religious customs” handed on from the sixteenth century. 4 In a similar 
fashion, Etty Hillesum has been hailed for her “free and interreligious 
holiness, which escaped the restrictive confines separating various reli-
gious faiths and denominations.” 5 Our postmodern, secular age wel-
comes, some have argued, “unconventional saints like Etty to carry on 
proclaiming the freedom of the Spirit and the breath of God’s creative 
love.” 6 
 While there is much to be explored between these two religious seek-
ers, this chapter considers them within a more explicitly systematic-
theological context – that of the Trinitarian basis of the human desire 
for God both “inside” and “outside” the ecclesial milieu. Accordingly, I 
revisit Robert Doran’s four-point hypothesis and consider Neil Ormer-
od’s extension of this hypothesis as a basis for establishing the “meta-
physics of holiness” as “created participation in the divine nature.” 7 The 
approach constitutes a further moment in my response to Feingold’s 
claim – highlighted in chapter 2 and revisited in chapter 5 – that our 
innate inclination to our connatural end is “capable of transformation 
into a supernatural inclination to the vision of God through the reception 
of sanctifying grace, by which we are made mysteriously proportionate 
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to a divine end.” 8 After establishing this explanatory ground, the chap-
ter explores Thérèse’s desire to be “love in the heart of the Church” and 
Hillesum’s desire to be “the thinking heart of the barracks.” 
 The Four-Point Hypothesis and the Metaphysics of Holiness 
 In the previous chapter, I noted Robert Doran’s integration of the eros 
of the human spirit and mimetic desire. For Doran, Girard’s mimetic 
desire – whether pacific or destructive – penetrates our spiritual ori-
entation to the intelligible, the true and the real, and the good. In other 
words, distorted mimetic desire can infect the unfolding of the intel-
lectual quest, while positive mimesis may strengthen, enhance, and 
deepen our commitment to the exigencies of the mind. 9 Positive mod-
els have the power to elicit the desire to be faithful to the natural desire 
for meaning, truth, and goodness. In other words, there are a variety of 
imitations. The working of grace in history is a matter of created imita-
tions of and participation in the divine relations. The working of sin in 
history, on the contrary, involves the imitation of violent and destruc-
tive relations, indicated in the aforementioned account of bias, envy, 
rivalry, scapegoating, and violence. To be an  imago Dei in history – a 
theme reflective of de Lubac’s retrieval of the Fathers of the Church – 
lies both in being faithful to the unfolding of the eros of the sprit, that 
is, to the transcendental precepts to be attentive, intelligent, rational, 
and responsible, and in the active reception of the divine grace, which 
is a participation in the active and passive spirations of the Trinitarian 
relations. 
 Doran argues that systematics should begin with active and pas-
sive spiration as universally accessible realities. Accordingly, the mis-
sion of the divine Word is the definitive revelation of God’s love that 
has already been “poured into human hearts everywhere and from the 
beginning.” 10 This constitutes, in short, an emphasis on being on the 
receiving end of an unqualified love (active spiration) and the invitation 
to love in an unqualified fashion in return (passive spiration). 11 Genuine 
evangelization promotes a soteriological differentiation of conscious-
ness – the return of good for evil – which is distinctively articulated in 
Christianity but is also present “wherever the gift of the Holy Spirit has 
been gratefully received, however anonymously.” 12 
 To develop this emphasis on the saints as expressions of the desire 
for the supernatural in a systematic-theological vein requires a more 
explanatory account of holiness, rooted in Trinitarian categories. 13 If 
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Balthasar is correct in his challenge to theologians to discern the intel-
ligible in the sensible in the concrete lives of the saints, then Ormerod 
has offered us some explanatory tools for responding to this challenge. 
Building on Lonergan’s and Doran’s Trinitarian theology, Ormerod 
connects the four distinct, created participations in divine nature – sanc-
tifying grace, the habit of charity, in-dwelling divine wisdom, and the 
beatific vision – with four types of holiness that correspond to these four 
created participations. The importance of this typology is that it offers 
a Trinitarian account of holiness that can be applied to other religious 
traditions. As Ormerod suggests, “Such a possibility could be called a 
supernatural  vestigia trinitatis , to supplement the traditional Augustin-
ian understanding of a  vestigia trinitatis found in the created order.” 14 
 The basic assumption is that the call to holiness is a historical expression 
of our participation in and imitation of the divine nature. This biblical com-
mand to be holy was given fresh expression in the Second Vatican Coun-
cil’s  Lumen Gentium. 15 The four types of holiness that correspond to the 
divine relations and the created participations in these divine relations are: 
simple sanctity (active spiration, sanctifying grace), apostolic sanctity (pas-
sive spiration, habit of charity), saint as sage (secondary  esse of the Incarna-
tion, in-dwelling divine wisdom), and saint as mystic (beatific vision). 
 Active spiration/sanctifying grace/sanctity simpliciter. The divine relation 
of  active spiration connects to the created reality of  sanctifying grace . Active 
spiration refers to the divine relation of the Father and Son “breathing” 
the Holy Spirit together. This involves the relation between the spirator 
Divine Relations Created, Human 
Participations
Forms of Sanctity
Active Spiration: Father 
and Son breathing the 
Holy Spirit
Sanctifying grace Sanctity simpliciter
Passive Spiration: Holy 
Spirit as proceeding 
love to Father and Son
Habit of charity Apostolic sanctity
Paternity: Father to Son Esse Secundarium of the 
Incarnation
Saint as sage
Filiation: Son to Father Beatific vision (Light of 
Glory)
Saint as mystic
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(Father and Son) and the spirated (Holy Spirit). For Lonergan, sanctify-
ing grace – the reception of the Father’s love as including us and becom-
ing our love – participates in and imitates active spiration, that is, the 
Father and the Son together as they “breathe” the Holy Spirit, and so 
bears a special relation to the uncreated Holy Spirit. Sanctifying grace 
corresponds to  sanctity simpliciter , which emphasizes those who embody 
a consoling, contemplative rest and transformation by divine love. The 
“little way” of Thérèse of Lisieux embodies this type of holiness. 16 
 Passive spiration/habit of charity/apostolic sanctity. The divine relation of 
passive spiration connects to the created reality of the habit of charity. 
The habit of charity proceeds from the reception of sanctifying grace and 
participates in the proceeding love breathed by the Father and the Son. 
The habit of charity embraces the return of good for evil in an abiding 
friendship with God. 17 The habit of charity corresponds to  apostolic sanc-
tity , and embodies the common work of the Father and Son to build the 
kingdom of God. This form of sanctity emphasizes the active dimension 
of the spiritual life and the habitual orientation to enacting God’s love 
in the world – working for the Kingdom, if you will. Ormerod identifies 
St Ignatius Loyola and Dorothy Day as examples of apostolic sanctity. 18 
 Ormerod importantly draws attention to the mutual relationship 
between simple sanctity/sanctifying grace and apostolic sanctity/habit 
of charity. This integration of contemplation and action will be empha-
sized in my discussion of Thérèse of Lisieux and Etty Hillesum below. 
As ideal types, they are distinct and may in fact be embodied more in 
one than in another. But there are dangers in severing sanctifying grace 
and the habit of charity, simple sanctity and apostolic sanctity. A claim 
to holiness rooted in contemplation divorced from political and personal 
implications in the ethical sphere, on the one hand, and activist apos-
tolic sanctity divorced from the contemplative nature of simple sanctity, 
on the other hand, both seem inadequate. This Trinitarian-theological 
grounding reminds us these two types of sanctity are intrinsically related 
as “active and passive spiration are related, as two aspects of the single 
divine procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.” 19 
 Paternity/Incarnation/saint as sage. The in-dwelling of divine wisdom 
corresponds to the  saint as sage . This type of holiness relates in a spe-
cial way to the Logos made flesh who lived in obedience to the Father. 
Ormerod identifies Thomas Aquinas as a special exemplary of this wis-
dom. “Those who live this form of holiness,” writes Ormerod, “leave a 
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lasting cultural legacy in the life of the Church, providing future gen-
erations with an enduring witness to the profundity of the mysteries of 
faith.” 20 
 Filiation/beatific vision/saint as mystic. The created participation in the 
beatific vision (which corresponds to the divine relation of filiation) cor-
responds to the  saint as mystic . The beatific vision is the eschatological 
promise to enjoy the vision of God forever. While mystics have been given 
glimpses of this vision, the encounter is often expressed “apophatically 
and ineffably, a stripping away of images and concepts which are inad-
equate to divine mystery.” 21 The Spanish mystics, St Teresa of Ávila and 
St John of the Cross, exemplify this type of holiness in dramatic ways. 
 Thérèse of Lisieux: Love in the Heart of the Church 
 Mindful of these explanatory categories, I turn now to two concrete 
models of holiness and the human desire for the supernatural. In this 
chapter I emphasized the first two sets of categories discussed above, 
participations in active and passive spiration as universally accessible 
realities. This theological grounding enables me to highlight sanctify-
ing grace and the habit of charity at work both within and without the 
visible boundaries of the church. 
 When Thérèse was born in 1873, her father and mother, Louis and 
Zelie, had already lost four of their children. The five surviving chil-
dren were all girls – Marie, Pauline, Leonie, Celine, and the youngest, 
Thérèse. Four years later, Zelie died of breast cancer at the age of forty-
six and Louis moved his family to the town of Lisieux. Whereas Etty 
Hillesum experienced a largely secular upbringing sustained by eclec-
tic classical, philosophical, and religious sources, Thérèse’s rearing was 
thoroughly Catholic and of the French variety. An image that captures 
this upbringing is of the girls’ room on the second floor of their home 
in Lisieux, which offered a view over Lisieux and its Cathedral of Saint-
Pierre, which they regularly attended. 22 
 Contemplative Life and Openness to the World 
 Since my aim is systematic-theological, this section privileges 
Balthasar’s attempt to mediate the theological wisdom of Thérèse as 
part of his larger project of developing a supernatural phenomenol-
ogy of the saints. 23 The aim, of course, is not to offer a comprehensive 
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account of her life and thought, but only to consider her as an instance 
of incarnate meaning in the larger analysis of the human desire for God 
in the context of concrete subjectivity. 
 Balthasar presents a multilayered vision of this French Carmelite 
saint, who died at the age of twenty-four. A full examination of her life 
and witness would, of course, have to include a historical, biographi-
cal, and even psychological analysis. Balthasar’s “supernatural phe-
nomenology” aims to penetrate essential dimensions of her mission, 
without depersonalizing her concrete story or reducing her witness to 
an abstraction. As Balthasar notes, Thérèse “understood the act of total 
surrender to the triune God as the highest possible form of engagement 
on behalf of the world’s salvation.” 24 While there are many themes to 
be explored in Balthasar’s lengthy account of Thérèse, I focus here on 
what Balthasar considers to be her distinctive account of the relation-
ship between contemplation and action. 
 To preface my presentation of her vision, I will say something about 
Balthasar’s concern with the fate of contemplation in the contempo-
rary world. He first published his book on Thérèse of Lisieux in the 
early 1950s, when the meaning of the contemplative life was not under 
debate, and reissued a new edition in 1970, when the meaning of the 
contemplative life had become “so obscure that even the orders living 
the contemplative life, including the Carmelites, [had] become uncer-
tain.” 25 Balthasar was unnerved by the active assault on monasticism, 
asceticism, and contemplation. Openness to the world, for him, was 
more than dialogue measured by practical goals and successes. This 
short-sighted posture ignored the deeper insight of the contemplatives: 
contemplation is, in fact, “an inward continuation of action” as attested 
by the incarnation of God. “Far from being a flight from the world,” 
comments Balthasar, “Carmel and all purely contemplative forms of 
life in the church extrapolate the encounter between the world and the 
living God of Jesus of Christ to its most radical point.” 26 
 Little Way as Sanctity  Simpliciter 
 One of the dominant images of Thérèse, technically known as St Thérèse 
of the Child Jesus and the Holy Face, is the “Little Flower.” “It seems 
to me,” writes Thérèse, “that if a little flower could speak, it would 
tell simply what God has done for it without trying to hide its bless-
ings.” 27 This image of the little flower exemplifies “Thérèse’s genius 
for sisterhood” – her way of placing herself as “an equal in the midst 
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of the masses of simple folk who will never be specifically noticed or 
acclaimed.” 28 Thérèse, of course, had intense desires to do great things 
and was tortured by these great desires. It was only in the discovery 
of her vocation that the torture subsided. Her story reveals, as does 
Etty Hillesum’s, that “when we come to rest in God, we are simple, 
singlehearted creatures,” but that this same path to simplicity is “com-
plex, often torturous, fraught with painfully conflicting desires and 
dreams.” 29 
 The sanctity  simpliciter of the “little way” is a constitutive dimen-
sion of Thérèse’s contribution. The little way, in Balthasar’s terms, is 
a way of both “demolition” and “construction.” In terms of the first, 
the little way demolishes an obsession with performing great deeds – 
a kind of Gospel demolition of religious facades. The living flame 
of love casts fire upon the earth and sends the saints to spread the 
flame, not to be dampened by bourgeois Christianity. 30 Thérèse was a 
fighter by nature – fearless and aggressive – which explains her devo-
tion to Joan of Arc, about whom she wrote poetry and even penned 
a play. Thérèse’s battle was to rid Christianity of Pharisaism and the 
will to power disguised under the mantle of religion, which in reality 
functions to assert one’s own greatness. 31 She was, therefore, scep-
tical of ascetical practices that seemed to aim at human perfection. 
Preferring spiritual childhood more than religious greatness, Thérèse 
believed sanctity consists not in successfully performing religious 
acts, but in being ready “to become small and humble in the arms of 
God, acknowledging our own weaknesses and trusting in his fatherly 
goodness to the point of audacity.” 32 
 Even if she downplayed the successful performance of religious acts, 
she still prioritizes a set of renunciations as a mark of the little way, 
for they represent “the steps leading directly to the state where each 
new call of God’s love finds its response in faith.” 33 She renounced, 
for example, the desire for the joy and pleasure that accompany love, 
along with consoling visions that might solidify her faith. With such 
renunciations, she experiences instead the darkness of naked faith. 34 
She also renounced an obsession with progress. She strides endlessly, 
in Balthasar’s words, in “the darkness, below the earth, without bear-
ings” and “puts one foot in front of the other along a road whose direc-
tion God alone knows.” 35 If Christ fell three times, Thérèse reflects in 
the intimacy of spousal language, why should she expect a different lot 
from her spouse? Instead of climbing a mountain, he is waiting for her 
in the fertile valley of humility. Her standard is neither good feelings 
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nor progress and perfection, but love – the love of God and her total 
loving response. 36 
 In light of this book’s emphasis on developing the interpersonal 
dimension of religious experience, it is pertinent to note that Thérèse’s 
relationship with God was never controlled by legal language but 
always bore the marks of the interpersonal. To the average Christian, 
this love may seem overdone; to the unbeliever, it may seem childish. 
To those standing outside a relationship of love in general, this “inner, 
secret realm with a far-ranging geography” seems “incomprehensi-
ble.” 37 But even if misunderstood, lovers delight in roaming in such 
spaces. In many of her writings, Thérèse expressed desire not so much 
to be consoled, but to “console Jesus,” to “give pleasure to Jesus,” to 
make her heart “a little garden of delight where Jesus may come to find 
rest.” 38 
 Thérèse’s model of the little way – of sanctity  simpliciter – constitutes, 
in Balthasar’s play of words, both  a way and  the way. It is  a way in 
that there are many other ways to be found in the history of Chris-
tian religious experience, including the way of those who emphasize 
significant penances or receive extraordinary mystical graces. Since 
these extraordinary dimensions are not absolutely essential in light of 
the teaching of the Gospel, however, Thérèse’s way – which makes love 
of God and neighbour absolutely central – can also be described as  the 
way.” 39 
 Thérèse expresses the centrality of love and the unity of her con-
templative and missionary vocation in the Church most poignantly in 
Manuscript B – a document written at the request of her sister Marie of 
the Sacred Heart. It is in this manuscript that many of the oft-quoted 
passages from her work reside. Here Thérèse yearns for the “science 
of Love” and realizes that it is “only love that makes us acceptable to 
God.” 40 
 The little way demands not great actions, but simply surren-
der and gratitude. Thérèse possessed high aspirations to perform 
heroic deeds by being a warrior, priest, apostle, doctor, and martyr. 
She hoped that these apostolic missionary ventures would lead her 
to martyrdom in the manner of other great saints. After meditating 
on 1 Corinthians 12–13, however, Thérèse realized that even the 
most heroic deeds are nothing without love. She discovered that 
her vocation was simply to love. Without love, she understood, 
martyrs would not sacrifice their lives; love lay at the heart of all 
vocations. 41 
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 Contemplation and Action: Sanctity  Simpliciter as 
Apostolic Sanctity 
 As noted above, Ormerod draws attention to the “mutual relationship” 
between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, between simply 
sanctity and apostolic sanctity. This Trinitarian-theological grounding 
reminds us these two types of sanctity are intrinsically related as “active 
and passive spiration are related, as two aspects of the single divine 
procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.” 42 Thérèse embod-
ied this unity in a distinctive way. 
 In terms that resonate with being on the receiving end of God’s love, 
her practice involved “complete surrender and openness to the Word of 
the Lord, reaching beyond all active prayer into a state of being held, of 
simply receiving and, finally, of necessity, passing on to suffering and 
to passion.” 43 Balthasar attributes to Thérèse a pioneering development 
of this unity. For him, many of the Fathers had an individualistic con-
ception of contemplation influenced heavily by Stoic and neoplatonic 
contemplative ideals. Balthasar suggests boldly that the “little Thérèse 
is the first to rid contemplation of its neoplatonic relics.” 44 
 Here we have a doctrine of contemplation, explicitly formulated, such as 
the medievals never worked out clearly. Contemplation is not superior to 
action because it allows a person leisure and tranquility, as the ancients 
thought who despised work as illiberal. Nor even, as St. Thomas argued 
in stating the traditional doctrine, because contemplation is directly con-
cerned with God, whereas action deals “only” with one’s neighbor. It is 
solely because, of all the church’s manifestations of love, contemplation 
bears the most abundant fruit, so abundant that Thérèse does not hesitate 
to compare the contemplative vocation to that of the priesthood. 45 
 This is an integrating and demanding vision of “fructifying contem-
plation.” The superiority of contemplation, if one wants to speak in 
these terms, resides not in a zone sealed off from the concrete concerns 
of everyday life, but “must integrate into itself the whole pathos and 
strength of action.” Thérèse’s vision of contemplation is “the very oppo-
site of Quietism: It is the fruit of an endeavor into which one throws all 
one’s energies.” It is to be applied to the smallest details of everyday life. 
Thérèse’s vision embodies the motto of Ignatius,  In actione contemplati-
vus . This integrated vision is shown, for example, when Thérèse was 
appointed novice mistress. Cognizant that she was taking on a duty 
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beyond her powers, she did not “sit down to work out a scheme for 
dividing her time between prayer and action.” Instead she devoted her-
self contemplatively to God: “without leaving your arms, without even 
turning my head, I shall distribute your precious gifts to the souls who 
come asking for food.” 46 Thérèse embodies “an attitude that cannot be 
described exactly in terms of either contemplation or action.” 47 Rather, 
she is, more accurately stated, “beyond them both in the all-embracing 
law of love, which governs both receptivity and fruitfulness, both Mary 
and Martha.” 48 In other words, Thérèse transcends the “dualism of pas-
sivity and activity, at the point where they meet in Christian love.” 49 Too 
often, in Balthasar’s estimation, patristic and scholastic interpretations 
are strongly influenced by ancient philosophy. Aquinas’s interpretation 
of the Martha-Mary story, for example, relies too heavily on Aristotle’s 
account of the contemplative life in privileging contemplation over 
action. Thérèse’s vision consists not in alternating from one to the other, 
but in perfecting the two simultaneously. 50 In a letter at the end of her 
life, she writes: 
 I really count on not remaining inactive in heaven. My desire is to work 
still for the Church and for souls. I am asking God for this and I am cer-
tain He will answer me. Are not the angels continually occupied with us 
without their ever ceasing to see the divine Face and to lose themselves 
in the Ocean of Love without shores? Why would Jesus not allow me to 
imitate them? 51 
 The beatific vision is often imagined as the cessation of all movement – 
a resting in God. 52 Unparalleled by any other saint, however, Thérèse 
regards heaven as the scene for her most intense mission, not unlike 
Jesus, who retained the vision of the Father in the midst of his earthly 
mission – a relational vision that shaped every moment of his earthly 
activity. 53 With this integration of contemplation and action, Thérèse felt 
closer to Joan of Arc than to any other saint. They are united by their 
single-hearted commitment to do God’s will. 
 Habit of Charity: Feasting at the Table of Unbelief 
 Having examined the unity of action and contemplation, the insepa-
rability of active and passive spiration, we focus in this section on 
Thérèse’s embodiment of the habit of charity. Again, the habit of char-
ity is, in Lonergan’s terms, the antecedent willingness to respond to 
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evil with love. It is the habitual orientation to enacting God’s love in 
the world. It is the imitation of and participation in passive spiration. 
I discuss three instances: her conversion during the Christmas of 1886, 
her response to sisters in the Carmel whom she despised, and her will-
ingness to feast at the table of sorrow of unbelievers. 
 The story of the Christmas of 1886 seems simple and ordinary, but 
it had profound implications for her spiritual life. 54 When she was in 
her early teens, the girls came home from midnight mass and Thérèse 
immediately ran to her shoes, which she had placed at the chimney, to 
look for the little gifts she was accustomed to receiving. Her father – 
fatigued and annoyed – remarked harshly on Thérèse’s childishness. 
Her response would normally involve wounded feelings and crying. 
It was on this night that she received what she called the grace of her 
“complete conversion.” “Forcing back my tears,” Thérèse writes, “I 
descended the stairs rapidly; controlling the poundings of my heart, I 
took my slippers and placed them in front of Papa, and withdrew all 
objects joyfully. I had the happy appearance of the Queen … I felt  char-
ity enter my soul, and the need to forget myself and to please others.” 
This ordinary family incident was a profound moment of conversion; 
Thérèse had discovered “the art of transforming narcissistic hurt into 
outpoured love.” 55 
 Second, in Manuscript C, Thérèse addresses the difficulty of the habit 
of charity, especially to those for whom we have natural antipathy. Yet it 
is precisely in loving the latter that our love becomes divine. 56 Thérèse 
despised, for example, a sister in her convent, and yet in her wisdom 
admits that this sister must be pleasing to God. Exhibiting the habit of 
charity – the very imitation of and participation in passive spiration – 
Thérèse reflects: 
 Not wishing to give in to the natural antipathy I was experiencing, I told 
myself that charity must not consist in feelings but in works; then I set 
myself to doing for this sister what I would do for the person I loved the 
most. Each time I met her I prayed to God for her, offering Him all her 
virtues and merits. I felt this was pleasing to Jesus, for there is no artist 
who doesn’t love to receive praise for his works, and Jesus, the Artist of 
souls, is happy when we don’t stop at the exterior, but, penetrating into 
the inner sanctuary where He chooses to dwell, we admire its beauty. I 
wasn’t content simply with praying very much for this Sister who gave 
me so many struggles, but I took care to render her all the service possible, 
and when I was tempted to answer her back in a disagreeable manner, 
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I was content with giving her my most friendly smile, and with changing 
the subject of conversation. 57 
 Third, Thérèse willingly feasted at the table of sorrow – “the dark ban-
quet of bitter bread.” 58 The healing episode of Christmas 1886 described 
above set forth her missionary vocation to become a fisher of souls. If 
Thérèse resisted the temptation “to see,” she embraced with equal fervour 
something akin to the dark night of the soul. I will not enter into the debate 
over whether she experienced the dark night of the soul in the same sense 
as St John of the Cross and whether she also belongs in the category of 
saint as mystic, in Ormerod’s terms. My point here is that her experience 
of the “night,” which is where “she lives almost the whole time,” was inte-
gral to her mission of charity to unbelievers. 59 She subjectively absorbed 
the pain and alienation of unbelief experienced widely in the secular age. 
 During Easter 1896, after the Good Friday when she first spat up 
blood, God shows her, as she interprets the experience, that there really 
are people who have no faith. 
 He permitted my soul to be invaded by the thickest darkness, and that the 
thought of heaven, up until then so sweet to me, be no longer anything but 
the cause of struggle and torment. This trial was to last not a few days or a 
few weeks, it was not to be extinguished until the hour set by God himself 
and this hour has not yet come … One would have to travel through this 
dark tunnel to understand its darkness. 60 
 These images express a kind of mystical experience of the dark night of 
the soul. One of the fundamental points about the habit of charity that 
she learns is that charity is not always a feeling but an act of the will. 
In the midst of these feelings of darkness, she begs for mercy for her 
unbelieving brothers and resigns herself to sit with these poor sinners 
at the table filled with bitterness. 61 
 When I want to rest my heart, weary of the surrounding darkness, by 
the memory of the luminous country after which I aspire, my anguish 
only increases. It seems as if the darkness, echoing the voices of sinners, 
is mocking me, saying, ‘You dream of light, of a fragrant homeland, you 
dream that you will possess the Creator of these wonders for all eternity, 
you believe that you will one day emerge from this gloom … Go on! Look 
forward to death, which will give you – not what you hope – but a still 
darker night, the night of nothingness. 62 
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 Though there is still debate over the precise nature of her dark night, 
most scholars suggest that Thérèse probably experienced significant 
subjective desolation, without technically losing her faith. Thérèse 
understood herself “as standing among the sinners, no longer sepa-
rated in any way from their condition,” experiencing “the fullness of 
alienation from God.” 63 
 Etty Hillesum: The Thinking Heart of the Barracks 
 If Thérèse of Lisieux is accessible through her profound yet chal-
lenging little way, Etty Hillesum is for some contemporary seekers 
perhaps even more accessible. Her vivacious demeanour, her erotic 
pursuits and struggles, her rearing in a house gifted with intellec-
tual and artistic acumen and complicated by mental illness, and her 
spiritual pluralism make her even more relatable to many sojourners 
in the secular age. 
 Born in the Netherlands in 1914, Etty – an assimilated Dutch Jew – was 
the oldest of four children. The Hillesums were a middle-class, socially 
well established family. Though they were part of the ethnic Jewish 
community, they did not participate regularly in Jewish religious prac-
tices. According to Etty, her family exuded “a remarkable mixture of 
barbarism and culture.” 64 Louis, her father, was a respected grammar 
school teacher and a disciplined scholar. “He studied the Jewish and 
Christian scriptures, read French literature, especially Pascal, explored 
various German philosophers, and studied Freud.” 65 Though Etty had 
much in common with her father, “she did not share the skepticism 
which kept him away from social contracts and denominational orga-
nizations. His intellectual attitude of situating himself above mundane 
reality characterized him to the end of his life.” Her mother was unbal-
anced and difficult, extroverted, and domineering. Etty shared “the 
emotional tonality of her mother’s life,” though she was well aware 
of her mother’s shortcomings and regarded her mother as “a model 
of what I must never become.” 66 Her brothers, Jaap and Mischa, were 
both talented and emotionally disturbed. Jaap, who studied medicine, 
suffered from schizophrenia and Mischa, one of the most promising 
pianists in Europe, was hospitalized for a time with psychotic episodes. 
Etty herself fought at times with “periods of inner fragmentation, 
depression, and immobility, sleeping for long stretches at a time, experi-
menting with self-medication, and experiencing moments of physical 
and internal fatigue and extreme mood swings.” 67 
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 During the time of her journals – later published as  An Interrupted 
Life – Etty was living in Amsterdam where she worked as a Russian 
tutor. Her life in Amsterdam revolved around two communities: the 
household of Han Wegerif, where she lived, and a group of women 
devoted to the Jungian-influenced psychochiriologist Julius Spier 
and his practice of a kind of psychotherapy. She had ongoing intimate 
sexual relationships with both Wegerif and Spier, the latter being the 
more captivating and transformative relationship in her life. As Eva 
Hoffman notes, “As part of his therapeutic method, Spier engaged in 
eroticized tousles with his patients, which were not, apparently, sup-
posed to lead to sexual intercourse.” 68 Etty’s chronicling of “his tan-
talizing touches and kisses, of the casual liberties he took with admir-
ing female patients, strike us as highly incorrect, to say the least.” 
Nevertheless, such behavior was not uncommon during the interwar 
period, which was marked by “eclectic psychoanalytic experiments” 
and “eccentric adventures in self-exploration.” In some ways, Spier’s 
mode of therapy represents an “older tradition of active philosophi-
cal teaching”: through her “real and metaphorical wrestlings with 
Spier, Etty “trained herself to check her impulses and restrain the 
impetuousness of her needs.” Indeed, her most difficult battle was 
with the “problem of sexuality in its modern, feminine variant”: she 
was both “seduced and riven by her desires, torn between romantic 
yearnings for submergence and the need for independence.” As her 
journals attest, however, she began to learn “the kind of love that is 
closer to selfless agape than to urgent eros and that combines deep 
sympathy with calm detachment.” 
 Universal Activity of the Spirit 
 Richard Galliardetz notes that “while it is true that in her later writing 
she admits to reading with great interest and sympathy the Gospel of 
Matthew, the writings of St. Augustine and the medieval mystic, Meis-
ter Eckhart,” it would be at the same time “misleading to characterize 
her as a crypto-Christian, as many Christian admirers of her thought 
have been inclined to do.” 69 She drew on a variety of religious, philo-
sophical, and poetic sources: classical literature, Russian literature, art, 
psychology – with an emphasis on Jung and Adler, Augustine, Thomas 
à Kempis, and the Bible, and above all Rainer Maria Rilke. 70 In fact, 
“as she was preparing to go to Westerbork for the last time, she fret-
ted about which books to bring with her and decided upon her bible, 
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Dostoyevski’s  The Idiot , Rilke’s  Book of Hours and  Letters to a Young Poet , 
and her Russian dictionaries.” 71 
 Mindful of these dangers, it still seems plausible for a theologian to 
discern vestiges of Trinitarian love at work in a broken, interrupted, 
unfinished life such as Etty Hillesum’s, presuming from the perspec-
tive of a Catholic theologian that the Trinitarian God of love continually 
breaks into history. It is fitting to discern in compelling examples of 
religious experience the possibility of sanctifying grace – the consoling, 
complacent love that offers true rest, and the habit of charity – the kind 
of apostolic sanctity that habitually orients one to enact God’s love in 
the world. This approach avoids “seeking to make sweeping judgments 
about different religious traditions in themselves, but seeks to identify 
concretely the way in which God has operated within their traditions, 
according to a normative Trinitarian template.” 72 
 I noted in chapter 2 a contemporary theological development on 
limbo in light of the Christological teaching of the Second Vatican 
Council. To place this treatment of Hillesum in theological context, it 
is fitting to note another emerging theological emphasis on the pres-
ence of the Spirit outside the visible borders of the church. If indeed the 
Spirit is manifested in a special way in the Church and in her members, 
exemplified by Thérèse of Lisieux, still the Spirit’s activity is universal 
and may be discerned in the lived witness of Etty Hillesum. This vision 
was articulated in Vatican II’s  Gaudium et Spes 22 – a passage that high-
lights both one ultimate supernatural human end and the penetrating 
mission of the Spirit: 
 All this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of good will in 
whose hearts grace works in an unseen way. For, since Christ died for all 
men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we 
ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers 
to every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery. 
 I give particular attention here to John Paul II’s development of this 
insight in  Redemptoris Missio 28. 73 The Church, John Paul II writes, is 
aware that humanity is continually being stirred by the Spirit of God. 
This is evident in the ongoing human quest for the meaning of life in 
the face of the riddle of death. The Spirit, according to John Paul II, 
resides “at the very source of man’s existential and religious question-
ing, a questioning which is occasioned not only by contingent situations 
but by the very structure of his being.” The Spirit animates not only 
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individual lives, but also “society and history, peoples, cultures and 
religions.” Indeed, the Spirit is “at the origin of the noble ideals and 
undertakings which benefit humanity on its journey through history.” 
The risen Christ is continually working to both instil “a desire for the 
world to come” and to animate, purify, and reinforce “the noble aspira-
tions which drive the human family to make its life one that is more 
human and to direct the whole earth to this end.” 
 Robert Doran’s vision both affirms and extends these post–Vatican II 
developments. 74 In light of the unity of nature and grace in the con-
crete world order, Doran argues that “we Christians share a religious 
community with all human beings, including the people of the world’s 
other religions, because of this universal gift of what we call the Holy 
Spirit.” 75 The communities to which we belong are grounded both 
in “the common orientation of human nature as obediential potency 
through intentional consciousness to the mystery of love and awe that 
in fact is the transcendent triune God, and in the universal gift of the 
transcendent God’s triune life through what Christians would confess 
to be the indwelling of the Holy Spirit” 76 
 If the legacy of the Second Vatican Council enables us to discern, in 
a contemporary mode, the presence of the Spirit at work on a large 
scale, then Benedict XVI helps us discern this presence more specifi-
cally in the life of Etty Hillesum. In his Ash Wednesday audience given 
shortly after he announced his resignation, Benedict narrated familiar 
examples of religious conversion, such as St Paul and St Augustine. But, 
sensitive to the secular age and the prevailing “eclipse of the sense of 
the sacred,” he also challenged his audience to notice “God’s grace is at 
work and works marvels in the life of so many people. The Lord never 
tires of knocking at man’s door in social and cultural milieus that seem 
engulfed in secularization,” he said. Benedict highlights Etty Hillesum 
as a particular example to be noted in a secular age. 77 “At first far from 
God,” Benedict remarked, “she discovered him looking deep within her 
and she wrote: ‘There is a really deep well inside me. And in it dwells 
God. Sometimes I am there, too. But more often stones and grit block 
the well, and God is buried beneath. Then he must be dug out again.’” 78 
Benedict adds, “In her disrupted, restless life she found God in the very 
midst of the great tragedy of the 20th century: the Shoah. This frail and 
dissatisfied young woman, transfigured by faith, became a woman full 
of love and inner peace who was able to declare: ‘I live in constant inti-
macy with God.’” Indeed, in a secular age wherein the very plausibility 
of the question of God is eclipsed, “we may not be surprised to discover 
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modern-day mystics and unconventional instances of contemporary 
sanctity that fall outside the framework of traditional hagiography.” 79 
 The Little Way of Etty: Quest for Simplicity and 
Contemplative Rest in God 
 It is possible to discern in Hillesum’s journals something akin to the 
sanctity  simpliciter of Thérèse of Lisieux. This kind of sanctity is a histor-
ical expression of sanctifying grace – an embodiment of divine love as 
“a consoling, complacent love which offers an invitation to rest and be 
transformed by that love.” 80 It is not altogether obvious that she under-
stands the God to whom she refers over four hundred times in her jour-
nals as the God of Judaism and Christianity. Still, as time progresses and 
as the Jewish situation in Amsterdam worsens, Etty develops a more 
intimate, loving relationship with God. We witness a transition from 
her speaking of God in the third person to an I-Thou encounter. In a 
letter from Westerbork, Etty recounts her journal entry from that very 
afternoon to her friend Tide: 
 You have made me so rich, Oh God, please let me share out Your beauty 
with open hands. My life has become an uninterrupted dialogue with You, 
oh God, one great dialogue. Sometimes when I stand in some corner of the 
camp, my feet planted on Your earth, my eyes raised toward Your heaven, 
tears sometimes run down my face, tears of deep emotion and gratitude. 
At night too, when I lie in bed and rest in You, oh God, tears of gratitude 
run down my face, and that is my prayer … I may never become the great 
artist I would really like to be, but I am already secure in You, God. Some-
times I try my hand at turning out small profundities and uncertain short 
stories, but I always end up with just one single world: God. And that says 
everything, and there is no need for anything more. And all my creative 
powers are translated into inner dialogues with You. The beat of my heart 
has grown deeper, more active, and yet more peaceful, and it is as if I were 
all the time storing up inner riches. 81 
 This loving rest in God is captured by a key image in her journals – that 
of kneeling. Etty described herself as “the girl who could not kneel” but 
who would later become a “kneeler in training”: 82 
 There is a sort of lamentation and loving-kindness as well as a little 
wisdom somewhere inside me that cries to be let out. Sometimes several 
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different dialogues run through me at the same time, images and fi gures, 
moods, a sudden fl ash of something that must be my very own truth. Love 
for human beings that must be hard fought for. Not through politics or a 
party, but in myself. Still a lot of false shame to get rid of. And there’s God. 
The girl who could not kneel but learned to do so on the rough coconut 
matting in an untidy bathroom. Such things are often more intimate even 
than sex. The story of the girl who gradually learned to kneel is something 
I would love to write in the fullest possible way. 83 
 The language that animates these passages – “thou,” “kneeling,” “love,” 
“intimacy” – expresses the kind of active receptivity and relationality 
that marked Lonergan’s later emphasis on being-in-love as the highest 
way of being that shapes our quest for self-transcendence. 
 This same loving-kindness is expressed in her experience of reading 
and meditating on Paul’s profound reflection on love in 1 Cor. 13. Paul’s 
circling meditation, Etty recounts, “worked on me like a divining rod 
that touched the bottom of my heart, causing hidden sources to spring 
up suddenly within me.” “All at once,” she adds, “I was down on my 
knees beside the little white table and all my released love coursed 
through me again, purged of desire, envy, spite, etc.” 84 Notice a particu-
lar kind of Girardian sanctity at work here (see chapter 6)? 
 Thérèse’s contemplative life was marked by a rich relationship 
between time and eternity, especially as she faced a slow, brutal death 
by illness. “It seems to me,” writes Thérèse, “that love can substitute 
for a long life. Jesus takes no account of time, since there is none in 
heaven. He must take account only of love.” 85 Hillesum, as her rela-
tionship with God progressed, had to similarly focus on being atten-
tive to the present, facing death in the midst of the great atrocities of 
the twentieth century: 
 I must conquer in myself … Life is diffi cult … In the past I would live 
chaotically in the future, because I refused to live in the here and now. I 
wanted to be handed everything on a platter, like a badly spoiled child. 
Sometimes I had the certain if rather undefi ned feeling that I would “make 
it” one day, that I had the capacity to do something “extraordinary,” and 
at other times the wild fear that I would “go to the dogs” after all. I now 
realize why. I simply refused to do what needed to be done, what lay right 
under my nose. I refused to climb into the future one step at a time … I no 
longer think of the future, that is, I no longer care whether or not I shall 
“make it,” because I now have the inner certainty that everything will 
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be taken care of. Before, I always lived in anticipation, I had the feeling 
that nothing I did was the “real” thing, that it was all a preparation for 
something else, something “greater,” more “genuine.” But that feeling has 
dropped away from me completely. 86 
 In the place of continually anticipating the future, which began to take 
on for Hillesum a sense of doom, that she would be a part of the mass 
extermination of Jews under Hitler, she continual reflects on the mean-
ing of the quotidian and the beauty of love. 
 Every minute of this day seems one great gift and consolation, a memory 
I shall carry within me as an ever-present reality … We must count neither 
on being preserved nor on being destroyed. These are extreme possibili-
ties, but neither is a certainty. What matters are the concerns of daily life 
… the main thing is that even as we die a terrible death we are able to feel 
right up to the very last moment that life has meaning and beauty, that we 
have realized our potential and lived a good life. 87 
 Similar to Thérèse, the journals of Hillesum reveal an ongoing asceti-
cal process of pruning herself of the desire for greatness, what I called 
above the “demolition of great deeds,” and instead orienting her atten-
tion to the little things. Just as Thérèse desired to be a missionary, war-
rior, and priest, Hillesum desired to be a great writer. 
 Wash your hands of all attempts to embody those great, sweeping 
thoughts. The smallest, most fatuous little essay is worth more than the 
fl ood of grandiose ideas in which you like to wallow … Your imagina-
tion and your emotions are like a vast ocean from which you wrest small 
pieces of land that may well be fl ooded again. That ocean is wide and 
elemental, but what matter are the small pieces of land you reclaim from 
it. The subject right before you is more important than those prodigious 
thoughts on Tolstoy and Napoleon that occurred to you in the middle of 
last night, and the lesson you gave that keen young girl on Friday night 
is more important than all your vague philosophizings. Never forget that. 
Don’t overestimate your own intensity; it may give you the impression 
that you are cut out for greater things than the so-called man in the street, 
whose inner life is a closed book to you. In fact, you are no more than a 
weakling and a nonentity adrift and tossed by the waves … Keep your eye 
fi xed on the mainland, and don’t fl ounder helplessly in the ocean. And 
now to the job at hand! 88 
Thérèse of Lisieux and Etty Hillesum 177
 As Hillesum’s spiritual quest deepened, she became more committed 
to simplicity of speech and lifestyle, discipline in work, faithfulness in the 
little things, and finding God in the midst of the concreteness of her life. 
 Sometimes I long for a convent cell, with the sublime wisdom of centu-
ries set out on bookshelves all along the wall and a view across the corn-
fi elds – there must be cornfi elds and they must wave in the breeze – and 
there I would immerse myself in the wisdom of the ages and in myself. 
Then I might perhaps fi nd peace and clarity. But that would be no great 
feat. It is right here, in this very place, in the here and now, that I must 
fi nd them. But it is all so terribly diffi cult, and I feel so heavyhearted. 89 
 When she translated Russian, she felt, for example, that she must write 
another  Brothers Karamazov and she was filled “with sudden fears that I 
might not fulfill the promise of those ‘exalted’ moments.” But she asks 
reflectively why she feels she has to achieve such noble deeds: “All I 
need to do is to ‘be,’ to live and try being a little bit human … and that’s 
probably why I accumulate knowledge, out of a desire to be impor-
tant.” She asks God instead for the “knowledge that leads to wisdom 
and true happiness and not the kind that leads to power.” 90 
 A key challenge of the little way is attentiveness to the concreteness 
of the little things and not to grand, sweeping ideas. This tension is 
crystallized in Hillesum’s experience with and reflection on her father. 
When she was travelling to visit her father, she was stressed over how to 
engage him, but reflected: “the main item for this weekend’s program: 
to love my father deeply and sincerely and to forgive him for disturbing 
my pleasure-seeking life.” 91 Thinking about her father prompted a kind 
of Dostoyevskian insight about the abstract and the particular: whether 
to approach humanity abstractly through a kind of detached Enlighten-
ment objectivity (Ivan Karamazov) or through an embrace of the world 
through the concrete particularity of humble love (Fr Zosima)? 
 Then something dawned on me. At a fairly advanced age, my father had 
traded all his uncertainties, doubts, and probably also his physical inferi-
ority complex, his insurmountable marriage problems, for philosophical 
ideas that though held in perfect sincerity and full of the milk of human 
kindness are totally vague. Those ideas help him to gloss over everything, 
to look just at the surface instead of plumbing the depths he knows full 
well are there, perhaps precisely because he knows it. And so he can never 
hope to attain clarity. Beneath the surface, his resigned philosophy simply 
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means: Oh, well, which of us knows anything, all is chaos within and 
without. And it is that very chaos that also threatens me, that I must make 
it my life’s task to shake off instead of reverting to it time and again. And 
no doubt my father’s expressions of resignation, humor, and doubt appeal 
to something in me that I share with him, but which I must nevertheless 
outgrow. 92 
 In contrast to her father’s abstract approach, Etty grows in her commit-
ment to the little way, to a resting simplicity and a commitment to the 
concrete details of daily living: 
 To be very unobtrusive, and very insignifi cant, always striving for more 
simplicity. Yes, to become simple and to live simply, not only within your-
self but also in your everyday dealings. Don’t make ripples all around 
you, don’t try so hard to be interesting, keep your distance, be honest, 
fi ght the desire to be thought fascinating by the outside world. Instead, 
reach for true simplicity in your inner life and in your surroundings, and 
also work. Yes, work. It doesn’t matter at what. 93 
 Habit of Charity: “A Balm for All Wounds” 
 Hillesum’s contemplative being-in-love with God – her imitation of and 
participation in active spiration – is intimately connected to her love 
and care for others in a dire moment of history. In what way might 
we envision her in the context of passive spiration – the proceeding 
love breathed by and proceeding from the Father and the Son – and its 
historical expression as the habit of charity? In what way did Hillesum 
embody what Ormerod calls apostolic sanctity – the habitual orienta-
tion of enacting God’s love in the world? I will focus the analysis here 
on three dimensions of the habit of charity: her concrete care for the 
victims of Nazi violence, her return of good for evil, and her embodied 
transformation of eros into agape. 
 If Thérèse wanted to be a “balm of consolation” and “love at the 
heart of the Church,” Hillesum desired to serve as a “balm for all 
wounds” and to be “the thinking heart of the barracks.” Her journals 
reveal a turning point in July 1942, when she realizes more clearly the 
severity of the Nazi program against the Jews in Amsterdam. Many 
of the reflections in the section above are set against the backdrop of 
the increasing ban of Jews from public places, curfews, confiscation of 
property, and so on. As she grew more independent of Spier and more 
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deeply engaged in the spiritual practices of reading, reflection, and 
intimate prayer, she was “confronted with the realities of war and her 
responsibility to become socially active and involved.” 94 She accepts 
a position as typist with the Jewish council, “an organization coopted 
by the German Nazi regime to help transport Jews out of the coun-
try.” 95 Aware of the ambiguity that comes with an organization full 
of intrigue and Nazi accommodation, Hillesum accepted the position 
with the hope of doing some good in the midst of persecution. A few 
weeks later she volunteered to be sent to the transit camp at Wester-
bork, which entailed “living on the campsite and in an environment 
of cramped and noisy quarters, hospital and prison barracks, depriva-
tion and food shortages, illness and lack of hygiene, and in the con-
stant company of death.” 96 The deep prayer life nurtured in solitude in 
Amsterdam enabled her “to become an embodied presence of compas-
sion, dispensing simple words and gestures of consolation and love” – a 
“balm for all wounds.” 97 
 Second, Hillesum embodied the habit of charity in her embrace of 
the return of good for evil. Her attitude towards the enemy is one of 
the more remarkable and controversial dimensions of her journals and 
letters. She embodied a kind of Girardian pacific mimesis. Tzvetan 
Todorov strongly criticizes Hillesum’s approach to evil and the enemy. 98 
He finds her fascinating and even admits that when we read her “we 
feel in the presence of someone whom we would want to spend time 
with, to count among our friends, to love.” 99 Nevertheless, Todorov is 
convinced that her approach ends up contributing to the kind of “fatal-
ism and passivity” that lent itself to “the murderous project of the 
Nazis.” 100 He identifies in Hillesum’s writings an indifference to things 
outside the self, an acceptance of evil, and even at times a preference 
for suffering. In fact, he thinks her navigating of evil and suffering often 
resembles stoicism, quietism, and even Taoism – a religious tradition 
to which she does refer. Though she prefers “ordinary virtues (caring) 
to heroic virtues (war),” she goes further in a way that proves to be 
disturbing to Todorov: “Instead of doing something about the causes 
of evil, she is content to be ‘the balm for all wounds.’ She lives not in 
resignation but rather in joyful acceptance of the world and thus of evil 
as well.” 101 “And this is why,” Todorov adds, “despite her uncontest-
able nobility, I cannot commend her position to the downtrodden of 
the earth.” 102 
 Todorov’s criticisms should be considered carefully. An eclectic spiri-
tuality that sloppily combines Christian and Taoist imagery is destined 
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for ambiguity. That said, from the theological framework established in 
this book, it is possible to discern a key dimension of the habit of charity 
as it is expressed in the Christian tradition in the Sermon on the Mount 
and the Law of the Cross – the command to return evil with love. While 
there are many legitimate moral responses to a mass atrocity like the 
Shoah – Dietrich Bonhoeffer discerned after all that it was legitimate 
for a Christian to assassinate Hitler – Hillesum’s little way of fighting 
against hatred embodies traces of the Trinitarian relation of passive spi-
ration as it is embodied in the habit of charity in history. Furthermore, in 
light of our discussion of mimetic desire in the previous chapter, I want 
to suggest that her journals reveal a progressive movement from antag-
onistic mimesis to peaceful mimesis. One finds in Hillesum a mature 
transformation of mimetic desire from envy to peacefulness. Even if 
there are other ways of dealing with the horror of the Nazis, as Todorov 
indicates, this does not nullify her mimetic spirituality of committing 
to the sustained work of overcoming hatred, scapegoating, and other 
types of mimetic snowballing. For example, she writes: 
 It is the problem of our age: hatred of Germans poisons everyone’s mind 
… I had a liberating thought that surfaced in me like a hesitant, tender 
young blade of grass thrusting its way through a wilderness of weeds: if 
there were only one decent German, then he should be cherished despite 
that whole barbaric gang, and because of that one decent German it is 
wrong to pour hatred over an entire people. 103 
 Akin to the unity of contemplation and action envisioned by Thérèse 
above and to Girardian sanctity, Hillesum sees “no other solution” than 
“to turn inward and to root out all the rottenness there.” “I no longer 
believe that we can change anything in the world until we have first 
changed ourselves,” she writes. 104 Her developing spirituality of return-
ing evil with good is captured in her encounter with a young Gestapo 
officer, who verbally abused her. The real import of the story, according 
to her, was not that she was wronged but that she “felt no indignation,” 
but instead a “real compassion.” She wanted to ask him: “Did you have 
a very unhappy childhood, has your girlfriend let you down?” Recog-
nizing that the officer looked harassed, sullen, and weak, she reflected: 
“the blame must be put on the system that uses such people. What 
needs eradication is the evil in man, not man himself.” 105 
 This dimension of the habit of charity, this nurturing of peaceful 
mimesis, was given pointed expression as she lay upon her bed in 
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Amsterdam listening to Bach. Cognizant that “any minute now a piece 
of shrapnel could come through that window,” she still felt “so peaceful 
and grateful”: 106 
 All disasters stem from us. Why is there a war? Perhaps because now and 
then I might be inclined to snap at my neighbor. Because I and my neigh-
bor and everyone else do not have enough love. Yet we could fi ght war 
and all its excrescences by releasing, each day, the love that is shackled 
inside us, and giving it a chance to live. And I believe that I will never be 
able to hate any human being for his so-called wickedness, that I shall only 
hate the evil that is within me … In any case, we cannot be lax enough 
in what we demand of others and strict enough in what we demand of 
ourselves. 107 
 Hillesum advises us to open up to “cosmic sadness.” She repeatedly 
contemplates the beauty of life even in the midst of horror. This involves 
an incipient embrace of the Law of the Cross as the humble way to free-
dom – a resistance to the perpetual temptation to nurture hatred. 
 Yes, life is beautiful and I value it anew at the end of every day, even 
though I know that the sons of mothers, and you are one such mother, are 
being murdered in concentration camps. And you must be able to bear 
your sorrow; even if it seems to crush you, you will be able to stand up 
again, for human beings are so strong, and your sorrow must become an 
integral part of yourself, part of your body and your soul, you mustn’t run 
away from it, but bear it like an adult. Do not relieve your feelings through 
hatred, do not seek to be avenged on all German mothers, for they, too, 
sorrow at this very moment for their slain and murderous sons. Give your 
sorrow all the space and shelter in yourself that is its due, for if everyone 
bears his grief honestly and courageously, the sorrow that now fi lls the 
world will abate. But if you do not clear a decent shelter for your sorrow, 
and instead reserve most of the space inside you for hatred and thoughts 
of revenge – from which new sorrows will be born for others – then sorrow 
will never cease in this world and will multiply. And if you have given 
sorrow that space its gentle origins demand, then you may truly say: life 
is beautiful and so rich. So beautiful and so rich that it makes you want to 
believe in God. 108 
 Third, as her journals attest, Hillesum also began to learn “the kind 
of love that is closer to selfless agape than to urgent eros and that 
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combines deep sympathy with calm detachment.” 109 As mentioned 
above, Hillesum experienced a dominant erotic spirit, which was at 
times expressed in envious mimetic desire. This kind of antagonistic 
mimesis occurred, for example, amidst the women who were involved 
in the social circle associated with Spier. Hillesum expresses her jeal-
ousy that other women, the “Aryan girls,” find him attractive. 110 Their 
desire for physical and spiritual intimacy with Spier escalated mimeti-
cally; they desired according to the desires of one another. Still, one 
witnesses in her journals an elevation and transformation of her erotic 
desires into agapic commitments. As Richard Gaillardetz suggests: 
 Her journal presents the reader with a fl awed woman who nevertheless 
embodied “passionate living” in both of its senses: erotic passion, and the 
willingness to suffer. Moreover, her writing suggests that these two capac-
ities may fl ow from the same wellspring, a willing to risk powerlessness 
and vulnerability. Surrounded by a climate of fear, suspicion and hatred, 
Hillesum opted for a vulnerable presence to and with others. Her remark-
able capacity to face suffering and death for the sake of others should 
not be separated from her willingness to explore the erotic and sensual 
dimensions of her being. For both authentic sexual intimacy and suffering 
demand the embrace of powerlessness and vulnerability that lie at the 
heart of passionate living. 111 
 Galliardetz is suggesting that her sometimes “reckless exploration of 
human sexuality, while fraught with danger, may indeed activate that 
mysterious capacity latent within all of us to be vulnerable not just to 
our intimates but before the world.” Her passionate life was certainly 
not always lived within the boundaries of religious moral teaching. Yet, 
while living with passion may complicate life, “such  passion , whether 
realized through human sexual intimacy, or the arts or in any number 
of other directions, can give rise to  compassion, a capacity to suffer in 
solidarity with others.” Such compassionate living is “trafficking in the 
divine.” 112 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter tied together several themes that emerged throughout the 
book. First, mindful of Lonergan’s shift to concrete religious experience, 
it examined particular examples of being-in-love with God that marked 
his attention to concrete subjectivity. Second, in a related manner, it 
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responded to the contemporary challenge of integrating concrete mod-
els of holiness as theological sources and did so by establishing – by 
way of Doran and Ormerod – the Trinitarian roots of the human desire 
for God. This constitutes a further moment in my response to Feingold’s 
claim – highlighted in chapters 2 and 5 – that our innate inclination to 
our connatural end is “capable of transformation into a supernatural 
inclination to the vision of God through the reception of sanctifying 
grace, by which we are made mysteriously proportionate to a divine 
end.” 113 Accordingly, I revisited Robert Doran’s four-point hypothesis 
and considered Neil Ormerod’s extension of this hypothesis as a basis 
for establishing the metaphysics of holiness as created participation 
in the divine nature. I then explored Thérèse’s of Lisieux’s desire to 
be “love in the heart of the Church” and Etty Hillesum’s desire to be 
“the thinking heart of the barracks.” This chapter suggested, albeit in a 
speculative manner, that sanctifying grace and the habit of charity – two 
supernatural realities that make possible the kind of humble love and 
non-violent resistance so integral to Girard’s expression of Christian 
holiness – were especially operative in the lives of these two very dif-
ferent models of holiness, who both embodied a Trinitarian basis of the 
human desire for God both “inside” and “outside” the ecclesial milieu. 
 8 Distorted Desire and the Love of 
Deviated Transcendence 
 In thinking about a way beyond the neo-Thomist-Lubacian impasse, 
Edward Oakes suggested that the term “desire” is “still spoken of too 
abstractly, without a due allowance being made to the phenomenology 
of desire in the light of original sin – with its legacy of the  fomes  peccati , 
that is, of temptation and concupiscence.” 1 This chapter argues that atten-
tion to concrete subjectivity protects against the temptation of too easily 
equating the natural desire for being with the natural desire for God with-
out simultaneously acknowledging the widespread distortion of desire in 
human life – the very misdirection of human loves to false and deviated 
transcendence. I examine distorted desire in the form of contemporary 
consumerism and do so through the prism of Lonergan and Girard – the 
very line of conversation that has animated part 3 of this book. 2 
 Though our living is artistic and dramatic, though we participate in 
our own self-making, we are also limited as concrete subjects in the 
degree to which we fully shape our lives. We are “already constituted 
biologically in a particular way,” and in large part human identity and 
self-understanding is a product of “a multifaceted process of socializa-
tion.” 3 The facticity of our lives – the already given, the already consti-
tuted – is the material out of which we “shape our drama”; it is within 
the “already constituted horizon of meanings and value that the drama 
of human living unfolds.” 4 With a sense of historical consciousness, this 
chapter takes seriously “hermeneutic interiority” and the communal 
and cultural formation of our concrete subjectivity in the world. Human 
receptivity involves the meanings and values handed on to us in our 
communities. 5 Attentive to concrete subjectivity, this chapter notes our 
vulnerability to the all-pervasive cultural moods that shape the very 
meaning and meaningfulness (or lack thereof) of the question of God. 
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 It is important to note that I do not address the very difficult ques-
tions related to political economy. I am more concerned with the forma-
tion of human subjectivity in an age of global consumerism. A socially 
dominant vision of the human being in our culture is, in Nicolas Boyle’s 
terms, the self as consumer – an anonymous, identity-less generator of 
a “never-ending series of new wishes demanding instantaneous sat-
isfaction.” 6 In Alasdair MacIntyre’s characterization, persons are edu-
cated “to regard themselves primarily as consumers whose practical 
activities are no more than a means to consumption.” “Unsurprisingly,” 
MacIntyre comments, “ pleonexia , the drive to have more and more, 
becomes treated as a central virtue.” 7 
 A Civilization of Consumption: The Challenge of 
Catholic Social Teaching 
 Pope Francis in  Evangelii Gaudium emerges not so much as an enemy of 
capitalism as a prophetic critique of some of the deleterious effects of 
global consumerism: “The great danger in today’s world, pervaded as 
it is by consumerism,” he writes, “is the desolation and anguish born of 
a complacent yet covetous heart, the feverish pursuit of frivolous plea-
sures, and a blunted conscience.” 8 When our interior lives are marked 
by egoism, “there is no longer room for others, no place for the poor. 
God’s voice is no longer heard, the quiet joy of his love is no longer 
felt, and the desire to do good fades” ( EG 2). Francis explicitly uses 
the language of idolatry in his diagnosis of some of the challenges of 
today’s world. “The worship of the ancient golden calf (cf. Ex. 32:1–35) 
has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of money and 
the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly human pur-
pose” ( EG 55). In light of Francis’s indictment of the idols of consumer-
ism, I turn briefly to selected themes from Catholic social teaching, with 
special attention to the writings of John Paul II. 
 The first theme I highlight is the problem of superdevelopment. A 
phenomenon not unrelated to the massive challenge of underdevelop-
ment, superdevelopment, John Paul II has noted, is the “excessive avail-
ability of every kind of material good for the benefit of certain social 
groups.” 9 Superdevelopment enslaves us to immediate gratification of 
desire, and confines us to a narrow horizon marked by the multiplica-
tion or continual replacement of things. This civilization of consumption 
exhibits both a “crass materialism” and a “radical dissatisfaction.” The 
deeper aspirations of the human heart remain unsatisfied ( SRS 28.2). 
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 Second, Catholic social teaching highlights the distinction between 
“having” and “being” ( SRS 8.3). Employing the language of human 
subjectivity, John Paul writes, “To ‘have’ objects and goods does not in 
itself perfect the human subject, unless it contributes to the maturing 
and enrichment of that subject’s ‘being,’ that is to say unless it contrib-
utes to the realization of the human vocation as such” ( SRS 28.3). This 
is, in part, a question of individual authenticity and the dialectic of the 
subject, but is situated within the dialectic of the social and cultural life. 
The unjust distribution of goods and services creates the following sce-
nario: the few who possess much do not grow in  being because they are 
stifled by by the cult of  having . And those who have little cannot realize 
their basic human vocation because they are deprived of basic goods 
( SRS 28.5). If our deepest desire is to engage in the “dramatic artistry of 
living,” then the neglect of vital needs by oppressive social structures 
“remove[s] the conditions of the possibility of satisfying the deeper 
desire and the pattern of experience in such a way that the prosecution 
of this desire becomes impossible.” 10 In  SRS , John Paul II introduces his 
notion of “structures of sin” and encourages us to analyse consumerism 
as a form of modern “imperialism.” 
 Third, in light of the priority of being over having, Catholic social 
teaching challenges us “to create life-styles” that prioritize “the quest 
for truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others” for the sake 
of the common good. 11 As we identify new needs and the new means 
to meet them, we must be guided by a comprehensive understanding 
of the human person. An economic system as such “does not possess 
criteria for correctly distinguishing new and higher forms of satisfying 
human needs from artificial new needs which hinder the formation of 
a mature personality” ( CA 36.1). This requires significant cultural and 
educational work. 12 
 Finally, the historical experience of the West has shown that the so-
called good life, with its emphasis on unsustainable superdevelopment, 
on having over being, on an unrestrained use of the earth’s resources, 
has created the conditions for widespread alienation and the loss of 
meaning. This loss of authentic meaning is precipitated by consumer-
ism, which confines human beings to a web of superficial gratifications 
instead of an experiencing personhood in authentic and concrete ways, 
that is, in solidarity and communion with others ( CA 41). A society is 
alienated, a culture distorted, if “its forms of social organization, pro-
duction and consumption make it more difficult to offer this gift of self 
and to establish this solidarity between people” ( CA 41.2). Benedict XVI, 
Distorted Desire and Love of Deviated Transcendence 187
in his important contribution to Catholic social teaching  Caritas in Veri-
tate , identifies the continual emergence of a consumerist and utilitarian 
view of the world, which distracts us from the anthropological cen-
trality of gift and gratuity ( CV 34). The good life, in reality, involves 
the contemplative space for nurturing a “disinterested, unselfish and 
aesthetic attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of 
the beauty which enables one to see in visible things the message of the 
invisible God who created them” ( CV 37.1). 
 Idolatry and Deviated Transcendence: Consumerist 
Practice in the Realm of the “Sacred” 
 Contemporary Catholic social teaching has diagnosed some of the del-
eterious effects of consumerism and has exposed its anthropological, 
ecological, and ontological deficiencies. If human beings are oriented 
by nature to truth, goodness, and beauty – if indeed human beings are 
made for gift – then a consumerist culture at its worst offers only simu-
lacra of the realities that truly satisfy the deepest desires of the human 
heart. Though we intuitively frame consumerism as a secularism to be 
resisted, I want to suggest that consumerism is in fact a more like a 
sacralization to be resisted – a deleterious form of idolatry. Of course, 
the terms “secularization” and “sacralization” are fluid, and it is there-
fore useful to examine two terms central to this chapter – “idolatry” 
and “false” or “deviated transcendence” – and highlight some sacral, 
liturgical dimensions of consumer culture. 
 One of the central questions guiding Aquinas’s treatment of idolatry – 
a treatment that is deeply Augustinian – is whether it should be con-
sidered as a species of superstition or unbelief. 13 This question is perti-
nent here because it reorients the question of idolatry, shifting it from 
what we believe to what we love, that is, what we worship, the object 
of what we desire as ultimate. For Aquinas, idolatry is a species of 
superstition. Superstition involves the distortion of worship, and this 
is done chiefly when “divine worship is given to whom it should not 
be given.” Aquinas contrasts the act of superstition with the virtue of 
“religion,” which is marked by worshipping “the most high uncreated 
God alone.” 14 Hence, Aquinas writes, “superstition is a vice contrary 
to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than 
true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it 
ought not, or in a manner it ought not.” 15 Aquinas also distinguishes 
superstition and heresy; heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to 
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those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas, 16 whereas 
superstition is a confession of unbelief, not by false opinion, but by false 
external worship. 17 
 False or deviated transcendence, then, can be the object of idola-
trous worship. According to Girard, the “true guide of human beings 
is not abstract reason but ritual.” 18 For Girard, human society is “the 
work of the mimetic process that is disciplined by ritual.” 19 In fact, 
religion gave birth to culture. And primitive religion, in Girard’s writ-
ings, often restored peace through controlled, ritualized violence. As 
scandal, chaos, and disorder are part of living cultures, the religious 
response that emerged was the practice of killing or expelling a victim 
– a response that restores order and solidarity among the community. 
This religious act of sacrifice reveals a double transference: a shift of 
blame to the victim and yet a paradoxical divinization of the victim, 
who gets credit for peace and prosperity. Girard argues that this reli-
gion is illusory, protecting humans from violence and chaos by means 
of sacrificial rituals. That said, although this system is grounded in an 
illusion, “its action in the world is real to the extent that idolatry, or false 
transcendence, commands obedience.” 20 
 Connected to this false transcendence, for Girard, are the powers 
and principalities, the thrones and dominions that perpetuate forms of 
false worship. 21 As we look ahead, this connection is relevant insofar 
as consumerism can be considered a kind of imperialism operative in 
the world – a global phenomenon marked, in the words of Doran, by 
an “objectless disposition” and “unlimited forcible expansion” not of 
capitalism as such, but of the kind of unbridled capitalism scrutinized 
by Catholic social teaching. 22 Furthermore, this kind of consumerist 
imperialism is perpetuated through an array of cultural liturgies, as 
we suggest below. Girard writes, “On the one hand, these powers are 
“worldly” and “dwell concretely in the world.” On the other hand, they 
are “celestial,” meaning that there is a “religious dimension,” the “pres-
tige that thrones and sovereigns enjoy among humankind and that is 
always perceived as a little supernatural.” Girard notes a paradox at 
work in “organizations or institutions that are very real but rooted in a 
transcendence that is unreal and yet effective.” Human language “does 
not command the necessary resources to express the power of bringing 
people together that false transcendence possesses in the real, material 
world, in spite of its false and imaginary nature.” 23 
 Having situated idolatry within a sacralized sphere 24 – within the 
context of worshiping a false sacred – I end this section by highlighting 
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a related dimension of the work of James K. A. Smith. Smith offers an 
account of the human person as a liturgical, desiring animal and illu-
minates the variety of ways we participate in the liturgies of consump-
tion, aiding us in identifying some often ignored, “sacral” dimensions 
of consumer culture. He argues that we are first liturgical, desiring ani-
mals. Human identity is shaped by what we love – and what we love 
as ultimate, what orients our being-in-the-world and gives us a sense 
of meaning and purpose. 25 Smith expresses then in a different way 
Lonergan’s and Marion’s emphasis on the priority of love, highlighted 
in chapter 5. The desiring person intends the world in the mode of love, 
embodied in the structure of desire or longing. 26 
 To say that to be human is to love, for Smith, is to suggest that this 
vision of the good life becomes “inscribed or infused in our habits and 
dispositions and thus woven into our precognitive (second) nature.” 27 
(Recall Lonergan’s account of habits and grace in chapter 4.) These habits 
are formed by the texts – the compelling visions in stories, songs, films, 
and the like – that shape our desires. They are inscribed in us through 
bodily practices and rituals that train us to desire certain ends. 28 Smith 
identifies the desire-forming practices of what he calls our “cultural 
liturgies.” His aim is not to be simply anti-cultural, but “to raise the 
stakes of what it means for us to be immersed in such cultural rituals.” 29 
Hence, he frames the “consuming transcendence” of “mall religion” not 
merely in terms of opposing worldviews, but as a set of liturgical prac-
tices with a holistic, affective, embodied anthropology. 30 The mall, he 
argues, is an intensification of consumerism with marketing as its evan-
gelism, with advertising in all its emerging varieties as its outreach. 
The rituals and practices of the mall capture our imaginations through 
the senses. The embodiments of a sexy ideal are offered in the icon-like 
mannequins in the windows, offering a variety of hagiographies about 
what constitutes the good life. The mall communicates its “transcen-
dent” story “not through tracts and didactic lectures but through visual 
embodiments of the happy life” – functioning as an effective liturgy and 
pedagogy of desire, forming us into “a certain kind of people without 
ever realizing it.” 31 Mindful of the injustice at the heart of consumer cul-
ture noted above, however, this kind of liturgical training for the good 
life also requires massive consumption of natural resources, along with 
the use of cheap and exploitive labour. The liturgy of consumption cre-
ates “a desire for a way of life that is destructive of creation itself” and 
a way of life “that we can’t feasibly extend to others, creating a system 
of privilege and exploitation.” 32 
190 The Givenness of Desire
 Consumerism as a “Sacralization to Be Dropped” 
 To this point I have highlighted Catholic social teaching’s diagnosis 
of the problems associated with superdevelopment and the challenge 
of reorienting our desires to truth, beauty, communion, and justice. 
Smith’s analysis helped us to situate the challenge of consumerism 
within a sacralized context by pointing out the often unnoticed, quasi-
liturgical practices at work in our civilization of consumption. Even if 
Smith’s case is at times exaggerated, he is still correct in illuminating the 
primacy of desire in human experience and directing our attention to 
what’s at stake in our participation in the quasi-liturgies of our culture. 
In sum, he helped us frame consumerism as a false sacralization to be 
resisted. 
 I turn once again to Lonergan, Doran, and Girard, all of whom give 
due attention to the primacy of desire in human experience in com-
plementary ways, as I have noted in previous chapters. Earlier in 
the book, I offered a more comprehensive account of the relationship 
between Lonergan’s natural desire for meaning, truth, and goodness 
and Girard’s positive account of mimetic desire – both of which can 
contribute in a more explanatory way to John Paul II’s challenge to cre-
ate lifestyles that prioritize the quest for truth, beauty, goodness, and 
communion with others for the sake of the common good. I limit my 
analysis here to Lonergan’s account of sacralization and secularization, 
and am especially mindful of Doran’s development of this account in 
light of the work of Girard. 
 In “Sacralization and Secularization,” Lonergan challenges us to dis-
tinguish between (1) a sacralization to be dropped and (2) a sacraliza-
tion to be fostered; (3) a secularization to be welcomed and (4) a secu-
larization to be resisted. 33 
 Mindful of my treatment of the  ressourcement challenge in chapters 1 
and 2, it is relevant to note that Lonergan centres his reflection on the 
positions of M.D. Chenu and J. Daniélou. 34 Though I have treated  res-
sourcement thinkers as a unity in this book so far, this Chenu-Daniélou 
conversation illuminates the fact that the movement was not a mono-
lith. In fact, one can detect different theological emphases between 
the Jesuits at Lyon-Fourvière and the Dominicans at Le Saulchoir. As 
Boersma notes, “The difference between the Jesuit and the Dominican 
theologians may point, on the one hand, to a predilection among the 
Fourvière Jesuits for the Greek Fathers with their neoplatonic inclina-
tions; and, on the other hand, to a more pronounced interest among the 
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Dominicans from Le Saulchoir in St. Thomas with his Aristotelian back-
ground.” 35 Hence de Lubac’s emphasis on the upward natural desire for 
a supernatural end had a sacramental focus; Chenu’s downward focus 
on the Incarnation prioritized this-worldly historical realities. Chenu 
and the Saulchoir theologians tended to emphasize the relative auton-
omy of the created order and the need to adapt to modern culture. Their 
subtle differences, however, were “emphatically theological in nature,” 
and cannot be reduced to a conservative-progressive divide. 36 
 In Lonergan’s reading, Chenu is a “disciple of Aquinas,” who “broke 
with the symbolic thought of his medieval predecessors and contempo-
raries” – one who “acknowledged the reality of human nature and the 
legitimacy of its proper sphere of activity.” 37 In terms of the sacralization 
to be dropped and a secularization to be welcomed, Chenu welcomes 
“the contemporary movement of secularization and laicization insofar 
as it compels us through the force of circumstance to get out of the men-
tal and institutional complex of Christendom.” 38 Chenu suggests the 
abandonment of outdated institutions and some of the heavy-handed 
procedures of the past. Christians are called more to be missionaries of 
the gospel and less to concern themselves with the Church as protector 
of a civilization. 
 In terms of a new sacralization to be fostered, Lonergan (via Chenu) 
refers to the Council’s call for Christians to discern the signs of the times. 
Such signs include the humanization and socialization of the human 
person, peace among nations, and the emerging signs of conscience that 
can be discerned globally. These signs reveal “the autonomous process 
proper to the world,” but they are also “toothing stones,” a new kind of 
“ praeparatio evangelica ” pointing to ultimate human destiny. 39 The aim 
is not to “bring about a sociological Christianization of the masses, or 
to set up a Christian world alongside the world, but to be in the world 
without being of it, to respect and promote its genuine values without 
being confined to them and without identifying Christian values with 
them.” 40 
 To find a secularization to be dropped, Lonergan turns to Jean Danié-
lou. While Daniélou abandoned the dream of a Christendom, he still 
advocated for some kind of “sociological preparation for the faith, 
certain zones where sacred and religious elements are preserved so 
that the faith of the poor is not left without social and cultural founda-
tions.” 41 Although it is clear that Lonergan is not fully satisfied with 
Daniélou’s analysis, he still assigns significant value to his contribution. 
All human beings need symbols and, in reality, most do not transcend 
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the limitations of symbolic thinking. Hence, in a developed culture, 
Lonergan notes, “religion has to be pluralist: it needs some measure of 
symbolization for all; it needs only a limited measure for the few that 
get beyond symbolic thinking; and it needs a bounteous dose for the 
many that do not.” 42 
 If one is sympathetic with Lonergan’s account of the relationship 
between the natural and supernatural, as I am, then one is inclined 
to sympathize with the broad lines of Chenu’s vision. Still, it is plau-
sible to question whether such a seamless vision of the supernatural 
elevation of the autonomous secular process allows due attention to 
the false sacralizations at work in human cultures, including the pro-
cesses of global consumerism. Lonergan reveals a great deal of wisdom, 
I believe, by including Daniélou’s voice. In fact, the analysis of cultural, 
consumerist quasi-liturgies that form and deform our desires on such a 
ubiquitous scale heightens our attention to the wisdom of Daniélou. In 
many ways, the liturgies of consumption do what Daniélou suggested: 
they create through the predominance of images and symbols, narra-
tives and practices a kind of “sociological preparation” for allegiance to 
the priority of having over being, to unfulfilling kinds of false transcen-
dence. In the contemporary era, human identity and the human desire 
for meaning, truth, goodness, beauty, and love are massively shaped 
by the forces of global consumerism. As Kelton Cobb observes, we now 
live in an era in which “whole generations in the West have had their 
basic conceptions of the world formed by popular culture”: 
 Television, movies, a multitude of genres of music, amusement parks, fast 
food franchises, action heroes, Dr. Seuss, Disney, Dream Works, comic 
books, advertising, soundtracks, mail order catalogs, video games, con-
temporary fi ction, sports, celebrities, journalism, wall art and science 
fi ctions have been the primary sources of the myths, parables, iconogra-
phies, hagiographies, devils and heroes that orient them in life. From this 
plethora of material whole generations are now attempting through  bri-
colage to invest life with meaning and fi nd a justifi cation for their lives.” 43 
 As the sociologist Juliet Schor has argued in her book  Born to Buy: 
The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture , “Children have 
become conduits from the consumer marketplace into the household, 
the link between advertisers and the family purse.” 44 As eager and 
often naive “repositories of consumer knowledge and awareness,” 
young people are “the first adopters and avid users of many of the new 
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technologies” and are often “the household members with the most 
passionate consumer desires,” sometimes almost mystically united to 
brands and consumer products. Marketing is, she argues, “fundamen-
tally altering the experience of childhood. Corporations have infiltrated 
the core activities and institutions of childhood, with virtually no resis-
tance from government or parents.” “We have become,” she adds, “a 
nation that places a lower priority on teaching its children how to thrive 
socially, intellectually, even spiritually, than it does on training them to 
consume. The long-term consequences of this development are omi-
nous.” 45 With the diminishing relevance of the gatekeeper model of par-
enting, advertisers have secured parent-free access to children through 
a variety of media. 46 If this diagnosis is correct, then Daniléou’s call for a 
“sociological preparation for the faith,” for “certain zones where sacred 
and religious elements are preserved so that the faith of the poor is 
not left without social and cultural foundations,” seems indispensable 
for nurturing the desire for God. How are we to open up more enrich-
ing, challenging, and holy ways of living in the modern world – ways 
rooted not in the images and practices of global consumerism but in the 
symbols, images, and practices of a Christian form of life? 
 In this same essay, Lonergan contrasts the “religion of the infrastruc-
ture” with the “religion of the superstructure.” In terms of “religious 
infrastructure,” he has in mind primitive religion and primitive soci-
eties. Citing Toynbee, he writes that the “pith of primitive religion is 
not belief but action, and the test of conformity is not assent to a creed 
but participation in ritual performances.” 47 There is a certain immedi-
acy associated with the religion of the infrastructure: “it will fixate on 
sacred objects; it will acknowledge sacred places, it will hallow sacred 
times, it will celebrate sacred rites; it will conform to the dictum that the 
metaphysics of primitive man are expressed in the sedate and rhyth-
mic movements we associate with dance.” 48 According to Lonergan, the 
religions of the infrastructure, more than any other, are “open to pal-
pable idolatry and superstition, to orgiastic and cruel cults, even to the 
ritual murder of human sacrifice,” a problem explored painstakingly 
by Girard. 49 As Doran notes, “the probability is far greater that religions 
of the infrastructure will misplace, misidentify, misconstrue precisely 
what constitutes ‘the substance of the sacred.’” 50 What if the substance 
of the sacred is dictated by the sacralization of consumerism – with its 
lived emphasis on surface image and the vacuity of signs, the trumpet-
ing of exchange value over use value, the detachment of the signifier 
and the signified, and the compulsion to desire “desire itself”? Not to 
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mention its corresponding rituals and practices, along the lines indi-
cated by Smith above? What if our experience of mystery, our images of 
human flourishing, and the orientation of our fundamental desires are 
shaped primarily by the quasi-liturgies of consumerism? Can we not, in 
some analogous way, call this a religion of the infrastructure, prone to 
a kind of idolatry similar to that which we find in pagan religious tradi-
tions? Does not consumerism as a kind of religion of the infrastructure 
offer several sacrifices inimical to the human good: the flourishing of 
the targeted children, the flourishing of the underdeveloped who pro-
duce the products for our conspicuous consumption, even the flourish-
ing of the “superdeveloped,” the flourishing of our natural ecology? 
 Girard on Consumerism and Mimetic Desire 
 Robert Doran interprets Lonergan’s account of a sacralization to be 
dropped and a secularization to be dropped by creatively integrating the 
thought of Girard, especially the French literary scholar’s illumination of 
deviated transcendence, as we defined above. For Doran, Girard is most 
helpful in identifying a sacralization to be resisted: “any and all attempts 
to employ the name or word of God or any other sacral trappings to jus-
tify persecution, exclusion, and scapegoating.” 51 In light of Doran’s inter-
pretation of and elaboration on Lonergan’s essay, I will integrate several 
Girardian themes to bolster the case that consumerism can be interpreted 
under certain conditions as a sacralization to be resisted. 
 First, Girard’s expansive account of mimetic desire offers an explana-
tory term with which to illuminate Smith’s account of the lure of the 
liturgies of consumerism. “The goods and aspects of human flourishing 
painted by these alluring pictures of the good life,” Smith writes, “begin 
to seep into the fiber of our being and thus govern and shape our deci-
sions, actions, and habits. Thus we become certain kinds of people; we 
begin to emulate, mimic, mirror the particular vision that we desire.” 52 
Smith’s account of emulation and mimicry can be explained in a more 
painstaking way by Girard’s account of mimetic desire. Recall from 
chapters 6 and 7 that mimetic desire names the all-pervasive other-
mediated and socially mediated nature of our desire. 
 In an audio interview with Robert Harrison of Stanford University, 
Girard captures the kind of mimetic desire at the heart of consumer 
culture: “Why have all girls been baring their navels for the last five 
years? Obviously, they didn’t all think by themselves that it would be 
nice to show one’s navel or maybe one is too hot in the navel and one 
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must do something about this. We see the mimetic nature of their desire 
the day that fashion collapses. Suddenly it becomes very old-fashioned 
to show one’s navel and no one will show it anymore. And it will be 
because of other people, just as now it is because of other people that 
they show it.” 53 
 Second, this fundamental reality of mimetic desire creates the condi-
tions, especially in a consumer society, for the proliferation of rivalry 
and envy among neighbours. Girard’s interpretation of the romantic 
lie brings this to light in a crystallized way. We noted in a previous 
chapter Girard’s critique of the romantic or autonomous lie. Influenced 
as we are by expressive, indeed excessive, individualism, we presume 
that we are autonomous individuals, that we are individual agents who 
create our own desires and do not desire the goods of our neighbours. 
Does the tenth commandment of the Decalogue forbid an uncommon 
and perverse human desire – the coveting of our neighbour’s posses-
sions, his wife, and his goods? For Girard, the Decalogue prohibits a 
widespread common desire – a desire in fact constitutive of all human 
beings – acquisitive mimetic desire. To understand the inadequacy of 
the expressive individualist account of desire, all one has to do is “to 
watch two children or two adults who quarrel over some trifle.” 54 In 
other words, “we tend to desire what our neighbor has or what our 
neighbor desires.” 55 If this is true, then “rivalry exists at the very heart of 
human social relations. The rivalry, if not thwarted, would permanently 
endanger the harmony and even the survival of all human communi-
ties.” 56 In sum, we are not, for Girard, “autonomous individuals,” but 
rather “interdividuals” whose desires are socially mediated through a 
complex web of internal and external mediations. The following pas-
sage captures the essence of Girard’s (not uncontroversial) claim: 
 We do not each have our own desire, one really our own. The essence of 
desire is to have no essential goal. Truly to desire, we must have recourse 
to people about us; we have to borrow their desires. This borrowing occurs 
quite often without either the loaner or the borrower being aware of it. It is 
not only desire that one borrows from those whom one takes for models; 
it is a mass of behaviors, attitudes, things learned, prejudices, preferences, 
etc. And at the heart of these things the loan that places us most deeply 
into debt – the other’s desire – occurs often unawares. The only culture 
really ours is not that into which we are born; it is the culture whose mod-
els we imitate at the age when our power of mimetic assimilation is the 
greatest. 57 
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 And Girard explicitly acknowledges a sacramental-liturgical element of 
the workings of mimetic desire in consumer culture. “If you really look 
at advertising,” Girard says, “they are never trying to demonstrate to 
you that the object they are selling is the best possible from an objective 
point of view, from the point of view of scientific objectivity.” 58 Rather, 
they are “always trying to prove to you that this object is desired and 
possessed by the people we would like to be.” Coca-Cola, for example, 
offers the setting of “a very beautiful beach, marvelous sun, a bunch of 
people sun tanning in an ideal way, while always between the ages of 
16 and 22.” He adds, “And therefore there is something sacramental; 
religion is always mixed up these things. If you consume Coca-Cola, 
maybe if you consume a lot of it, you will become a little bit like these 
people you would like to be. It’s like a kind of Eucharist that will turn 
you into the person you really admire.” 
 Third, Girard recognizes that the “consumption society has simply 
become a system of  exchange of signs , rather than an exchange of actual 
objects.” 59 As a by-product of superdevelopment, there are also cultural 
currents Girard identifies in which consumption as “a sign of wealth is 
no longer appealing,” precipitating a mimetically inspired “minimalist” 
or “anorexic” trend. 60 Drawing on the work of Thomas Frank, Girard 
notes a phenomenon known as the commodification of discontent. 
Practitioners of this trend of non-consumption perceive themselves as 
representing the height of cultural refinement. Hence, this conspicuous 
non-consumption is only “superficially discontinuous with the attitude 
it supersedes” and “at a deeper level, it is a mimetic escalation of the 
same process.” 61 
 Fourth, if Girard is correct in his reading of the Decalogue, then in his 
view the heart of neo-paganism is a subversion of the wisdom of the com-
mandments in terms of desire, part of a widespread neo-Nietzschean her-
itage. Girard interprets contemporary secularization in sacralized terms, 
noting the centrality of sacrifice in contemporary paganism. Neo-pagan-
ism treats Judeo-Christian morality as an expression of intolerable vio-
lence, and longs for its complete abolition. Girard identifies neo-paganism 
with ubiquitous consumerism and the multiplication of desires. “Neopa-
ganism locates happiness,” he writes, “in the unlimited satisfaction of 
desires, which means the suppression of all prohibitions.” 62 Yet in one 
respect the multiplication of available products weakens certain mimetic 
rivalries: “By making the same objects, the same commodities available 
to everybody, modern society has reduced the opportunity for conflict 
and rivalry.” 63 Wide availability leads to undesirability. Still, Girard 
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warns that this weakening of mimetic desire does not end the sacrificial 
solution so widespread in human culture. “Like all sacrificial solutions,” 
he writes, “the consumer society needs to reinvent itself periodically. It 
needs to dispose of more and more commodities in order to survive.” 64 
An inflation of objects leads to the kind of “throw-away,” superdevel-
oped cultures critiqued by John Paul II, where objects “go directly from 
the shop to the bin, with hardly a stop in between.” 65 “One buys objects 
with one hand,” Girard says, “and throws them away with the other – in 
a world where half of the human population goes hungry.” 66 Also atten-
tive to the ecological consequences discussed above, Girard points out a 
new kind of sacrificial performance: “the market society is devouring the 
earth’s resources, just as primitive society devoured its victims.” 67 
 Finally, for Girard, the dissatisfaction generated in a consumer society 
can also turn us into mystics “in the sense that it shows us that objects 
will never satisfy our desires.” 68 While it can certainly “lead us to all 
sorts of useless activities,” it can also “bring us back to an awareness of 
our need for something entirely different. Something that the consumer 
society cannot provide.” 69 As the searching Augustine reflected in Book 
4 of the  Confessions : “There is no rest where you seek for it. Seek for what 
you seek, but it is not where you are looking for it. You seek the happy 
life in the region of death; it is not there. How can there be a happy life 
where there is not even life?” 70 
 Consumerist Idolatry and the Distortion 
of the Scale of Values 
 I have situated the phenomenon of consumerism in the realm of “reli-
gion” and the “sacred” and have explored consumerism as a kind of 
idolatry – as a sacralization to be dropped. Although Lonergan did 
not often use the term “idolatry,” when he did he captured its heart, 
namely, the orientation of our desires, our ultimate loves, to something 
other than God: “for only idolatry would bestow” this state of being 
in love on anyone or anything of this world.” 71 To raise the question of 
idolatry, then, is not to deny that we love and we worship, but that our 
ultimate concerns, our deepest desires, our highest loves are attached 
to the wrong things. If Lonergan and Marion are correct (see chapter 5) 
– that in religious matters “love precedes knowledge” – in what ways 
do our distorted loves shape the way we desire, understand, judge, and 
deliberate? What if we fall in love with the wrong object: how does 
this affect the “new organization” of our world? 72 If the proper human 
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response to “transcendent mystery is adoration,” what happens when 
we adore pseudo-mysteries, false gods, alluring idols with the same 
kind of adoration? 73 And what implications might this have for social 
and cultural life? 
 Though I suggested in passing that consumerism operates as a kind 
of global imperialism, I also recognize that the term “imperialism,” as 
Doran notes, is a largely descriptive term. 74 A more adequate explana-
tory framework consists in the “integral scale of values” and a “set of 
distinct but related and currently distorted dialectics of the subject, cul-
ture, and community,” noted earlier in the book. 75 Accordingly, I reiter-
ate Robert Doran’s interpretation of this scale: 
 From above, then, religious values condition the possibility of personal 
integrity; personal integrity conditions the possibility of authentic cultural 
values; at the refl exive level of culture, such integrity will promote an 
authentic superstructural collaboration that assumes responsibility for the 
integrity not only of scientifi c and scholarly disciplines, but even of every-
day culture; cultural integrity at both levels conditions the possibility of a 
just social order; and the just social order conditions the possibility of the 
equitable distribution of vital goods. Conversely, problems in the effective 
and recurrent distribution of vital goods can be met only by a reversal of 
distortions in the social order; the proportions of the needed reversal are 
set by the scope and range of the real or potential maldistribution; the 
social change demands a transformation at the everyday level of culture 
proportionate to the dimensions of the social problem; this transformation 
frequently depends on refl exive theoretical and scientifi c developments at 
the superstructural level; new cultural values at both levels call for pro-
portionate changes at the level of personal integrity; and these depend 
for their emergence, sustenance, and consistency on the religious develop-
ment of the person. 76 
 While Doran explains the mutual conditioning among the different 
dimensions of the scale, the point I want to emphasize here is Doran’s 
claim that “personal integrity and authentic religion” lie in a sense 
“beyond both the infrastructure and the superstructure,” but that they 
are “essential to the integral functioning” of a just society. 77 In light of 
the argument of this chapter, I suggest that consumerism as a form of 
idolatry – as quasi-liturgical worship of false transcendence – is not 
simply part of everyday cultural meanings and values that distort the 
social infrastructure, but is first and foremost an inauthentic ordering 
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of religious love, leading to a distortion of the scale, as it were, from the 
beginning. This communicates perhaps a more explanatory way of inte-
grating the theme of the “ordering of loves” so prominent in the tradi-
tion. The ordering of loves, after all, is what distinguishes Augustine’s 
two cities in the  City of God . The heavenly city and the earthly city in 
Augustine’s rendition are not two geographical regions, but are divided 
by contradictory, ultimate loves: the heavenly city is directed to love 
of God and neighbour, the earthly city to a disordered love of self. The 
heavenly city is identified with the common good, humility, and rest, 
the earthly city with arrogant love of domination, pride, and restless-
ness. The heavenly city is imbued with truth, goodness, and justice, the 
earthly city with greed, envy, and corruption. 78 
 If this kind of “secularized sacred” distorts the scale of values, then 
the “sacralization to be fostered will be found precisely in the dynamics 
of the redemptive process that is a constitutive feature of the structure 
of history, that is, in the Law of the Cross.” The Law of the Cross – the 
response of self-giving religious love – “characterizes all genuine and 
sustained fidelity to the integral scale of values.” 79 Instead of the dis-
torted anthropology and soteriology of consumer liturgies, a genuine 
anthropological differentiation of consciousness prioritizes “being over 
having,” while a genuine soteriological differentiation of consciousness 
brings to light the “mysterious intelligibility” of “the pattern of suffer-
ing servanthood assumed by the world-transcendent measure of integ-
rity become human flesh.” 80 
 I return in this light to Lonergan’s appropriation of Daniélou and 
the importance of creating particular communal spaces for the com-
munication of and formation in the “really sacred.” If indeed we are 
moved by the “transcendent” stories, the visual embodiments, the 
liturgies and pedagogies of desire of consumer culture without even 
realizing it, then it seems fitting to suggest that a bounteous dose of 
symbols is needed as an antidote, illuminating a massive cultural need 
for a self-appropriation of one’s empirical consciousness. This kind of 
affective or psychic conversion effects an ongoing habitual conversion 
to phantasms, restoring the “natural” orientation of the human spirit, 
which is, as I argued in chapter 4, intimately connected to the desire for 
God. It involves understanding the manner in which symbols express 
and influence our affective state and challenges us to the nurturing 
of redemptive symbols to elevate and heal the culture. 81 This kind of 
conversion is a “transformation of desire.” 82 We are, of course, mov-
ing beyond the scope of this chapter into the realm of ecclesiology and 
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liturgical theology. That is, we are raising questions about the need for 
the church and the church’s liturgy to be “sacred zones” for the ongoing 
ritualized encounter with authentic mystery, stories of transcendence, 
visions of the good life, marked by the priority of the gift and the self-
giving communion of persons. 
 Conclusion 
 Walker Percy treated this theme of disordered loves masterfully in his 
novel  Love in the Ruins . The lukewarm Catholic protagonist, Dr Tom 
More, a distant descendent of St Thomas More, exclaims: “I believe in 
God and the whole business, but I love women best, music and science 
next, whiskey next, God fourth, and my fellow man hardly at all.” 83 In 
other words, it is not a matter of whether we love, but what or whom 
we love, and how we order our loves. Tom More in Percy’s narrative 
did not doubt God’s existence, so it was not first a matter of belief or 
unbelief. It was a question of what he loved ultimately. This disordering 
created the conditions for the malaise and anxiety that marked his life 
in the novel and, I suggest, marks our lives within the contemporary 
horizon of consumerist superdevelopment. Could it be that our fun-
damental choice – at least in the affluent West – is not between theism 
and atheism, but between the God of Life and the idolatry of deviated 
transcendence? Akin to Girard’s suggestion that a consumer society can 
turn us into mystics, perhaps it is fitting to end with Lonergan’s reflec-
tion on the importance of the right ordering our religious loves: “Unless 
religion is totally directed to what is good, to genuine love of one’s 
neighbor and to a self-denial that is subordinated to a fuller goodness 
in oneself, then the cult of God that is terrifying can slip over into the 
demonic, into an exultant destructiveness of oneself and of others.” 84 
 Conclusion 
 This book constructed a multifaceted language for the human desire for 
God in the context of concrete subjectivity. The problematic situation 
to which the inquiry responded was the work of Henri de Lubac and 
the widespread reconsideration of his writings on the supernatural that 
continues to emerge in contemporary theological discourse. 
 Lonergan’s voice proved to be especially fruitful because, over the 
course of his career, he engaged in a highly serious way the writings of 
Thomas on nature and grace expressed in metaphysical categories and 
then later integrated the insights of phenomenology and existentialism – 
concrete subjectivity, meaning, religious experience, the gift- character of 
love. This tension between metaphysics and phenomenology, broadly 
conceived, has shaped the theological debates between the neo- scholastics 
and the  ressourcement Lubacians from the Danielou- Garrigou-Lagrange 
exchange in the late 1940s down through the Schindler-Long debate at 
the dawn of the third millennium. 
 What particular value, then, did the hermeneutical lens of concrete 
subjectivity offer to ongoing conversations about the human desire to 
see God? What is the significance of this inquiry? 
 1.  Concrete subjectivity bears the resources for responding to the Lubacian 
emphasis on concrete and historical nature, on the one hand, and the neo-
Thomist call to develop a substantive and ontologically dense understanding 
of nature, on the other hand. In contrast to many neo-Thomists, Lonergan 
marginalized the theorem of pure nature, but he consistently affirmed 
a rich and dynamic account of nature, expressed in both his retrieval of 
Aquinas and in his transposition of Thomistic wisdom in his account 
of emergent probability. Lonergan affirmed what might be called the 
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“relative autonomy” of the created order. 1 His treatment of vertical final-
ity and obediential potency over and against a static-essentialist vision 
of the relationship between the natural and supernatural orders offered 
a reconciling voice to the debate. He also possesses the resources, more 
than any other interlocutor in this book, for constructive integration 
of the natural sciences. His substantive account of “nature” both pre-
serves the gratuity of the supernatural order and creates the conditions 
for multidisciplinary and interreligious deliberation about social life. It 
emphasizes that what binds us together is the transcultural call to be 
attentive, intelligent, rational, responsible, and loving. What unites us 
is the common vocation to be faithful to the eros of self-transcendence 
and to root out bias wherever it surfaces. The normative scale of values 
constitutes, as I suggested in these pages, a contemporary reformula-
tion of the nature-grace synthesis with greater attention to the social 
and historical dimensions of human subjectivity. 
 Furthermore, this shift from intellectual desire to a more holistic 
account of the concrete subject paved the way for integrating Loner-
gan’s emphasis on the centrality of love into this conversation on the 
human desire for God. Establishing a phenomenological transposition 
of a metaphysical framework enabled me to articulate the Trinitarian 
roots (sanctifying grace and the habit of charity) of the human desire 
for the supernatural and to enrich this vision with the interpenetration 
of agapic and erotic subjectivity. 
 One particular defence of “pure nature,” for example, suggests that 
the value of this theological term lies in its nurturing of epistemological 
humility. Bernard Mulcahey argues that Christian believers cannot fully 
grasp any given domain of created reality, and that includes theologians, 
bishops, and even popes who transgress their competence on particu-
lar secular topics. 2 Pure nature reminds theologians that the world and 
human beings are intelligible to natural reason, and hence to recognize 
both the “limits of their competence” in other disciplines and “the right-
ful autonomy of secular learning.” Lonergan’s dynamic account of the 
eros of self-transcendence and its relation to building the human good 
affirms the general thrust of this claim. His vision of nature as emergent 
probability requires, for example, a multidisciplinary exploration. That 
said, in light of Lonergan’s account of concrete subjectivity, the claim 
about “the rightful autonomy of secular learning” also requires atten-
tion to the way individual, dramatic, group, and general bias may affect 
the eros of the mind at work in these other authorities on knowledge. 
Holding too dearly to “pure nature” may in fact falsely convey a kind of 
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purity in secular learning and diminish the challenge of rooting out bias 
that is required of every kind of disciplinary inquiry. In the words of the 
Lubacian thinker David Schindler, the fundamental question is whether 
in one’s abstraction – the seeking of common ground, the appeal to 
reason, the methodological differentiation of academic disciplines – one 
remains “dynamically open” in one’s interior disposition and in the 
content of one’s inquiry “to the realities of grace and sin that are always 
already operative in the one historical order.” 3 
 2.  Concrete subjectivity provides the space for theological reflection on the 
human desire for God with heightened attention to the contemporary cultural 
milieu. In recent years, Benedict XVI has identified a particular narrow-
ing of reason in the West, and has urged us to rethink an account of rea-
son that is open to God. 4 He has challenged the modern cultural super-
structure in the west (philosophy, science, scholarship, art, literature, 
etc.) to nurture meaningful spaces for the question of God to emerge 
as a constitutive question of the human condition. 5 Benedict referred to 
the question of God as the crucial question: “faith and culture are per-
manently connected heights, a manifestation of that  desiderium naturale 
vivendi Deum that is present in every person.” 6 Benedict resituates the 
natural desire to see God within the horizon of the question of God: 
“The question of the Truth and the Absolute – the question of God – is 
not an abstract investigation divorced from daily life, but is the  crucial 
question on which the discovery of the meaning of the world and life 
depends.” 7 Understanding the human quest as a search for truth and 
goodness enlarges the scope of reason and diminishes the temptation 
of making scientific discoveries a means of power and enslavement. 
This narrowing of reason identifies real scientific knowing with the 
interplay of mathematical and empirical elements. This methodologi-
cal approach, then, by its very nature “excludes the question of God, 
making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question.” 8 
 In this light, Lonergan’s shifts of emphasis from an intellectual proof 
of God’s existence in the tradition of natural theology to the variety of 
ways  the question of God arises in the intellectual, moral, and religious 
dimensions of our concrete lives is highly relevant. That is, he empha-
sized the human call to self-transcendence and the way acts of self-
transcendence enable the  question of God to emerge in one’s conscious 
horizon. The plausibility of even asking “the question of God” cannot 
be taken for granted in the secular age. 
 With his emphasis on concreteness, Lonergan was concerned with 
the difference the natural human desire for God and natural human 
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knowledge of God made to human living and human society. For 
Lonergan, this natural desire means that the reality of God resides 
within the horizon of human knowing and doing – that “religion rep-
resents a fundamental dimension in human living.” 9 He, of course, 
understood that many contemporary wayfarers regard religion as little 
more than a comforting illusion. This dimension of the modern social 
imaginary communicated, for him, a “profound ignorance” of the “real 
nature” of the human person, and may have “a gravely distorting effect 
on the conduct of human affairs.” 10 Thus, the question of the human 
desire for God is intrinsically connected to the human quest for self-
transcendence. Although the intellectual, the moral, and the religious 
are quite distinct, they are not disparate. They are, in fact, three distinct 
phases in the unfolding of the human spirit. Lonergan was avoiding an 
extrinsicist account of nature and grace – expressed here, of course, in a 
new idiom. The acceptance or rejection of the call to self-transcendence, 
which includes openness to the question of God, has real consequences 
for concrete living. 
 In addition to the cultural issue of the narrowing of reason, the chal-
lenge of consumerism also distorts the natural desire for God.  Concrete 
subjectivity resists the tendency of equating too easily the natural desire for 
being with the natural desire for God without at the same time acknowledg-
ing the widespread distortion of desire . As I argued in the previous chap-
ter, consumerism is a distorted form of worship, a misdirected love of 
false and deviated transcendence. The quest for the “good life” in West-
ern culture, and its predilection for having over being, have created 
the conditions for widespread experience of alienation and the loss of 
meaning. Concrete subjectivity recognizes the dominance of “herme-
neutic interiority,” that is, of the communal and cultural formation of 
our concrete being-in-the-world. Human receptivity has to do with the 
meanings and values that are handed on to us in our communities. 11 
Concrete subjectivity challenges us to account for our vulnerability 
to the all-pervasive cultural moods that shape the very meaning and 
meaningfulness (or lack thereof) of the question of God as shaped by 
our communal history. 
 3.  Concrete subjectivity attends to the impact of other-mediated, mimetic 
desire in the human life-world, and provides fertile soil for thinking theologi-
cally about the role of the religious experience of the saints and concrete models 
of holiness in eliciting the human desire for God. The rise of academic theol-
ogy in the Middles Ages tended to separate the study of the saints from 
theological discourse. 12 The work of Hans Urs von Balthasar resists 
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this division, representing the most pioneering contemporary attempt 
to employ the saints as a theological resource in Catholic systematic 
theology. 13 Lawrence Cunningham has suggested that the “theological 
foundations of sainthood have received short shrift in the theological 
tradition partially, one suspects, because of the perceived notion that 
the saints are part of the ‘popular’ tradition of Catholicism rather than 
central to the Catholic doctrinal tradition.” 14 With particular attention 
to the ongoing Girard-Lonergan conversation, this book integrated the 
categories of natural desire, incarnate meaning, and mimetic desire, 
and further developed an explanatory account of holiness, with par-
ticular attention to sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. These two 
supernatural realities help explain in a systematic-theological way the 
kind of humble love and non-violent resistance so integral to Girard’s 
account of Christian sanctity. With the development of these theologi-
cal categories, the book explored in a theologically fruitful way two 
examples of the human desire for God in a secular age – Thérèse of 
Lisieux and Etty Hillesum. 
 I began this book with the example of the ancient seeker Augustine and 
his grasp of the true longing and all-too-common distortion of human 
desire; it is perhaps fitting to end with a contemporary wayfarer, Dor-
othy Day, who mused as she found herself stopping by St. Joseph’s 
Church in New York at six a.m. after a long night out: “Sooner or later 
I would have to pause in the mad rush of living and remember my first 
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